

HANSARD 4 February 1983 → Written Answers (Commons) → PRIME MINISTER

Atomic Test (Release of Information)

HC Deb 04 February 1983 vol 36 c209W

Mr. Frank Allaun asked the Prime Minister why the report to the Cabinet, and minutes thereof, on the result of the British atomic test at Monte Bello in 1952 has not been released under the 30-year rule; and if she will now authorise the release of this material.

The Prime Minister Papers relating to this test have been retained with the approval of the Lord Chancellor under the proviso to section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958. The material is still sensitive and it is not yet appropriate to release it.

Ref.:

Prem 11/563

C 503799

SECRETDR. PENNEY'S DRAFT BROADCAST

Recorded: 30 October 1952

13

When the planning began, a lot of thought was given to deciding which type of explosion would provide information and experience of the greatest value. Purely scientific measurements are most easily made when the weapon is placed at the top of a high tower, but there were other weighty considerations. The Civil Defence authorities in this country badly needed more data about atomic explosions and, accordingly, the test was planned to get as much novel information as possible for Civil Defence. The decision was made to explode the weapon in a ship moored near land, thus simulating an explosion in a port. The ship was to be equipped as a scientific transmitting station, sending out by radio a vast number of measurements about the nuclear explosion before the equipment was destroyed. More scientific apparatus was to be placed on the land to record other phenomena such as blast, heat and radioactivity.

Many comments have been made about the shape of the cloud, and how different it was from the 'mushroom' cloud with the very high stem shown in most American pictures of atomic explosions. The great weight of the mud and water in the cloud at Monte Bello kept it from rising very far.

The experiment went according to plan and the scientific records were complete. We know what happened and we can give to the Civil Defence authorities an accurate description of their problems. As you know, the explosion threw water, mud and rock into the air and on to the nearby land, causing severe radioactive contamination, and that it was necessary to measure this contamination and to recover records in the contaminated area.

1	2	cms	The National Archives	ins	1	2
Ref.: Prem 11/563 C 503799						

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

TO: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN AUSTRALIA

(SENT: 01.00 hours, 22nd October 1952)

CYPHER
IMMEDIATE

No. 848

SECRET

HURRICANE

*Prime Minister
Winston Churchill's
Statement to House
of Commons, 23 October
1952.*

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of Prime Minister's statement. Begins.

The object of the test was to investigate the effects of an atomic explosion in a harbour. The weapon was accordingly placed in H.M.S. "PLYM", a frigate of 1,450 tons, which was anchored in the Monte Bello Islands.

2. Conditions were favourable and care was taken to wait for southerly winds so as to avoid the possibility of any significant concentration of radio-active particles spreading over the Australian mainland.
3. Specimen structures of importance to civil defence and to the Armed Services were erected at various distances. Instruments were set up to record the effect of contamination, blast, heat flash, gamma ray flash and other factors of interest.
4. The weapon was exploded in the morning of the 3rd October.
5. Thousands of tons of water and of mud and rock from the sea bottom were thrown many thousands of feet into the air and a high tidal wave was caused. The effects of blast and radio-active contamination extended over a wide area. H.M.S. "PLYM" was vaporised except for some red hot fragments which were scattered over one of the Islands and started fires in the dry vegetation.

1	2	cms	The National Archives	ins	1	2
Ref.:		Prem 11/560		C503799		

TOP SECRET

*B. F. with the H. H.
11/3*

R 5th March, 1953.

Dear Montague-Browne,

With reference to my letter of 4th March about the article in the Daily Telegraph on searching of ships for atomic bombs, my attention has now been called to the fact that Sir Norman Brook sent a minute to the Prime Minister on this subject dated 28th March 1952, enclosing a copy of a paper headed "Clandestine Use of Atomic Weapons".

I had not realised when I wrote to you that Sir Norman Brook had been handling this question. I suggest that in the circumstances it would be better not to put my letter to the Prime Minister until Brook has had an opportunity of considering the matter further in the light of recent developments. I will let you know as soon as I can whether or not we would like the letter to go forward.

Yours sincerely,

Montague-Browne
Sir N. Brook's minute now submitted

*A m B
10/3*

A.A.D. Montague-Browne, Esq., D.F.C.

TOP SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

You have drawn the attention of the Ministry of Defence to an article about Atom Bomb Checks by American Coast Guards, which appeared in the Daily Telegraph on February 27. *— flag A*

flag B I made a submission to you on this subject on March 28, 1952, when I sent you a copy of a minute which I had sent to Mr. Attlee in July, 1951. I said then that I believed the risk that an enemy might explode an atomic bomb in a ship in one of our ports was one against which we could not at present take any effective precautions. Recently, however, we have heard that the Belgians and the Dutch - as well as the Americans - are claiming to have introduced precautions of some sort. We are now finding out more about these; and, when this information is available, I will make a further submission to you on the question whether we should review our own position again.

*Duplicate noted
and returned.*

OK 4/5.

123
MARCH 9, 1953
R.

Norman Brooks.

EXTRACT FROM "THE DAILY TELEGRAPH"

27/2/53.

page 7:

ATOM BOMB CHECKS 1,500 Ships Searched

Rear-Adml. Richmond, Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard Service, revealed to-day that Coast Guards were regularly searching vessels approaching ports such as New York for atomic bombs, other types of explosive and bacteriological weapons. More than 1,500 ships had been searched during the past two years.

At present 30-40 vessels are being searched monthly, most of them from Iron Curtain countries. "So far," added the Admiral, "we have found nothing that resembled explosive."

G.R.

TOP SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

*Take All of
Claude's time use of weapon
Part 2*

At the "Apex" Committee on Wednesday you asked me to let you have a report on the risk that an enemy might explode an atomic bomb in a ship in one of our ports and on difficulties of countering this risk. *below*

I attach the report on this question which I submitted to Mr. Attlee in July, 1951. As you will see, the Chiefs of Staff had then asked me to arrange to have the matter further considered by the civil Departments concerned; but I had come to the conclusion that matters could not be advanced further by this means and I suggested that Mr. Attlee should discuss the problem with the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence. This he was unable to do before the Election. Since then I have taken no further initiative to raise the matter since I myself believe that this is a risk against which we cannot at present take, in normal times, any effective precautions.

Norman Brook.

R. 28th March, 1952

Clandestine Use of Atomic Weapons

The Chiefs of Staff have been considering the possibility that the enemy might open the next war with an atomic attack on London on the model of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour - without warning and before any formal declaration of hostilities. The most effective method of making such an attack would be to drop an atomic bomb from a military aircraft. If the control and reporting system were fully manned and alert in a period of tension, there would be some chance that hostile aircraft approaching this country could be intercepted and driven off. At any rate, there are no special measures, outside the normal measures of air defence, which we could take in peace-time to guard against this type of attack.

2. It is, however, possible that the enemy might use other means of surprise attack with atomic weapons. A clandestine attack could be made in either of the following ways:-

(i) A complete atomic bomb could be concealed in the hold of a merchant ship coming from the Soviet Union or a satellite country to a port in the United Kingdom:

(ii) An atomic bomb might be broken down into a number of parts and introduced into this country in about fifty small packages of moderate weight. None of these packages could be detected by instruments as containing anything dangerous or explosive, and even visual inspection of the contents of the packages would not make identification certain. These packages could be introduced either as ordinary merchandise from Soviet ships, or possibly as diplomatic freight. The bomb could subsequently be assembled in any premises with the sort of equipment usual in a small garage, provided that a small team of skilled fitters was available to do the job.

3. It is difficult at any time to take practical and effective measures against this type of danger. It would be less difficult, of course, in a period immediately before the outbreak of a war which the

public had come to regard as inevitable - the period which we call the Precautionary Stage. But the enemy might prefer to make such a move in a period of comparative calm, when he might assume that less attention would be paid to security risks of this kind.

The only possible measures which could be taken to reduce this risk are control of shipping and closer supervision of diplomatic freight.

Control of Shipping

4. For effective security against this risk all suspect shipping would have to be kept at least 5,000 yards distant from any worth-while target - e.g. from London, Liverpool, Glasgow, Southampton, Bristol and Hull. There are in theory four possible ways of doing this:-

(a) Trade Attraction. All Russian ships carrying bulk cargoes on Government account could be diverted to minor ports, by specifying that that was where the consignee desired delivery of the goods. This would be regarded as discrimination against Russian ships and would invite inconvenient reprisals. It would be expensive. And it would not cover Russian ships carrying cargo ordered on private account.

(b) Diversion by Order. The Admiralty could take power to regulate the movements of all vessels, as they had in the war under Defence Regulation 43. They could then divert all ships of any kind suspected of carrying Russian cargo to minor ports. By a liberal use of this power, the diversion could be made effective; but the discrimination against Russian and satellite shipping would be so blatant that it might well end in the complete stoppage of all trade with the Iron Curtain countries.

(c) Off-shore Discharge. All Russian, Polish and Roumanian ships approaching the major ports could be instructed to discharge their cargoes at off-shore anchorages. This method would lead to retaliation. Moreover, it is hardly practicable; for grain is the main commodity carried by Russian ships and we do not possess the floating elevators which would be necessary for off-shore discharge of grain cargoes at all major ports.

(d) Port and Transit Control. In the Precautionary Stage we propose to introduce a scheme by which all ships approaching the country would be met and escorted to determined ports and anchorages. Under this control

suspect ships could be diverted away from the main target areas; but the control would only be practicable in the Precautionary Stage when there would be a much reduced volume of United Kingdom and Allied shipping, and enemy shipping would be likely to keep as far away as possible from United Kingdom ports. It would be impracticable to bring this system into force at a time of normal trade with Russia and satellite countries.

5. Any action of the kind discussed in the preceding paragraph would involve some element of open discrimination against the Soviet Union; it would invite retaliation in some form; and it would probably have serious political and economic consequences. Moreover, even if those consequences could be accepted, this type of action could not completely exclude the risk. For even, if it were possible by this type of action to keep all Russian, Polish and Roumanian ships away from the main target areas, the enemy could, if he were so minded, defeat all these precautions by chartering an innocent-looking ship of another flag and using it for a clandestine atomic attack or by placing his bomb in crated merchandise consigned to this country by a neutral vessel normally trading to a U.K. port.

Supervision of Diplomatic Freight

6. If the enemy wished to introduce an atomic bomb into this country in parts and assemble them here, as suggested in paragraph 2(ii) above, the parts would probably be consigned to the Soviet Embassy in London as diplomatic freight. A foreign Embassy has an absolute right to receive by diplomatic courier correspondence which is exempt from any examination by the territorial authorities. It has a further right to import certain things without paying Customs duty, but the territorial authorities are entitled to verify that diplomatic freight and diplomatic bags are not being abused as a method of importing things which are neither documents nor things which the Embassy has a right to import without paying Customs duty. It would therefore be permissible for us to open the Soviet diplomatic bag or to examine diplomatic freight for this purpose, provided that this were done in the presence of a member of the Soviet Embassy and that no attempt was made to open seals on any documents in envelopes. There would, however, be serious risks in doing so. We should invite immediate reprisals, which might involve widespread interference with our arrangements for supplying our own diplomatic missions behind the Iron

Curtain. In an exchange of discourtesies like this, we should normally have more to lose than to gain. Action of this kind could not fail to increase international tension. These disadvantages are certain. The gain, on the other hand, would be problematical; for we understand that, even if packages were opened and subjected to expert inspection, it could not be established with certainty that the contents were not parts of an atomic bomb.

7. Although it may be impracticable to prevent the importation of parts of an atomic bomb into this country, whether as diplomatic freight or otherwise, it is just possible that we might be able to detect the preparation for its assembly. This process would probably be directed and controlled through the Soviet Embassy in London, and it might be possible by increased vigilance to detect suspicious movements of vehicles to and from the Embassy. That is a point which we should like to examine further. It is of course by no means certain that we should be able by this means to secure, until it was too late, any positive indication that a bomb was being assembled here.

Conclusion

8. It is clear that it would be practicable for the Russians to introduce an atomic bomb into this country by clandestine methods. It is equally clear that there is no certain method of preventing them from doing so. The most that we could secure, by taking any of the measures discussed in this minute, would be to make their task more difficult. And the adoption of any of these measures would involve considerable risks and serious political and economic difficulties. This being so, it seems legitimate to ask whether the Russians would think it worth while to adopt these elaborate clandestine methods of launching an atomic attack when a military aircraft might do the job more effectively for them. An even larger question is whether the Russians would think it was worth their while to invite immediate retaliation by atomic attack against themselves so long as the advantage in numbers of atomic bombs remains overwhelmingly with the Americans.

9. The Chiefs of Staff have already arranged for an official working party (comprising representatives of the interested civil Departments) to consider means of guarding against this risk, and the possible

counter-measures discussed in this minute were all suggested in the report of this working party. The Chiefs of Staff have now asked me to arrange for further Departmental examination of these proposals and for any necessary submission to Ministers. For the reasons indicated in this minute I am very doubtful whether the increased security which might be obtained by adopting any of these measures could outweigh the very serious disadvantages, political and economic, which would be entailed. I have therefore thought it desirable to seek your guidance in the matter before asking Departments to undertake the work of assessing those disadvantages. You may like to discuss the problem with the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence; but I suggest that, for the moment, it would be preferable that it should not be discussed in any wider group of Ministers.

(Signed) NORMAN BROCK

12th July, 1951

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Ref.:		Prem 11/565		C503799		

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Prime Minister

As requested in your letter I attach a note showing the principal events leading up to the dropping of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

I think this account answers all the questions you asked - if you want further details I will try and to unearth them.

CHERWELL

28th January, 1953.

Mr Little has sent the
originals to Miss Kindee
to keep with the book pps.
B. 29/1.

SECRET

4

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB. 1945

On March 21, 1944, Sir John Anderson suggested that the Tube Alloys programme should be mentioned to the Service Ministers and to the other Ministers concerned but you minuted "I do not agree". Sir John Anderson was perturbed by your decision and I am fairly certain that in the spring of 1945 he made another attempt to persuade you to bring the matter to Cabinet and that I supported him. No papers bearing on this can however be found. In the event, it seems, the question was never discussed at Cabinet or in the Defence Committee.

2. In September 1944 Sir John Anderson minuted you annexing a report which included the information that a bomb (equivalent to 20,000 - 30,000 tons of T.N.T.) would "almost certainly" be ready by August 1945. On my return from America in November 1944, I gave you further details about the work they were doing and said that it was hoped a bomb would be ready some time the following summer.

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3. In the winter of 1944/5 so far as I recollect I mentioned to you that some doubts had arisen about the initiation of the detonation of the plutonium bomb but that there was no anxiety about the U.235 bomb. But I well remember telling you in the spring of 1945 that I thought the successful explosion of a bomb was 90 to 95% certain but that the people actually working on it considered it 99% certain.

4. In April 1945 Lord Wilson telegraphed to Sir John Anderson that the Americans proposed to make a full scale test in the desert in July and to drop a bomb on the Japanese in August and I told you about this.

5. On May 2 Sir John Anderson minuted you that he had had some details from Lord Wilson of the American intentions for the operational use of the bomb and requested your approval of his proposal that Lord Wilson should tell General Marshall that you had been consulted and would want to be kept informed. On May 21 you agreed that Wilson should speak to Marshall "in a tactful and friendly way";

SECRET

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you thought that the machinery for reaching a joint decision would emerge from this talk. Discussions took place and it was agreed that in order to fulfil the Quebec Agreement, the concurrence of H.M.G. should be recorded at a meeting of the Combined Policy Committee.

6. On June 29 Sir John Anderson reminded you of the American intentions about which I had told you. In this minute he requested authority to instruct our representatives to give the concurrence of H.M.G. in the decision to use the bomb against the Japanese. You initialled this minute on July 1. On July 4 Lord Wilson formally gave the concurrence at a meeting of the C.P.C.

7. A minute from Ricketts to Sir John Anderson's Secretary dated July 2 reads:

"Lord Cherwell told me this evening that in initialling the Chancellor's minute of the 29th June on the Operational Use of T.A., the Prime Minister had wished it to be understood that he would expect to discuss this matter with President Truman at TERMINAL, though he was anxious that nothing should be done by us to retard the use of the T.A. weapon."

SECRET

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8. A report on discussions at Potsdam records:

"Mr. Stimson described the results of the recent test to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister confirmed the agreement given by Field Marshal Wilson at a meeting of the Combined Policy Committee to the use of the weapon within the next few weeks against the Japanese."

9. It must be remembered that until the actual explosion in the desert in New Mexico there was great scepticism in military and political circles about the efficacy of the new form of explosive. Certainly nobody thought it would end the war. And in fact it is doubtful to what extent it did so. As you know it has now been proved that the Japanese asked the Russians to convey an offer accepting the Potsdam terms of unconditional surrender to the Allies on August 2. The Russians did not pass on this message. Had they done so, it might well be that the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki would not have been dropped. Whether the fact that they were dropped did more than induce the Japanese to make a direct offer of surrender to the Americans is therefore questionable.

SECRET

8
END

10. In retrospect it seems unlikely that the atom bombardment could have forced the Japanese to surrender before the planned invasion of the Home Islands in November 1945, had they not - unknown to us - been already at the point of collapse. For the Americans could not have dropped much more than two bombs a month for the rest of the year. But of course the Japanese did not know this.

28th January, 1953

~~TOP~~ SECRET—GUARD

Misc./P (54) 29

27th August, 1954

DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY
ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT

SCIENTIFIC DATA OBTAINED AT
OPERATION HURRICANE

TOP SECRET SECTION OF DIRECTOR'S REPORT

Issued by
Ministry of Defence,
London, S.W. 1.

27th August, 1954

~~TOP~~ SECRET—GUARD

DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY

ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT

(formerly of Ministry of Supply)

OPERATION HURRICANE—THE DOSE-RATE CONTOURS OF THE
RESIDUAL RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION

(Monte Bello, Australia—October, 1952)

TOP SECRET SECTION OF DIRECTOR'S REPORT

Summary

This section of the report on scientific data obtained at Operation Hurricane gives the dose-rate contours of the residual radioactive contamination resulting from the detonation of the first British atomic weapon which was exploded under conditions representing a ship-borne attack on a port.

The main body of the report, issued separately, covers other aspects of the contamination, as well as the air blast, gamma flash, thermal radiation and underwater shock.

The results given in the present section imply that the residual contamination due to the deposited fission products provides a major contribution to the effect of a weapon detonated in this way.

Approximate estimates suggest that the area in which a median lethal dose of 400 roentgens of gamma radiation could be received may be increased by the contamination by a factor of from two to four.

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET-GUARD

7.8. The Dose-rate Contours of the Residual Radioactive Contamination

7.8.1. The numbering of this sub-section follows that of the main report in which Section 7 deals with the residual contamination.

7.8.2. From an examination of the day-to-day radiological survey measurements at various points on the different islands and by the application of the gross decay relationship given in section 7.3. of the main report, a set of dose-rate contours at 1 hour after the explosion has been constructed as shown in Fig. 7.2. These are shown dotted over the sea areas because although the dose-rates in these regions would be the same as over land immediately after fall-out, the rapid dispersal of the contamination (see section 7.6.) in the sea would soon reduce the radiation dose-rate there to a negligible quantity. The dose-rate on a ship in these regions would, of course, be the same as on land until decontamination had been effected.

It will be seen that the radiation dose-rate from deposited fission products would be very high on land near an atomic explosion in a ship.

7.8.3. The areas within the various contours and the equivalent radii are given below in comparison with radii derived from figures given in "The Effects of Atomic Weapons" for an airburst at 100 feet over land.

TABLE 7.4.

Monte Bello Weapon			Low Air-burst over Land.
Dose-rate (r/hr) at one hour	Area (Sq. Miles)	Equivalent Radius (Feet)	Radius (Feet)
10,000	0.62	2,350	—
6,000	0.85	2,750	200
3,000	1.12	3,150	450
2,000	1.62	3,800	525
1,000	2.65	4,850	575
600	3.2	5,350	600
400	3.7	5,750	700
200	4.8	6,500	850

Since the lethal distance from the gamma flash, corresponding to the median lethal dose of 400r, is about 4,000 feet in both cases, it appears that whereas for a low airburst over land the lethal area is not likely to be appreciably increased by the contamination, the area due to a weapon exploded under the same conditions as at Monte Bello is likely to be considerably increased by the activity of the deposited fission products.

Approximate estimates suggest that the area in which a median lethal dose of gamma radiation is received may be increased by the contamination by a factor of 2 to 4 depending on the degree of screening afforded by buildings and the time taken to get out of the contaminated area.

7.8.4. A comparison may also be made between the contamination from the Monte Bello weapon and that which would be expected on land areas near to an underwater atomic explosion such as the one at Bikini Test Baker. The areas within the 50 r/hr contour from the Monte Bello weapon and from the underwater burst at Bikini Test Baker, for which estimates are given in Figure 8.101 of "The Effects of Atomic Weapons," are about equal. Within the 400 r/hr contour the area from the Monte Bello weapon is larger by a factor of about 3 to 4 while for regions of heavier contamination the areas within its contours will apparently be even greater relative to the Bikini weapon.

7.8.5. A further radiological survey was made in November, 1953, 405 days after the explosion and the islands were found to be still highly radio-active.

Although in some places drifting sand had materially reduced the gamma radiation compared with that in places where the soil surface was held by vegetation, in general, despite some 16 inches of rain and a cyclone in early 1953, there was no apparent evidence of the accelerated decay of fission products due to weathering.

From readings taken at certain points immediately after the trial and again in November, 1953, the decay factor from 1 hour to 405 days after the explosion was found to be 200,000. By applying this factor to the various readings obtained during this second survey, gamma dose-rate contours at one hour were constructed. These were found to be very similar in shape and size to those shown in Fig. 7.2. which are based on observations made during the period immediately following the explosion.

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET-GUARD

AWRE-T1/54 (27 AUGUST 1954)**DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY****ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT**
(formerly of Ministry of Supply)**SCIENTIFIC DATA OBTAINED AT OPERATION HURRICANE**
(Monte Bello Islands, Australia—October, 1952)**DIRECTOR'S REPORT****Summary**

This report summarises data on the external effects observed in the trial of the first British atomic weapon, which was exploded under conditions representing a ship-borne attack on a port.

Briefly, it may be said, in reviewing the general physical effects, that the air blast and gamma flash effects were comparable with those for an air burst but the thermal radiation effects were very much less. The underwater shock was much less than that from an underwater burst. Some general information on the residual contamination is given, but data on the extent of the contamination forms the subject of a separate section not generally available.

The report describes the conditions under which the trial was conducted, the measurements made of the physical phenomena produced by the detonation of the weapon, and gives brief descriptions of the results.

Information is given concerning the behaviour of Anderson shelters, of certain reinforced concrete cubicles, of a model ship's funnel, of a compartment representing a deckhouse, and various aircraft components. Data are also given for the penetration of gamma rays into slit trenches, concrete cubicles and Anderson shelters; for the effect of thermal radiation on various materials and service equipment; and for possible contamination (and decontamination) of personnel, equipment, ships and food stored in open dumps. The report also includes the results of experiments on the absorption of radio-elements by biological systems.

Regraded by A.W.R.E. on10-1-61.....

From SECRET ATOMIC GUARD

to SECRET

PART I.—BASIC SCIENTIFIC MEASUREMENTS

1. TRIAL CONDITIONS AND EFFECTS OBSERVED

1.1. The trial was carried out in the Monte Bello Islands lying about 50 miles off the North-West coast of Australia. Fig. 1.1 gives a map of these islands.

The weapon was exploded at 9.30 a.m., local time, on October 2nd, 1952, in H.M.S. *Plym*, a frigate lying in a shallow channel about 400 yards offshore from Trimouille Island. The depth of water was about 40 feet and the weapon centre was 9 feet below the water line. The conditions of burst were thus representative of a ship-borne attack on a port.

1.2. The variation of wind speed and direction was obtained by means of a balloon ascent one hour after burst. At ground level the wind was southerly (175°) with a speed of 17 knots. With increasing height it changed through east to become slightly north of east (77°) at 6,000 feet with a speed of 10 knots. The change in direction with height was then rapidly reversed so that the wind was practically due south again at 8,000 feet after which it changed gradually to about south-westerly at 12,000 feet and finally to westerly at 20,000 feet. Thus the wind was coming straight off the mainland up to about 8,000 feet after which it blew roughly parallel with the coast line. The speed decreased steadily up to 7,000 feet and then increased. The results are displayed in Fig. 1.1.

1.3. The main control centre was located at H 1 at the southern end of Hermite Island. Other key points, including A4, N4 and T4, will be referred to in connection with particular measurements.

1.4. The basic scientific measurements which were made covered all aspects which might be likely to have practical importance. One aspect, namely the thermal radiation, proved to have definitely less importance than it would have had in the case of an airburst bomb. The blast, gamma radiation and the contamination were the major effects at the observation sites.

The various measurements are considered in detail in the following pages, starting with a description of the phenomena (fireball and water column) photographed from a distance immediately after the detonation of the bomb. The air blast, gamma flash, thermal radiation and contamination which reached the observation posts are then considered, followed by the underwater shock, the crater in the sea-bed and the earth movements observed on the shore of Trimouille Island.




FIG. II.

2. THE FIREBALL

2.1. The fireball was first observed from H 1 with the Kerr cell camera at 23 microseconds after explosion as a faint segment of a circle on the water-line of *Plym*. Within the accuracy of measurement, it appeared to emerge from the point on the ship's side nearest to the weapon. Fig. 2.1 shows successive stages in the development of the fireball up to 3.75 milliseconds. In the early frames the bows of the target vessel can be seen silhouetted against a portion of the fireball which has emerged from the far side of the ship.

2.2. Fig. 2.2 shows the variation with time of the height of the top of the fireball above the weapon centre. The time t is taken from the arrival of the first gamma radiations. In the early stages, for about the first 1.5 milliseconds, this height varies approximately as $t^{\frac{1}{2}}$, after which it follows a more familiar $t^{\frac{2}{3}}$ relation up to about 100 milliseconds. The increase in the diameter of the fireball on the water-line is given graphically in Fig. 2.3. The variation of the diameter of the best fitting hemisphere fits this very closely although the fireball was far from hemispherical.

2.3. At 41 milliseconds the shock wave commenced to separate from the fireball which at this stage had a height of 650 feet and a diameter at the water-line of 1,000 feet. It eventually attained a diameter of 1,700 feet in 0.6 seconds after which it started to contract leaving an inner ball 1,400 feet in diameter after about $3\frac{1}{2}$ seconds. The configuration of the fireball at these later stages was rather indistinct owing to the water present in the ball itself and thrown up from the water surface by the underwater shock. As the fireball contracted it left a dark zone which appeared brown in the colour photographs. This darkening extended into the zone behind the shock wave up to a diameter of 2,500 feet and was presumably due to the presence of nitrogen dioxide.

(Annotations to PDF report version are in this typeface)




Fig. 2.1, Kerr cell camera photos of fireball emerging from far side of ship. Bows of ship are visible as dark region in the lower right of the fireball.

FIG.2.2 RISE OF FIRE BALL.





FIG.2-3 EXPANSION OF FIREBALL ON WATERLINE.



3. THE WATER COLUMN AND THE CLOUD

3.1. Water was first observed from H 1 emerging from the fireball at an angle of about 60° to the horizontal after about 0.1 seconds, Fig. 3.1. Its height above sea level at this stage was about 650 feet and its vertical component of velocity was 350 feet per second.





Fig. 3.1, 0.1 second. Water plumes begin to emerge from fireball due to the underwater bubble expansion and cratering.



Plumes of mixed water and black ferrous oxide from ship emerge at 1-2 seconds from the top of the fireball, which cools and fades out at 3 seconds. Last photo is at 5 seconds after burst.

3.2. Fall-out commenced from the side of the column but this did not spread far and was probably not important. The more widespread fall-out came from the bottom of the cloud and fell with an initial velocity of about 65 feet per second reaching sea-level at about 1 minute after the explosion, Figs. 3.8 and 3.9, and continuing for at least ten minutes.

3.4. The top of the cloud rose very roughly as $t^{\frac{1}{3}}$ having a height of about 1,800 feet at 1 second and reaching a maximum of about 10,000 feet at 4 minutes, when its ascent was substantially stopped by a temperature inversion.








Fig. 3.8, cloud and base surge at 30 seconds. Water is falling from base of mushroom cloud at 65 ft/sec, and reached surface at 1 minute after burst. The base surge fallout was trivial.



Fig. 3.10, cloud and base surge at 2.5 minutes after burst.





5. THE GAMMA FLASH

5.1. The initial radiation or gamma flash comes from the rising cloud of radioactive material following the explosion and is normally confined to the first minute although most of it is received in the first second or two.

5.2. The Variation of Gamma Flash Dose with Distance

The total initial dose from the gamma flash was recorded by film badges placed at over 100 sites. Because of the unexpected magnitude and extent of the fall-out, many of the films were in the fall-out area and were completely blacked-out. Altogether 35 reliable readings of the dose were obtained; for these there was either a free optical path or only slight shielding, there was no fall-out and dosage readings were given by at least two different emulsions. From these readings the dosage/distance curve down shown in Fig. 5.1 was obtained. The general accuracy of the results is considered to be of the order ± 10 to 15 per cent. The shielding effect of relatively small contours (of the order 30–60 ft.) was quite considerable; thus sites at equal distances from the explosion received doses that differed by as much as 50 per cent. depending on whether they were on a reverse or forward slope.

The doses received at given distances were about one half of those given for an air-burst weapon in the United States publication "The Effects of Atomic Weapons," but the distance at which a given dose was received was only about 10 per cent. less. Thus the ship's structure and the small depth of water above the point of burst did not have a very important effect in reducing the intensity of the initial radiation.

Measurements of the variations of dose-rate with time were made using flux-meters. Because of the long time-constant of the pen recorders used with them, the recording of the gamma flash was not entirely satisfactory but it was possible to use the results to obtain the approximate percentage of the total dose as a function of time. The results so obtained are given below in Table 5.1:—

TABLE 5.1

<i>Time after Detonation (seconds)</i>	<i>Percentage of total Dose Received</i>
0.05	30
0.10	50
1.0	80
10	90
60	99.5

These results indicate that about 80 per cent. of the total dose was received within one second of detonation, which is higher than the value of 50 per cent. generally quoted for an air-burst bomb and which suggests that only a small reduction in the dose received would be likely to result from evasive action.

The reason why a greater proportion of the total dose was received in the first second than would have been the case with an air-burst bomb is that the water and crater debris thrown up gave some protection after one second.




FIG. 5-1

6. THERMAL RADIATION

6.1. A number of methods were used to measure the total heat radiated by the fireball and the variation with time of the intensity of the radiation in a number of wave-bands and at various distances from the explosion.

6.2. *Variation of Intensity with Time*

6.2.1. Photo-electric recorders and photographic film recorders were used to obtain the variation of total intensity with time at 35,530 feet (H 1) and 10,630 feet (A4), the sun being used for calibration purposes. From these records, the curves shown in Fig. 6.1 have been derived showing the variation of the thermal radiation flux per unit area, at any distance D metres in an absorption free atmosphere. Also from these records the variation of temperature of the radiating surface has been estimated and the results are shown in Fig. 6.2.

6.2.2. Similar observations were made by staff of the Royal Naval Scientific Service using a photographic film intensity recorder designed at the Admiralty Material Laboratory. With this instrument the variation of intensity with time in nine wave-bands was recorded. The estimated total thermal output over the first 15 milliseconds of the flash in the range of wave-lengths, 3,850 Å° to 6,650 Å°, given by this method is in good agreement with the value derived from the experiments described in the previous paragraph.

6.2.3. The experiments referred to above show that the thermal radiation occurred in two peaks with a minimum at 25 milliseconds. In the first peak the energy was concentrated mainly in the shorter wave-lengths, whereas during the second peak it was mainly in the longer wave-length region. The total duration was quite short, about 1 second compared with 3 seconds normally quoted for an air-burst, suggesting that the water spout very quickly shielded the observation points from the heat radiation.

6.3. *Integrated Radiation Output*

6.3.1. The total thermal radiation output is of direct interest since, in general, when the rate of energy is high, as it is in the case of an atomic weapon, the damage produced is dependent largely on the total quantity of energy received.

6.3.2. In one experiment the total energy at three distances was determined from the rise in temperature of blackened copper discs exposed to the flash. From the three results obtained allowance was made for atmospheric absorption and a value of 0.36×10^{12} calories was derived for the point source of energy which at any distance in free space would give the same thermal intensity as the fireball. The absorption coefficient of 0.075 Km.^{-1} corresponded to a visibility of 33 miles.

6.3.3. A second method, used by staff of the Royal Naval Scientific Service, was developed at the Admiralty Materials Laboratory and employed a photo-chemical actinometer. This method gave results for the total energy output per sq. cm. at 3,220 and 4,630 feet in two wave-bands in the violet and near ultra-violet which for reasons which are not yet understood, were considerably higher than those given by the other methods.

6.3.4. A number of indicators designed by the Army Operational Research Group of the War Office incorporated heat sensitive papers drawn across slits. It was intended to use these to record the variation of intensity with time but, owing to the somewhat inadequate time resolution possible with the apparatus the shape of the intensity time curve obtained is probably not significant. However, the value deduced from the records for the *total* energy received at 4,024 feet was $1.52 \text{ calories/cm.}^2$, which is the same as would be given at that distance in free space by a point source of 0.31×10^{12} calories.


6.3.5. From the observations given by the photo-electric recorders, it is estimated that the total thermal energy released to the atmosphere in the first peak, i.e., in the first twenty milliseconds, was 0.05×10^{12} calories with an equal amount lost into the ground. The total of 0.1×10^{12} calories in the first twenty milliseconds may be compared with a release in free air of 0.36×10^{12} calories for the whole flash. The overall thermal energy released from an air-burst nominal weapon is generally quoted as 6.7×10^{12} calories.

1 kt = 10^{12} cal.

SECRET-GUARD

0.36×10^{12} calories is 1.8% of 20 kt yield

FIG 6.1
TOTAL THERMAL ENERGY FLUX AS A FUNCTION
OF TIME.




10⁶

RADIATING TEMPERATURE,

FIG. 6.2

NOT AVERAGE FIREBALL TEMPERATURE!

ESTIMATED FIREBALL TEMPERATURE.



TEMPERATURE
°K

7. THE RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

7.1. Residual contamination is due to the deposition of radioactive fission products, and lasts indefinitely with decreasing intensity.

7.2. Dose Rates during the First Twelve Hours

Continuous records of the dose-rate r of the gamma radiation from the residual contamination were made at various distances during the period 0 to 10 hours from the time of detonation. These were intended to give the time of arrival of the fall-out and the value of the exponent x in the relation $\frac{dr}{dt} = k t^{-x}$ over the first twelve hours.

For this purpose fluxmeters of the ionisation chamber variety were used in conjunction with pen recorders. These were protected from the effects of the blast by hermetically sealed steel casings about $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch thick and were shielded from the sun by a horizontal steel plate also $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch thick. It was estimated that the observed radiation doses should be increased by 25 per cent. to allow for the effect of these shields.

The time of arrival of the fall-out in the downwind areas of widespread contamination was approximately proportional to the distance from the explosion and a period of about one minute was required for each 2,500 feet of distance. This time clearly depends on the meteorological conditions obtaining at the time and is thus not of general application.

The measured decay factor varied over the fall-out area but a mean value of 1.45 is considered reasonable, *i.e.*, the dose-rate over the first twelve hours is proportional to $t^{-1.45}$.


7.3. The Gross Decay Law up to 1000 Hours

For later periods up to about 1000 hours dose-rate measurements were made by survey teams using portable monitors. The decay factors obtained at various points over the area were in fair agreement. Since the terrain varied from rock to very sandy areas, this agreement suggests that wind erosion was slight, perhaps merely resulting in a continual shifting of the active dust over a restricted region, and implies that the loss in intensity was due almost entirely to radioactive decay.

The dose-rate values have all been reduced to correspond to a dose of 1 roentgen per hour at H+1 (one hour after the explosion) and the results are shown graphically in Fig. 7.1. It will be seen that the results for the later times do not fit well with the results up to 12 hours and there is quite a pronounced scatter in the period 100 to 200 hours. It has been found from experiments carried out since the trial that, as the survey meters are dependent on the photon energies of the gamma rays up to 0.2 Mev, the readings given by these monitors are likely to have been too high by a factor of as much as 1.3. By reducing the dose-rates by a factor 1.3 the curve II of Fig. 7.1 is obtained which joins up with the curve for times up to 10 hours very much better.

It may be seen that:—

- (i) for the first twelve hours the dose-rate varied at $t^{-1.45}$;
- (ii) between 12 and 100 hours, the decay was proportional to about $t^{-1.2}$;
- (iii) between 100 and 200 hours, the decay was slower and very roughly as $t^{-1.0}$;
- (iv) after 200 hours, it was rapid and varied as $t^{-1.6}$.



**FIG.7.1 DECAY OF GAMMA DOSE-RATE
WITH TIME.**

(NORMALISED TO UNITY AT H+1 HOUR)

7.4. Variation of Dose-rate with Height

Observations were made of the variation of the dose-rate with height above the ground in order to determine whether the dose-rate on the ground could be inferred from measurements made by an aircraft flying at a known height above the ground.

The important practical conclusion was reached that dose-rates obtained by helicopter survey at a given height above a location will enable an estimate to be made of the dose-rate on the ground. The observed dose-rate at 100 feet should be multiplied by 2.5 and that at 500 feet by 10 to obtain the ground level value.

7.5. Air-borne Contamination and the Inhalation Hazard

Measurements were made to obtain data on the inhalation hazard in areas of heavy contamination and to assess its magnitude relative to the external hazard from the deposited activity. Samples of air were taken during the period following the explosion by means of standard air samplers working on the vacuum cleaner principle. The air was drawn through a filter paper of which the activity was subsequently measured, and the total volume passed was recorded on an anemometer. The air sampled was that which would have been inhaled by a man walking alone. In three cases it was arranged for dust to be stirred up by walking up and down in windward of the sampler while the sampling was in progress. A visible dust deposit was collected on the filter papers in consequence.

The results of these measurements are given in Table 7.1.

TABLE 7.1

Date	Time	Activity of Sample Microcuries/c.c.	Dose rate of Contamination on Ground Milliroentgens/hr.	Ratio of Activity to Dose rate
D-day	H+1 hour	1.9×10^{-4}	1.7×10^7	1.1×10^{-11}
D-day	H+2 hours	1.9×10^{-4}	6.1×10^6	3.1×10^{-11}
D-day	H+3 hours	5.7×10^{-6}	3.5×10^6	1.6×10^{-12}
D-day	H+4 hours	5.1×10^{-6}	2.3×10^6	2.2×10^{-12}
D+8		6.2×10^{-10}	1	6×10^{-10}
D+8		6.8×10^{-9}	8	8.5×10^{-10}
D+8		7.2×10^{-8} *	65	1.1×10^{-9}
D+8		8.8×10^{-8} *	15	5.9×10^{-9}
D+8		1.7×10^{-7} *	200	8.6×10^{-10}
D+8		3.1×10^{-9}	7.2	4.3×10^{-10}
D+16		1.36×10^{-8}	25	5.4×10^{-10}
D+16		1.14×10^{-8}	15	7.6×10^{-10}
D+16		1.88×10^{-8}	200	9.4×10^{-11}
D+18		7.2×10^{-7}	1,000	7.2×10^{-10}
D+18		1.5×10^{-7}	450	3.3×10^{-10}
D+18		5.1×10^{-8}	100	5.1×10^{-10}
D+18		4.9×10^{-8}	150	3.3×10^{-10}

* Dust stirred up by walking to windward of sampler.

There appears to be an approximate relationship between the dose-rate given by the contamination of the ground and the airborne activity associated with it. This relationship is 7×10^{-10} microcuries/c.c. per milliroentgen/hour under the particular conditions existing at Monte Bello. From this the values given in Table 7.2 are obtained for the total activity that would be inhaled while various integrated external doses were received.

TABLE 7.2

External Dose Received	Fission Products Inhaled
1 milliroentgen	8.7×10^{-4} microcuries
100 " "	8.7×10^{-2} " "
1 roentgen	0.87 " "
25 " "	22 " "
50 " "	44 " "
100 " "	87 " "
400 " "	348 " "

8. UNDERWATER SHOCK MEASUREMENTS

By means of mechanical gauges underwater shock measurements were made over the range 900 to 3,600 feet by staff of the Naval Construction Research Establishment of the Admiralty. Very few positive results were obtained because of the very low value of the underwater pressures.

Five different types of gauge were used, of which only one type gave measurable records. This was a 6-inch copper diaphragm gauge suspended at half-depth, 22 feet, and consisting of a heavy steel cylinder approximately 10 inches long with a 0.2-inch thick annealed copper diaphragm bolted on to each end. The mean deflection of the two diaphragms of each gauge was used to assess the dynamic peak pressure from the calibration curves.

Measurable deflections were obtained at only the two nearest distances, *i.e.*, 960 and 1,185 feet. The values obtained are shown in the Table 8.1 below in comparison with values given by similar gauges in Test Baker at Bikini where the bomb was fired at half-depth in water 200 feet deep.

TABLE 8.1

<i>Distance</i>	<i>Pressure (p.s.i.)</i>	
	<i>Monte Bello</i>	<i>Bikini Test B</i>
5,000	...	150
4,000	...	260
3,000	Negligible	490
2,000	Negligible	950
1,185	20	...
960	270	...


The very low underwater pressures obtained indicate that in an explosion in a ship and very near the water-line little of the energy is transmitted to the water as a pressure wave and that, in shallow water, the quantity of energy that does enter the water in this way is very rapidly attenuated by the surface cut-off action.

If a pressure criterion is applicable it appears, by comparison with observed damage to ships at Bikini, that slight to medium underwater damage to surface ships would occur between 800 and 1,000 feet and no material damage beyond 1,000 feet whilst a submarine, submerged at half-depth, might be sunk or seriously damaged at 800 feet and yet only slightly damaged at 1,000 feet. Judging from the results of Test Able at Bikini, at 1,000 feet the damage from air blast would cause almost total destruction to all but capital ships. Thus for a near-surface burst in very shallow water, the distance for structural safety of surface ships and surfaced submarines is likely to be determined by air blast.

9. CRATER

The crater formed in the sea-bed was a shallow saucer-shaped depression some 1,000 feet across and 20 feet deep at the centre with a lip averaging 4 feet in height. Its contour was determined by a survey of the sea-bed in the vicinity of the burst, before and after the trial, by means of echo soundings along six diametrical lines, 30 degrees apart and intersecting approximately in the position of the weapon. Fig. 9.1 shows the mean depth change between the two surveys over the six diametrical lines as a function of distance from the centre.

Before the explosion the sea-bottom in this region was a coarse sand composed of crushed coral, and for about 500 feet on each side of the weapon position it was fairly flat, differences from the mean depth not exceeding some 5 to 8 feet. It was at first thought that there was a layer of mud above the coral because of a black deposit which was found on objects in the fall-out area. This has since been identified at the Admiralty Materials Laboratory as being composed of 90 per cent. magnetic oxide of iron and 10 per cent. ferrous oxide and is therefore the remains of H.M.S. *Plym* and not mud.

CRATER CONTOUR.

DEPTHS ARE MEAN VALUES FOR SIX DIAMETRICAL LINES.

FIG. 9.1





FIG. 10-1. MAXIMUM ACCELERATIONS.



PEAK TO PEAK MAXIMUM DISPLACEMENTS.

FIG.10-2

12. BLAST EFFECTS

12.1. *Blast Damage to Anderson Shelters*

12.1.1. In accordance with certain requirements of the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Home Office, fifteen Anderson shelters were erected, three at each of five sites situated, on Trimouille Island, more or less due West of the explosion at distances of 1,380, 1,530, 1,800, 2,760 and 3,390 feet. In each group one shelter was placed with its entrance facing the explosion, one with the entrance facing away from the explosion and one sideways to it.

The shelters were erected with a blast wall shielding the entrance, by the normal procedure laid down by the Ministry of Works, there being a difference from the usual practice in this country in that the covering of the shelter and the filling of the blast wall, instead of being earth, consisted of sandbags filled with fine dune sand, the only material available. The shelters were sunk with their floors about 4 feet below ground level; the thickness of the sandbags averaged 18 inches directly over the top of the roof arch to about 3 ft. 6 ins. at ground level at the sides. The blast wall was from 2 ft. to 2 ft. 6 ins. thick contained within sheets of corrugated iron and was placed about 3 feet from the shelter.

12.1.2. In the groups of shelters at 1,380, 1,530 and 1,800 feet, the sandbags covering them were almost entirely blown away and the blast walls were destroyed.

At 1,380 feet, Fig. 12.1, parts of the main structure of the shelters facing towards and sideways to the explosion were blown in but the main structure of the one facing away from the explosion was intact, and would have given full protection. At 1,530 feet, Fig. 12.2, the front sheets of the shelter facing the explosion were blown into the shelter but otherwise the main structures were more or less undamaged, as were those at 1,800 feet, Fig. 12.3.

At 2,760 feet, Fig. 12.4, some of the sandbags covering the shelters were displaced and the blast walls were distorted whilst at 3,390 feet, Fig. 12.5, the effect was quite small. At these distances, the shelters were not in direct view of the explosion owing to intervening sandhills.

12.2. *Maximum Pressures Inside Anderson Shelters*

Measurements of the maximum pressures inside the Anderson shelters were obtained using the toothpaste tubes referred to in paragraph 4.1.

The results obtained are summarised below in Table 12.1.

TABLE 12.1

<i>Distance from Burst (Feet)</i>	<i>Maximum Excess Pressure in Incident Blast (p.s.i.)</i>	<i>Maximum Pressure Inside Shelter (p.s.i.)</i>		
		<i>Door towards Burst</i>	<i>Door sideways to Burst</i>	<i>Door away from Burst</i>
1,530	48	38	27	40.5
1,800	31.5	28	21	28
2,760	12	16	7	13.5
3,390	8	8.5	4	5.5

No results were obtained at the nearest distance of 1,380 feet.

12.3. *Blast Damage to Concrete Cubicles*

12.3.1. A number of concrete cubicles designed by the Ministry of Works were erected to obtain some information on the failure of reinforced concrete structural units under the action of the blast from an atomic bomb.

12.3.2. *Details of the Cubicles*

The original intention was to construct nine cubicles with internal dimensions of 12 feet and with wall and roof thicknesses of 6, 9 and 12 inches respectively. They were all designed to resist a uniform transverse load of 300 lbs./sq. ft. (2.1 p.s.i.), adopting conventional elastic theory. It was intended that one cubicle



Fig. 12.1, Andersons at 1380 ft range from bomb ship shown in the photo, anchored 400 yards off shore.



Left: Fig. 12.3, Andersons at 1800 ft after burst. Right: Fig. 12.4, Andersons protected by blast walls at 2760 ft.

of each thickness should be placed at distances where the peak excess hydrostatic pressure in the blast was expected to be 6, 10 and 25 p.s.i.

It transpired, however, that there was only sufficient time available at the site to construct five cubicles. Moreover, in order to permit the use of $1\frac{1}{4}$ inch aggregate, the proposed 6-inch and 9-inch walls had to be modified to $6\frac{3}{4}$ and $9\frac{3}{4}$ inches respectively.

The cubicles were situated as follows:—

TABLE 12.2

Distance (Feet)	Peak Hydrostatic Pressure in the Incident Blast	Wall Thickness (Inches)		
	(p.s.i)			
1,815	31	$9\frac{3}{4}$		
2,970	10	$6\frac{3}{4}$	$9\frac{3}{4}$	12
3,975	6	$9\frac{3}{4}$		

The reinforcement of MS rods to British Standard Specification 785 and the cement, Ferrocrete Rapid Hardening, were shipped from the United Kingdom. The aggregate was obtained by crushing local rock to a maximum size of $1\frac{1}{4}$ inches. The rock had a granular surface, a bulk density of only 72.5 lbs. per cu. ft., and was very weak. Chemically it consisted mainly of calcium carbonate.

The sand was obtained from the beach nearby; it was somewhat fine, 70 per cent. passing through a No. 25 sieve. The concrete was made using sea water.

Normal methods of construction were adopted throughout, the walls being cast in 3-ft. lifts. Compaction was done with tamping rods.

The mix used was 1 part cement, 1.4 parts sand, 2.8 parts aggregate (all by volume) with a water/cement ratio of 0.48. This was a richer mix than would normally be used for concrete made with ballast aggregate but it was found to be necessary, owing to the poor quality of the local aggregate, in order to obtain a suitable strength combined with reasonable workability. The density of the concrete so obtained averaged only 133 lbs. per cu. ft. Tests on bin cubes at 7 days gave a crushing strength ranging generally between 2,000 and 3,000 p.s.i. Tests on plain concrete beams gave a modulus of rupture varying from about 300 to 500 p.s.i.

12.3.3. Description of Damage

There were no indications that any of the cubicles was tilted or translated bodily.

The only cubicle that sustained any serious damage was the one at 1,815 feet in which the wall facing the explosion was completely destroyed, a large portion of it being pushed inwards and hurled against the rear wall. There were some instances of failure of the reinforcement in this panel, but, in the main, failure of the concrete caused collapse, the concrete being either stripped from the bars or failing in bond, the latter being very evident along the bottom edge. Figs. 12.6 to 12.9 show this cubicle before and after the explosion.

The two side walls were left slightly bowed outwards and showed typical fine cracks from the corners to the centre. There was some failure at the construction joints near the front edges of these walls, as shown in Fig. 12.8. The extent of the bowing was not measured but its magnitude was estimated as about 1 inch. It could not be ascertained whether or not these walls had been first deflected inwards and then, after the failure of the front wall, pushed outwards.

The roof showed some cracks which roughly followed the line of the inside faces of the walls and there was failure above the inside edge of the front wall. Only a few hair cracks could be found in the rear wall.

At 2,970 feet the cubicles with $6\frac{3}{4}$ and $9\frac{3}{4}$ -inch walls showed some fine hair cracks which did not extend to the inner surface, a typical example being shown in Figs. 12.10 and 12.11.

The cubicle with 12-inch walls showed no indication of any damage and the same applies to the one with $9\frac{3}{4}$ -inch walls at 3,975 feet.




Fig. 12.6 and Fig. 12.7. Concrete cubicle at 1815 ft.





Fig. 12.8 and Fig. 12.9. Concrete cubicle at 1815 ft.





Fig. 12.10 and Fig. 12.11. Concrete cubicle at 2970 ft

13. THE PENETRATION OF THE GAMMA FLASH

13.1. *Experiments on the Protection from the Gamma Flash afforded by Slit Trenches*

13.1.1. The experiments described in this section show that slit trenches provide a considerable measure of protection from the gamma flash. From the point of view of Service and Civil Defence authorities this is one of the most important results of the trial.

13.1.2. Rectangular slit trenches 6 ft. by 2 ft. in plan and 6 ft. deep were placed at 733, 943 and 1,300 yards from the bomb and circular fox holes 2 ft. in radius and 6 ft. deep were placed at 943 and 1,300 yards.

The doses received from the flash were measured with film badges and quartz-fibre dosimeters in order to determine the variation of protection with distance, with depth and with orientation of the trench and the relative protection afforded by open and covered trenches.

In general, the slit trenches were placed broadside-on to the target vessel but at 1,300 yards one trench was placed end-on. Two trenches, one at 733 and one at 943 yards were covered with the equivalent of 11 inches of sand.

13.1.3. A few results were obtained to show the variation of dose in a horizontal plane inside a trench and these indicated that the dose at a given depth is not likely to differ from that measured on the vertical axis by a factor greater than 2.5 even at the remote ends. Such differences are insignificant compared with those accompanying a change in depth so that the degree of protection can be assessed simply from the dose received on the vertical axis of the trench. A summary of the results obtained is given in Table 13.1. The surface doses are taken from the mean curve for the gamma flash dose given in Fig. 5.1.

13.1.4. From these experiments the following general conclusions may be drawn:—

- (a) Open slit trenches, nominally 6 ft. \times 2 ft. \times 6 ft. deep provide a considerable degree of protection from the gamma flash and this increases with depth but at a decreasing rate.
- (b) The approximate doses received by a man standing erect on the vertical axis of such a trench, averaged for all orientations of the trench are given below:—

Distance in yards ...	1,300	943	733
Dose in Roentgens	55	240	1,070

Thus personnel protected in this way would receive the median lethal dose of 400r at about 850 yards compared with just under 1,300 yards when exposed on the surface.

- (c) Personnel lying prone in open slit trenches 3 ft. or more in depth should not receive the median lethal dose even as close as 733 yards.
- (d) A top cover equivalent to one foot of earth reduces the dose experienced inside a trench by a factor of about 5 so that, under these conditions, median lethal dose for a man standing erect would be received at a distance of about 650 yards.
- (e) The dose received on the vertical axis of trenches of rectangular cross-section and which had random orientation, do not differ greatly from those on the vertical axis (at the same depth) of cylindrical trenches of the same area of cross-section.
- (f) This experimental data, showing how great is the protection afforded by slit trenches, provides one of the most important results of the trial from the point of view of Service and Civil Defence authorities.

TABLE 13.1

Variation of Gamma Flash Dose on Vertical Axis of Trench

Type of trench	Rectangular broadside-on open			Rectan- gular end-on open	Circular open		Rectangular broadside-on covered	
Distance (yards) ...	1,300	943	733	1,300	1,300	943	943	733
Surface dose (Roentgens)	300	3,000	14,000	300	300	3,000	3,000	14,000
Depth below ground level (inches)								
6 ...	150	1,000	—	230	214	1,200	(75)	—
12 ...	75	430	—	150	120	545	47.6	—
24 ...	33.3	150	584	60	54.5	188	25	(140)
36 ...	23	70	216	31.6	30	86	13	(56)
48 ...	(20)	43	100	20	17.7	48.5	7.7	(31)
60 ...	—	(37.5)	61	13.6	10.7	(33.3)	5	(23)
72 ...	—	—	(46.7)	(8.6)	7	—	(3.5)	—

Entries in brackets are extrapolations or estimates.

13.2. *The Penetration of the Gamma Flash into Anderson Shelters and Concrete Cubicles*

13.2.1. Film badges were used to measure the gamma flash dose inside Anderson shelters and concrete cubicles. The latter were erected primarily to study the effect of blast on reinforced concrete panels but because of their regular shape and appropriate range of panel thickness were well adapted for the study of gamma-ray penetration.

In the Anderson shelters, the floors of which were situated at a depth of 3 ft. below ground level, four film badges were disposed, two above ground level and two below. Four badges were also placed in the concrete cubicles, along the horizontal axis of symmetry pointing towards the weapon, (a) in the centre of the cube, (b) against the front wall, (c) against the rear wall and (d) at a distance of one foot from the front wall.

13.2.2. The results of these measurements are summarised in Tables 13.2 and 13.3 together with estimates of the dose received outside the cubicles.

The results for Anderson shelters show considerable scatter but some broad conclusions can be drawn. It is clear that for a burst near ground level, the dose below ground level was about half that above ground, but this would not necessarily apply to an airburst, where more of the radiation would come through the roof. The shelter as a whole was quite effective in reducing the dose and the median lethal dose of 400r would be received at about 2,400 ft. below ground level and at about 2,700 ft. above, as compared with 3,900 feet in the open. The advantage of getting down on the floor is further illustrated by the fact that at 2,700 ft. the dose received at floor level would be only 150r which may be regarded as generally non-lethal, whereas the median lethal dose would be received above ground level.

The results for the cubicles indicate complete protection against lethal effects of radiation, i.e., a dose of 100–150r, inside a reinforced concrete structure with walls 12 inches thick at about 3,300 ft. and for 6½-inch wall thickness in the region of 3,900 ft. where the dose in the open would be the median lethal dose of 400r.

TABLE 13.2

Gamma Flash Doses in Anderson Shelters

Distance (Feet)	Dose Outside (r)	Average Dose Inside (r)	
		Above Ground Level	Below Ground Level
1,380	75,000	N.R.	10,500
1,530	47,000	11,000	5,500
1,800	30,000	7,000	2,000
2,760	4,000	150	100
3,390	1,200	30	15

TABLE 13.3

Gamma Flash Dose inside Concrete Cubicles

Distance (ft.)	Estimated dose outside (r)	Dose inside (r)			Average dose inside (r)
		Wall thickness (inches)	Position of badge (see text)	Dose	
2,970	2,800	6½	a	410	460
			b	455	
			c	430	
			d	545	
		9½	a	260	270
			b	—	
			c	230	
			d	322	
		12	a	185	190
			b	220	
			c	158	
			d	195	
3,975	380	9½	a	35	50
			b	62	
			c	46	
			d	58	

The front of the cubicle at 1,800 ft. was blown in and the badges were exposed to radiation from the fall-out.

14. THE EFFECT OF HEAT FLASH ON MATERIALS

14.1. Samples of cloth, service clothing and equipment, black-out materials and temperature indicating lacquers were set out at various distances from the weapon. This work was organised by staff of the Scientific Adviser to the Army Council, of the Home Office and of the Admiralty. Owing to the small amount of heat radiated by explosion under the particular conditions of the test, very few positive thermal effects were obtained.

14.2. A preliminary report from the Scientific Adviser to the Army Council gives the following observations:—

(i) Some scorching of cloth samples set up on panels at 500 yards was observed.

(ii) No effects were observed on the following:—

Samples of R.A.F. flying clothing exposed at 1,000 and 1,500 yards.
Norman battle-dress or combat suits with respirators and steel helmets exposed at 1,000, 1,200 and 1,400 yards.

Gas capes and pouches at 1,000 yards and beyond.

Black-out materials, treated and untreated, fully exposed and behind clear and white-washed glass, together with temperature indicating lacquers on mild-steel plates at 1,000 yards and beyond.

Pieces of fibre-board and dummies representing the human arm covered with shirt and battledress serge at ranges of 1,000 yards and above.

(iii) Samples of black-out material and heat-indicating lacquer exposed at 500 yards received heavy contamination and have not yet been fully examined.

14.3. A service respirator face-piece, a civil defence respirator face-piece, a civilian respirator and a children's respirator were exposed at six positions between 450 yards and 1,000 yards. At all sites severe blast damage occurred and at the nearest nothing of the masks was recovered. At the other distances, i.e. between 500 and 1,000 yards, where in some cases only parts of the respirators were found, there was no sign of flash burn.

14.4. For one of the Naval ABC trials, canvas wallets, on to which were sewn samples of different types of naval clothing, were set up at twelve points between 750 and 3,500 yards from the explosion. The results were almost entirely negative, the only material affected being IA8 blue serge which had a very slight surface scorch at 750 yards.

15. CONTAMINATION AND DECONTAMINATION

15.1. The results and conclusions quoted here can be applied only to the type of conditions experienced at Monte Bello, *i.e.*, to a dry dusty location or to dry debris resulting from the destruction of buildings. They also apply to reconnaissance, rather than rescue or other dust-raising operations, with entry to the contaminated area after fall-out has occurred and any fluid fall-out has dried. The contamination will then be tightly absorbed on to the dust particles and decontamination is then largely achieved by removing the dust. Contamination from direct fluid fall-out was found to be strongly absorbed by the surface and its removal was very difficult.

15.2. *Protective Clothing*

15.2.1. For the use of personnel entering contaminated areas a standard issue was made of protective clothing. This consisted of cotton singlet and trunks, woollen socks, a combination suit, rubber undergloves, cotton overgloves, half wellington boots, a light service respirator and a hat, something like a trilby. The combination suit had double legs from just below the knee, the inner one being caught under the foot by means of a loop. The sleeves were double from the elbow, the inner sleeve being retained in place by a loop passing over the thumb. Both the inner leg and inner arm had elastic around the bottom. A sweat-rag was worn round the neck. The following notes are given to illustrate the lessons learned and conclusions reached, not always unanimous, concerning its protective value and general usefulness.

15.2.2. *Suits*

General opinion agreed that the combination suit was surprisingly comfortable although for use in a hot climate a lighter colour would have been preferable. The material was splash-proof but not water-proof and its weave seemed to be a fair compromise between reasonable ventilation and the need to keep out contaminated dust. It was generally effective in preventing body contamination but where the dust was rubbed or pressed in, *e.g.*, at the knees or elbows or round the legs when pushing through the long spinifex grass, it penetrated the suit and contamination of the skin resulted. Thicker material or the use of long pants or vests with sleeves would prevent this but would be impracticable for hot climates. Elastic at the bottom of the legs and sleeves is liable to be damaged during laundering and tapes would have been preferable.

15.2.3. *Sweat-rags*

The sweat-rags used were not of the type expected and made only a defective seal. They allowed perspiration to trickle on to the shoulders and thus caused contamination which was sometimes difficult to remove. The necessity for a sweat-rag would be obviated by the use of a hood as recommended later.

15.2.4. *Headgear*

The hats provided were unsuccessful as they did not prevent dust-borne and air-borne contamination from collecting on the exposed parts of the head and face. It was clear that only a hood would prevent head contamination.

15.2.5. *Respirators*

Although it was found that the respirators provided could be worn for long periods, heavy work was rendered difficult by condensation of perspiration inside the mask. It was felt generally that for fire or dust-raising operations, it is highly desirable to have some form of respirator and for trials purposes these should be worn in all significantly contaminated areas. Further investigation on the most suitable type is clearly required, *e.g.*, a light industrial dust mask and eye-shield might be adequate.

15.2.6. *Gloves*

Owing to the heat the rubber gloves were unpleasant to wear and were liable to be torn in heavy work. They were also surprisingly difficult to decontaminate. A plastic impregnated material might be more suitable, or alternatively the use of two separate expendable gloves, e.g., a light cotton close-fitting underglove and a heavier reinforced overglove. Experience with the suit and underwear showed that two layers of material would prevent contamination and at the same time allow reasonable ventilation and sweat absorption. Two gloves were found to be necessary at Monte Bello when records were being recovered from contaminated regions, but for general use it would probably be better to have a single glove if a suitable material could be found.

15.2.7. *Boots*

The rubber half-wellingtons used in conjunction with a double trouser leg (one inside the boot and one outside) were effective in reducing foot contamination. Their disadvantage lay in the difficulty of decontaminating them which was accentuated by the matt finish and the indented pattern of the sole of those supplied. A boot with a high gloss would probably be easier to decontaminate or an expendable overboot might be considered.

15.3. *Body Contamination*

15.3.1. *Removal of Body Contamination*

During the three weeks following the burst about 940 man-sorties were made into the contaminated areas. All personnel who had worn protective clothing had to take a shower, as a matter of routine procedure, although many, e.g., boats crews, had not entered areas of appreciable contamination. No records were kept of the number of cases where there was no appreciable contamination before the first shower. In only 18.4 per cent. of cases was further treatment necessary.

The effectiveness of the various treatments is summarised below:—

<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
No significant contamination after first shower ...	81.6
Contamination removed by re-wash only ...	5.5
Contamination removed with titanium dioxide and Teepol* followed by re-wash ...	8.3
Further treatment with potassium permanganate and re-wash ...	3.7
Release, after preceding treatments, with slight residual contamination ...	0.9

* Later precipitated chalk and Teepol.

Personnel who were released with slight contamination lost much of it within two days.

The heaviest contamination was found on members of a party which was engaged in a variety of activities in the worst contaminated area of Trimouille. They registered a gamma activity of between 3 and 6 milli-roentgens per hour. The total dose rate in the area in which they worked was between 5 and 10 roentgens per hour and the total gamma dose received by each person was about 3r. Even in these cases the first shower-bath removed the bulk of the activity.

15.3.2. *Location of Body Contamination*

The following summary shows the number of instances in which contamination was found on the various parts of the body after the first shower:—

<i>Neck</i>	<i>Face</i>	<i>Hair</i>	<i>Knees and Legs</i>	<i>Hands</i>	<i>Shoulders</i>	<i>Arms</i>	<i>Chest</i>	<i>Feet</i>
91	67	67	54	27	10	7	3	1

The location of the contamination varied with time. For example, about seven days after the burst, entry into areas of heavy contamination was possible and an increased number of contaminated knees and legs was caused by pushing through knee-deep vegetation. Later the boats became contaminated and this was spread to the knees and legs by sitting on the decks.

15.4. Decontamination of Equipment

15.4.1. General Procedure

The procedure adopted fell into three main classes

- (i) depending on complexing action involving the use of citric and other acids to form soluble complexes with certain of the fission products which are less easily absorbed on surfaces;
- (ii) normal cleansing action with wetting agents such as Teepol and degreasing agents such as trichlorethylene, Butex and Irgalon, which may also have valuable complexing actions;
- (iii) absorption with fine powders such as titanium oxide or precipitated chalk which present large effective surface areas.

15.4.2. Decontamination of Instruments

Loose dry contamination was first removed by cleaning by means of a dry rag or by vacuum cleaning. It was found to be important not to wet the surfaces before this was complete, for if the surface were wetted the fission products tended to be carried in solution on to the surface and to be strongly absorbed. When time allowed, dry cleaning was followed by storage to allow further decay of radioactivity.

If wet treatment was necessary, the procedure consisted in first rinsing with fresh water, and following it, if necessary, with a mixture of 5 per cent. citric acid and 1 per cent. Teepol in equal parts. Precipitated chalk was also used.

It was found to be important that electronic equipment for use in the field should be completely watertight so that it can be washed down. Rubber seals should be designed so that the minimum crevice is left into which contamination can lodge and so that joints can easily be remade after servicing. All surfaces should be as smooth as possible and recesses, screw holes, slots and knurled knobs avoided. Even then everything should be done to prevent contamination of monitoring instruments and the use of expendable covers or bags, is strongly recommended.

Experience with a ciné camera illustrates the difficulty of removing contamination due to direct fluid fall-out. This camera was not recovered until the fifth day and even though the surfaces appeared clean there was heavy contamination which was only reduced by about 20 per cent. after practically all the various treatments had been tried at a prohibitive cost in time. It was finally cleaned in the United Kingdom by complete removal of the black instrument finish.

It was also found to be practically impossible to decontaminate the fabric instrument carrying cases and haversacks by any simple process such as scrubbing. It is clear that expendable cases made of plastic or plastic-impregnated material with smooth surfaces are required for this purpose.

15.4.3. Decontamination of Boats

By the end of the operation the outer surfaces of the boat hulls were not seriously contaminated as the contaminated water had dispersed and the hulls had been cleansed by much passing through clean water. Cordage, canvas and bare wood fittings which retained radioactive products were finally jettisoned. Contamination of decks was never high, and at the end of the operation was removed by scrubbing and hosing after which the boats were hoisted at the davits and left for the radioactivity to decay.

15.5. Contamination of Ships

Some build-up of contamination occurred in certain parts of the engine room of the Health Ship due to the circulation of contaminated sea water. In the circulator and the weed trap the dose-rate rose to a higher level than that in the water outside and reached a value as high as 6 mr/hr. It was concluded that contamination of the engine room will be the limiting factor in assessing the level of water contamination into which a ship may be permitted to sail. At Monte Bello the contamination level was never serious and would not have restricted operations.

15.6. Special Decontamination Trials

15.6.1. Trial of Decontamination under Service Conditions

The steel deckhouse, referred to in section 12.6 under blast effects, received a heavy dose of contamination which gave a dose-rate of 6 r/hr after 19 days.

As part of the Naval ABC trials, decontamination was done by two naval parties, each of which, using a portable pump, hosed down for fifteen minutes with sea-water, three minutes for each bulkhead and three for the roof.

Two removable steel plates were fitted to the deckhouse. One was removed before decontamination and one after and both were sent to the health ship for measurements of the beta and gamma activity. These measurements indicated that the effect of the hosing down was to reduce the gamma activity by 60 per cent. and the beta activity by 70 per cent.

15.6.2. *Reduction of Contamination by the Water Spray Method*

In another Naval ABC trial, an attempt was made to protect surfaces painted with naval light grey weatherwork paint from contamination by spraying with water during exposure to fall-out. The operation commenced shortly before the explosion and continued throughout the fall-out period. One set of samples was sprayed with sea-water and one with a mixture of sea-water and 0.1 per cent. of citric acid. A third set was unsprayed and was used as a control. All samples were inclined at an angle of 30° to the horizontal to minimise the effect of blast and heat.

One set of samples was in a region of heavy fall-out, the dose-rate after 18 days being 5 r/hr. This corresponds to about 10,000 r/hr at 1 hour after burst, a dose-rate which is comparable with that at the centre of a base surge.

Measurements of beta plus gamma activities showed that the activity of samples sprayed with plain sea-water was only 11 per cent. of that of unsprayed samples whilst the use of sea-water and 0.1 per cent. of citric acid reduced the activity to only 4 per cent. of that of unsprayed samples.

15.6.3. A further Naval ABC trial was performed to determine the merits of various surface finishes and materials in regard to ease of decontamination. Small squares (3 inch) of a variety of paints, lacquers, instrument finishes and miscellaneous materials of Service interest were set out in the fall-out area in horizontal frames. At two sites the samples were lightly contaminated by dry fall-out. This fall-out is the type of contamination to be expected from dust distributed by an atomic explosion or carried by the smoke from fires. It is also the type to be expected when civil defence squads enter contaminated areas. Tests showed that about one half of this could be removed from smooth surfaces by rubbing with a dry cloth but complete cleansing required wet treatments. This work is still proceeding.

At a third site liquid fall-out occurred and samples were mottled with a black deposit of contamination which proved to be the remains of H.M.S. *Plym*. The main problem here is to find to what extent and by what process the finishes and materials contaminated by direct fall-out can best be decontaminated. This work is still proceeding at the Admiralty Research Laboratory.

It may be mentioned that the control samples which were used in the spraying tests at the same site and which were inclined at an angle of 30° were completely free of the black fall-out, indicating its very fluid nature. This emphasises the advantage of effective draining of ships' decks and superstructures.

15.7. *Contamination of Stored Food*

15.7.1. At the request of the Ministry of Food a trial was performed by the Home Office representatives to see the effect of an atomic burst on food stored temporarily on a dockside or in dock buildings severely damaged by previous attack, particularly with a view to estimating what proportion of such food could be recovered and made fit for human consumption. Three dumps of food were set up on Trimouille their contents being given in Table 15.1. It should be remembered that the results obtained must be related to the dose-rate rather than the distance since the position at which a given level of contamination was received at Monte Bello was determined by the particular wind conditions obtaining at the time.

15.7.2. At one site, the activity at one hour after burst was estimated to be 100 r/hr. There was no sign of fluid fall-out at this site. Considerable damage was done by blast and some samples were destroyed by fires which almost certainly were started by pieces of red hot metal from the target vessel rather than by heat flash. The activity in samples inside containers varied from 1/20th to 1/2,000th of that on the outsides of the containers which was of the order of 20 micro-curies per sq. cm.

At a second site, there was no appreciable fall-out in the region of the food dump and no disturbance of the food-stuffs by blast or fire.

At the third site, the estimated activity at one hour after the explosion was about 250 r/hr and there was evidence of heavy liquid fall-out in the form of black cloudy rain which covered the upper surfaces of the various packages with black spots giving the surfaces an overall activity of about 50 micro-curies per sq. cm. None of this discolouration penetrated to the inside surfaces of any of the covers. The activity of samples of the contents of the various packages was between 1/10th and 1/100th of that on the outside. The activity of the samples at this site was about ten times that in the samples at the first site although the ground contamination was only 2.5 times as great. This illustrates the greater penetrating power of liquid fall-out. It is also evident that the penetration through woven materials was about ten times that through paper and plywood. In the worst case (of woven sacks) only one-tenth of the activity deposited by the fall-out found its way into the upper layer of food and this activity was of the same order as that stated in Civil Defence Technical Bulletin TB-11-8 to be the permissible emergency level in water and food (0.9 microcuries per cc.) for consumption over a period of ten days.

15.7.3. It is therefore concluded that under heavy contamination of the type which occurred in this test a very high proportion of food exposed in dumps such as those tested would be fit for human consumption. Special care would be required in the handling and disposal of the covers. These considerations, of course, apply to dry atmospheric conditions. It is possible that, if there were heavy rain at the time, penetration through the covers would be much greater.

15.8. *Radiation Hazard, inside a Compartment, due to External Contamination*

Measurements of the gamma dose-rate inside and outside the $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch steel plate deckhouse used for the decontamination experiments described in section 15.6.1 showed that the dose-rate inside the compartment was 25 per cent. lower than that outside. The readings obtained before and after decontamination of the outside of the deckhouse were the same showing that the contamination on the actual deckhouse made only an insignificant contribution to the level of radiation inside.

15.9. *Radiac Instruments*

Tests under service conditions were made of many types of dose-rate meter and personal dosimeters. A report on appropriate ones has been made to the Radiac Panel.

TABLE 15.1
Contents of Food Dumps

Commodity	Weight	Container
<i>Flour</i>	3 × 140 lb. bags	Finely-woven jute
	3 × 140 lb. bags	Cotton
	3 × 140 lb. bags	Nylon
	2 × 56 lb. bags	5-ply paper, bitumen-lined
<i>Wheat</i>	5 × 180 lb. sacks	Jute
	3 × 180 lb. sacks	Cotton
	2 × 56 lb. bags	Paper, 5-ply, bitumen-lined
	2 × 56 lb. bags	Paper, no lining
<i>Carcase Meat</i> ...	1 Carcase of mutton, total weight 50 lb. ...	Wrapped in cotton
<i>Sugar</i>	1 × 160 lb. sack	Jute
	1 × 160 lb. sack	Cotton
	1 × 56 lb. case containing 28 × 2 lb. cartons	Fibreboard
	28 × 2 lb. cartons	Cardboard, unwrapped
<i>Tea</i>	1 × 120 lb. chest	Plywood—metal foil-lined
	56 × $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. packets	Paper, no outer wrapping
<i>Canned Meat</i> ...	24 × 6 lb. tins (360 lb. gross)	
<i>Fats</i>	1 × 64 lb. cases	Wood—paper-lined
	28 × $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. packs	Paper—exposed
	28 × $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. packs	Paper inner—fibreboard outer
<i>Rice</i>	2 × 114 lb. bags	Jute
	1 × 114 lb. bags	Cotton
<i>Potatoes</i> ...	2 × 1 cwt.	Jute sacks
	2 cwts.	Buried in soil
<i>Cabbage</i> ...	1 cwt. (2 × 56 lb.)	String bags

16. BIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

16.1. Introduction

Previous atomic explosions have provided information about injuries from blast effects, heat and prompt nuclear radiations, but relatively few data are available about the biological hazards of fall-out. The purposes of these investigations, undertaken at the instance of the Medical Research Council, were therefore to observe the Monte Bello explosion from the point of view of all medical effects, in a general way, and to scrutinise those of the fall-out in particular.

The following questions were selected for special study:—

- Would radio-iodine exist in the *fall-out on the ground* or in a vapour state? The absence of radio-iodine would not only influence ground radiation doses by some 20 per cent. in the first few days, but also the rate of decay of fall-out at this time.
- Would the iron and debris present during the quenching of the fire ball absorb the fission products and interfere with their availability to plants and animals? This would influence all risks due to radio-active elements lodging in tissues, especially bone, after inhalation or swallowing fall-out.

Investigations were conducted at the trial, and later in laboratories in the United Kingdom. In particular, samples of fission products were collected after the explosion and flown back to the United Kingdom for plant and animal studies.

16.2. *Studies in Relation to Operational Problems*

16.2.1. *Availability and Absorption of Radio-elements by Biological Systems*

Various animals and fish were caught within seven days of the explosion. Radio-iodine was recognised in the thyroid of a severely contaminated rat. The radioactive decay of all other tissues examined, including bones, suggested the absorption of a diversity of radio-elements by biological systems. Radio-iodine also appeared to be available to, and concentrated by, seaweed in the lagoon.

These results indicated that previous assumptions about the constitution of the mixed fission products on the ground are applicable to calculations of the intensity of radiation fields and their decay rates there in the early days after the explosion. The absorption of radio-iodine and other fission products revealed that the presence of iron and debris had not completely eliminated biological hazards due to swallowing or inhaling them and made necessary the quantitative studies of uptake described in Sections II and III below, and more experiments at the trial.

16.2.2. *Contamination and Decontamination of Vegetation*

It was found that the radioactive contamination of leaves was particulate, and, in worst cases, it could be recognised as black spots, visible to the naked eye; this could be of assistance to radiological monitors.

As up to 66 per cent. of the radioactive contamination could be removed by washing vegetation for 10 minutes, some measure of salvage of vegetables might be achieved, and such washing would be worth while in the absence of radiological monitoring, or until this could be completed. There appeared to be very little selection of the radio-elements removed from vegetation by water or detergents. Heavy rain cannot be expected to effect the complete decontamination of the surface of vegetation. A rough estimate suggests that 60-90 per cent. would be removed by heavy precipitation. Radio-elements from the fall-out, blackened with debris, which fell to the North of the Target Vessel, were absorbed by plants and recognised in leaf veins. However, this internal contamination was small by comparison with that adhering to the surface of leaves.

16.2.3. *Inhalation of Fission Products by Human Beings*

Inhalation could be another route of entry for fission products into animals and man. At various times, men entered the radioactive areas without respirators and it was possible to find traces of radioactivity in their urine within a few days. In an experiment designed to utilise a situation which arose fortuitously, it was possible to secure convincing evidence that such radioactivity in urine had been due to the inhalation of fission products, rather than by other possible routes of entry. These, and other, results indicated that respirators were effective barriers against the inhalation of fission products from this atomic weapon.

The amounts of radioactivity found in the urine subjects collected for 30 hours after exposure without respirators ranged up to 25×10^{-3} microcuries. These small amounts had some rough correlation with the radiation dose from the fission products on the ground. These results were in general agreement with previous predictions as between the uptake by inhalation, and the surface radiation intensity. Although only traces of radioactivity were found in men exposed to the fall-out several days after the explosion, it would seem advisable to wear a respirator while the fall-out settled.

It may be of some operational significance to record that, as expected, the urine of a man who inadvertently bathed in and swallowed mildly contaminated water (2 milli-r/hr at 3 feet) did not contain measurable radioactivity.

16.2.4. *Protective Clothing: Thermal Stress*

Men working in radioactive areas wore dark-coloured protective garments. The first parties to return to the Health Ship on D-day showed many features of thermal stress including intense thirst, marked irritability and tremor. Investigations were initiated. Men wearing the protective clothing in solar radiation with wind speeds of 9-10 knots, shade temperature of 77-86° F. and Relative Humidities of 61, lost up to 16 lbs. The mean 4-hour sweat rates ranged from 2-4 litres on various days. A sweat rate of 4 litres per hour is approximately the general upper limit of tolerance. It is concluded that the thermal stress of protective clothing deserves consideration.

16.2.5. *Decontamination Procedures—Time Involved*

After returning from radioactive areas, all men were monitored, decontaminated by washing and remonitored. The average times taken for the various procedures were measured, as follows:—

(a) Being undressed down to underwear and socks	...	61 seconds
(b) Preliminary monitoring	...	169 "
(c) Showering	...	390 "
(d) Drying	...	126 "
(e) Second Monitoring	...	164 "

In the case of personnel still contaminated—

(f) Application of decontaminating chemicals	...	60 "
(g) Second shower—usually to neck	...	235 "
(h) Second drying	...	120 "

Some men needed 5 showers to pass the (very low) tolerance at final monitoring.

These times do not include waiting periods. It must be emphasised that they apply to men insulated by protective clothing. The times would be greater for uninjured persons not in protective clothing escaping after an attack. It is clear that great time losses would accrue in the general confusion whether such persons were left to fend for themselves, or if cleansing were organised. Decontamination would certainly have to be organised for all casualties, with ensuing delays in evacuation, sorting and treating them.

16.3. *Botanical Investigations of Material Collected at Monte Bello*16.3.1. *Introduction*

The objects of the investigations were:—

- To make some measure of the degree of contamination of the ground by radio-elements of biological significance.
- To discover the fraction of the deposited radioactivity which consisted of such radio-elements.
- To determine the extent to which such radio-elements were available to plants.
- To discover how various soils might influence this availability.
- To assess the effect of rain upon the movement of fission products into the soil.

16.3.2. *Materials Used in these Investigations*

The materials which became available for study were:—

- Esparto grass filters contaminated with airborne fission products.
- Cotton gauze sheets, 1 yard square, collected from T 2 on D + 3.
- Miscellaneous plant samples collected from Gardenia, Primrose, North East and Trimouille Islands within three weeks of the explosion.

These materials became available in the United Kingdom 9, 13 and 48 days after the explosion. The majority of tests were conducted with aqueous extracts of the filters and the cotton gauze sheets, neither of which were contaminated by the blackened fall-out. However, it should be pointed out that it is highly unlikely that practical agriculture would be considered soon after an attack in areas visibly contaminated. The long-term problems in such an area are under study.

16.3.3. *Degree of Radioactive Contamination of the Ground*

The mean contamination levels by radio-elements of biological significance on the cotton gauze samples examined were, as microcuries per cm.², ¹⁴⁰Barium: 0.89, ⁹⁰Strontium: 0.007, ¹³¹Iodine: 0.99, ¹⁰⁶Ruthenium: 0.013. All these values have been extrapolated back to the day of the explosion, at which time they exceed the levels judged to be tolerable for cattle grazing by factors of 10 to 2,000.

16.3.4. *The Fraction of Total Radioactivity on the Ground which Consisted of Radio-elements of Biological Significance*

The solubility of fission products in water and aqueous carrier solution was regarded as a useful index of biological significance. 60 per cent. of the total activity in the cotton gauze samples, and 80 per cent. of that in the esparto grass filters, were soluble in this way.

Analysis of the radio-elements in these solutions several weeks after the explosion revealed that, as calculated back to the day of the explosion, ¹³¹Iodine was predominant and ¹⁴⁰Barium, ⁸⁹Strontium and ¹⁰⁶Ruthenium were also present: the proportions were approximately 600:175:15:3, respectively. Traces of other Rare Earths were also identified.

16.3.5. *Absorption of Radio-elements by Plants*

The absorption of the radio-elements in an aqueous extract of cotton gauze was studied.

- (a) *Water Culture*.—Barley and cabbage were grown in the aqueous extracts, alone and with various nutrients and concentrations of calcium ions. In 12 days, Barley took up 20 per cent. of the radio-barium present, 10 per cent. of the radio-strontium, 12 per cent. of the radio-iodine and 8 per cent. of the radio-ruthenium from the aqueous extract alone. Cabbage took up rather less ruthenium and rather more of the other radio-elements studied. After 21 days, the uptake was somewhat increased. Smaller amounts of barium and strontium were absorbed in the presence of calcium ions. It may also be noted that very little of the ruthenium or iodine was transferred from the roots to the shoots.
- (b) *Soil Culture*.—Wheat was grown in soil from Wytham and Cannock Chase to which aqueous extracts of the contaminated gauzes had been added. After 150 days, the radioactive content of the whole plants was less than 1 per cent. of the total activity added, and probably less than 0.5 per cent. of the original total fission products in the gauze. The radioactivity in the wheat shoot was greater by a factor of 3, in those growing in Cannock Chase soil. This is believed to be related to the lower calcium content of this soil, 0.6 mEq. per cent. as opposed to 17.2 mEq. per cent. in the case of Wytham soil.

Important for future laboratory studies is the finding in parallel experiments that the absorption and behaviour of carrier-free ⁹⁰Sr was in every way similar to the same element in the mixed fission products.

16.3.6. *The Effect of Rain upon the Movement of Fission Products into Soil*

One hundred days after the explosion, aqueous extract of fission products was added to the surface of soils in 12-inch high cylinders, and the mixture exposed to natural rainfall for a further 80 days.

Eighty-eight per cent. of these soluble fission products were retained in the top 1 inch of the Wytham soil, and 68 per cent. in the top 1 inch of the Cannock Chase soil.

Of the traces of radioactive material leached through the 12 inches of soil, over 90 per cent. was as ¹⁰⁶Ruthenium, which therefore may be regarded as the radio-element most likely to migrate from contaminated areas into the water table and so drain away.

16.3.7. *Summary of Botanical Investigation*

The results show that after the Monte Bello explosion, contamination of the ground occurred which was at dangerous levels for agriculture in places where the fall-out was not visible to the naked eye.

The presence on the ground of radio-iodine, and other radio-elements of biological importance, was confirmed, as was their availability to plants. However, apart from the risks of animals and human beings eating vegetation contaminated directly on the surface, a variety of factors in Nature tended to diminish the risks to be expected from eating fresh crops of vegetation growing in the fall-out area after the Monte Bello explosion.

Sixty per cent. of the fission products which lay invisible on the ground in the highly contaminated region of Trimouille were soluble, and may be considered

as of biological significance. Although plants growing in water culture might take up as much as 50 per cent. of these soluble fission products in 21 days, in the more practical experiments, wheat shoots grown for 150 days in soil to which soluble fission products had been added contained less than 1 per cent. of the radioactivity applied (*i.e.*, about 0.5 per cent. of the total fission products). This low fraction of fission products absorbed may be related to the fact that almost all the fission products were trapped in the top inch of soil, even after exposure to rain for 80 days. Thus the percentage uptake might be higher with shallow-rooted plants such as grass.

The retention of fission products in the upper layers of soil precludes their rapid removal from contaminated areas by rain. Less than 5 per cent. of the fission products were leached through 12 inches of soil between D+120 and D+200. Ruthenium constituted most of this leached fraction. Fortunately Ruthenium was not absorbed readily by plants; less than 1 per cent. of ^{106}Ru in water cultures found its way into the shoots of barley and cabbage plants growing therein for 12 days.

These results agree with the findings at the trial that internal contamination in plants is much less than direct surface contamination. Under the conditions of these experiments the expected uptake of fission products by new crops growing in contaminated soil would be no higher than 1 per cent., and new crops growing in areas draining contaminated zones, probably less than 0.05 per cent. More investigations are needed before these data can be used to determine accurate safety levels. In particular, it is necessary to establish the percentage of radioactivity in plants which can be absorbed by animals and man as a result of ingesting crops containing such radio-elements as the latter will select from the soil.

These investigations are being pursued.

16.4. *Zoological Investigations with Material Collected at Monte Bello*

16.4.1. *Introduction*

The purpose of these investigations was to confirm and extend, both qualitatively and quantitatively, those made on animals at the trial. Particular attention was paid to the proportion and chemical identification of fission products taken up by various tissues.

16.4.2. *Materials and Methods*

The samples investigated were:—

- (a) Airborne fission products collected on esparto grass filters. These and aqueous extracts thereof were fed to 4 rabbits 200–859 hours after the explosion.
- (b) Aqueous extracts of “invisible” fall-out from T 2 on Trimouille as prepared for the botanical experiments, containing 15–20 per cent. of the total radioactivity present in the fall-out. This was fed by pipette to 11 guinea-pigs 200–400 hours after the event.
- (c) Blackened earth and sedge-like herbage collected inland from Main Beach on Trimouille. These, and aqueous extracts thereof, were fed to guinea-pigs and 6 rabbits 1,300–2,500 hours after the event.

The animals were sacrificed at various times after being fed, dissected, and digests prepared of excreta, intestines, muscles, liver, kidneys, thyroid, and bones. These digests were investigated in an M.6.H. liquid counter.

16.4.3. *Results of Examining Tissue Digests for Radioactivity*

- (a) *General.*—Computations comparing the total radioactivity given to that detected in the excreta and tissues showed that recovery was within the limits of the errors in methods of feeding. A large proportion (usually more than 50 per cent.) of the radioactivity given appeared in the faeces and bowel contents and a small percentage was detected in the urine. The findings in all tissues except the thyroid and bones were of more interest than practical significance: after early sacrifice the livers, kidneys and muscles contained small percentages of relatively rapidly decaying fission products.

More detailed investigations were directed towards the findings in the thyroid gland, the skeleton, the former because of its value in providing information about radioactive iodine, the latter because of the clinical importance of injury to the blood-forming cells from bone-seeking fission products.

- (b) *Thyroids*.—Up to 2·4 per cent. of the radioactivity in the samples fed within 2 weeks of the explosion could be traced in the thyroid gland.

On D + 10 the thyroid from an animal fed with airborne fission products showed a decay compatible with a mixture of ^{132}I and ^{131}I . The decay of other thyroid glands was always with an 8 day half life, presumably due to ^{131}I .

15–20 per cent. of the radio-iodine in the aqueous extracts of invisible fall-out from T 2 fed to animals could be found in their thyroids after 24 hours.

It was therefore concluded that radio-iodine was present not only in the airborne cloud, but also in the *invisible* fall-out, and that it was water soluble and available for absorption by guinea-pigs and rabbits; it did not prove feasible to investigate the presence and availability of radio-iodine in the *black* fall-out.

- (c) *Bones*.—The outstanding feature of these studies was the variation in the percentage of radio-activity deposited in the bones after feeding different samples of fission products. The average percentages were:—

Airborne Fission Products	8 per cent.
Aqueous Extracts of Invisible Fall-out	14 per cent., <i>i.e.</i> , some 3 per cent. of the total activity on the ground.
Blackened Fall-out	0·2 per cent.

The counts of all skeletal digests showed an early rise, which could be attributed to $^{140}\text{Lanthanum}$ being formed from $^{140}\text{Barium}$. The subsequent decay could have been explained by various mixtures of ^{140}Ba and ^{89}Sr , but chemical analysis revealed the presence of various Rare Earths as well: Cerium, Yttrium and Praseodymium have been identified.

More detailed studies showed that, after feeding airborne fission products and aqueous extract of invisible fall-out, the proportion of Barium and Strontium in bones was roughly the same as in the material given. In contrast, after feeding material contaminated with blackened fall-out—where the percentage deposition in bone was so small (0·2 per cent.)—the absorption of Barium and Strontium was even more severely curtailed than that of Rare Earths.

16.4.4. Supplementary Experiments

The low absorption after feeding blackened fall-out and the very small percentage deposition in skeletons are obviously of interest not only in respect of a possible atomic attack, but also in the event of accidental exposures to mixed fission products in atomic energy programmes.

Some possible factors responsible for the diminished deposition in bones are as follows:—

- The presence of Magnesium Sulphate in the Monte Bello sand.
- The presence of Calcium ions in the Monte Bello sand; both these facts were known from previous soil analysis.
- The presence of iron from the target vessel.

Because low absorption was found using black fall-out but absent using extracts of the invisible fall-out which was mixed with Monte Bello sand at T 2, interest was naturally aroused in the possible rôle of iron in interfering with the absorption of Barium and Strontium as well as Rare Earths.

In an experiment with guinea-pigs fed radio-Barium/Lanthanum solution with minimal carrier, it was shown that 5 mg. spectroscopy-pure Iron oxide half an hour before feeding would reduce deposition in the skeleton by a factor of 3. When the same treatment was also continued twice a day for 3 days after feeding, the deposition in the skeleton was reduced by a factor of 10.

These studies continue.

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Johnson

A.W.R.E.
Aldermaston Berks.

May, 1953

3.2 Blast Damage

3.2.1 Anderson Shelters

Standard Anderson Shelters, with sandbag covering and blast wall construction were located at 460, 510, 600, 920 and 1,130 yards from ground zero. Mean blast pressures, in pounds/sq. inch, recorded inside the shelters are shown in the following table.

Distance (yds.)	Presentation		
	Front	Side	Rear
460	NR	NR	NR
510	38	27	40
600	28	21	28
920	16	7	14
1130	8.5	4	5.5

Front presentation implies blast wall facing towards event.
Rear " " " " " away from event.
Side " " shelter side on to event.

Shelters at 460, 510 and 600 yards suffered damage including demolition of blast walls, removal of sandbag covering and some displacement of the corrugated iron.

At 920 and 1,130 yards the shelters suffered relatively little damage.

Civil defence authorities consider that there might have been some 50% survival from blast damage of personnel in shelters at 460 yards and some 90 per cent at 600 yards, fatal casualties being mainly due to secondary blast effects (e.g. debris) and not to direct effects on the person of the blast pressure itself. The front presentation appears the most hazardous, due to the collapse of the blast wall into the shelter. At such distances, however, the survival from the effects of gamma flash would have been virtually nil. **(MORE EARTH COVER IS NEEDED FOR RADIATION.)**

At 920 and 1,130 yards there would have been no casualties from blast, and incidentally, little risk from the effect of gamma flash.

3.2.2 Concrete Cubicles

Reinforced concrete cubicles, 12 feet cube were exposed to the blast. There were three types of cubicle, varying in wall thickness and the mesh of reinforcement. The following table gives some details:-

Thickness of Wall and Roof	Mesh of Reinforcement		Dia. of Rods (mild steel)
	Walls	Roof	
$6\frac{3}{4}$ "	9"	$7\frac{1}{2}$ "	$\frac{5}{8}$ "
$9\frac{3}{4}$ "	$6\frac{1}{2}$ "	$4\frac{1}{2}$ "	$\frac{3}{8}$ "
12"	9"	$5\frac{1}{2}$ "	$\frac{3}{8}$ "

The concrete was a mixture of 1 cement, 1.4 sand and 2.8 of $1\frac{1}{4}$ inches aggregate (parts by volume). The aggregate was of local rock and rather soft and weak. The water/cement ratio was 0.5. This produced a crushing strength of 6 inches cubes of over 2,000 p.s.i. in 7 days.

The cubicles faced the event squarely. In the rear wall was a tapered opening about 2 feet high x 1 foot 6 inches broad into which a pile of four tapered blocks fitted to close this entrance prior to the explosion.

A $9\frac{3}{4}$ inch wall thickness cubicle was 600 yards from the explosion. Its front wall failed and was pushed inside the cubicle. The side walls were fractured and had a slight outward bowing (about 1 inch). The rear wall had minor hair cracks. The roof showed cracks along the line of the inside of the side walls and had failed completely along the line of the front wall.

At 990 yards, $6\frac{3}{4}$ inch and $9\frac{3}{4}$ inch walled cubicles showed fine hair cracks. There was no damage to the 12 inch walled cubicle at this distance, nor to one with a $9\frac{3}{4}$ inch wall at 1,320 yards.

In all cases the tapered blocks closing the rear entrance had been thrown outwards.

4.

Water Shock

The underwater shock was relatively feeble, and significant recordings were obtained at two points only. The results were:-

Depth of gauges - 22 feet.

Distance from weapon (feet)	Pressure p.s.i.
960	270
1185	20
1380	~ 0

Compare to air blast peak overpressures.

6. Fires

Some outbreaks of fire took place amongst the parched grass-like vegetation on Trimouille. It appeared that these were not due to radiant heat from the weapon, but arose from ignition by hot fragments of H.M.S. Plym. The inference is that the water column formed an effective shield against the direct thermal effects of the radiation.

7. The Gamma Flash

7.1 The Dose - Distance Relationship

The decay of short lived fission products from the weapon gives rise to an intense pulse of gamma radiation. A large proportion of the dose from this is received in a few seconds. Figure 4 shows the total dose (recorded by films) as a function of distance from the weapon.

7.2 Gamma Energies

In applying these results to shielding problems (using for example the methods given by Liston and Cave, HER Report H13/51) it would be desirable to know what assumed energy of photon would give the right answer. Naturally, the actual gamma ray flux consists of a continuous spectrum of a quite unpredictable nature.

The spectrum will of course vary with the distance from the weapon, largely due to Compton scatter. No data are available from the trial which can lead to an estimation of these spectra. The trend of the dose distance curve is similar to that which would be calculated on the assumption that the original photons were all of about 3 Mev energy; one must be careful not to draw any further conclusions from this statement.

Concrete cubicles of wall thickness $6\frac{3}{4}$ inches, $9\frac{3}{4}$ inches and 12 inches at 900 yards appeared, from somewhat incomplete data, to give the same reduction of dose inside as they would from a parallel gamma beam of about 1 Mev photons. At 1,320 yards a cubicle with a $9\frac{3}{4}$ inch wall appeared to reduce the dose by an amount equivalent to the reduction expected from a parallel $1\frac{1}{2}$ Mev beam. This latter result implies an energy higher than $1\frac{1}{2}$ Mev at 900 yards, and does not appear to be consistent with a value of 1 Mev at 900 yards. The difference between the results might be within the errors inherent in experiment and calculation.

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Washington 25, D. C.

FOR RELEASE AT 4:00 P.M. (E.S.T.)
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1955

A REPORT

BY THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
ON THE EFFECTS OF HIGH-YIELD NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

1. Considerable information on the effects of the explosions of atomic weapons has been made public by the Government since the first nuclear detonations in 1945. The handbook, "The Effects of Atomic Weapons", published in 1950, is being revised and brought up to date to include the effects of thermonuclear weapons, as a result of the most recent tests at the Pacific Proving Grounds. References to the effects of thermonuclear explosions have been made in several official statements, beginning with Chairman Strauss' description of the phenomenon of "fall-out" at a White House news conference on March 31, 1954. The following statement is designed to condense and correlate information, some of which already has been made public and other portions of which have been of a classified nature until now.

2. The effects of nuclear tests are evaluated for civil defense planning as well as for military and technological purposes. So long as nuclear weapons are in possession of any unfriendly power, the Commission believes the American public will wish to be as fully informed as possible as to the nature and extent of the dangers of nuclear attack and of the protective measures that can be taken by individuals and communities to avoid or minimize those dangers if we should be attacked.

BLAST AND HEAT EFFECTS

7. The effects of blast and heat from a nuclear explosion are relatively localized. One A-bomb of the earliest type equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT (20 kilotons) would produce blast sufficient to destroy or damage severely residences within a radius of more than one mile from the point of burst. Within a radius of about a mile and a half, residences would be so damaged as to be unusable without repairs. A principal hazard to human beings would come from flying and falling debris and from fires due to such causes as broken gas and electric lines or overturned stoves. The area in which injuries to human beings would be caused by blast, therefore, would be about the same as the area of damage to structures.

8. The United States, as announced previously, has developed fission bombs many times as powerful as the first A-bombs, and hydrogen weapons in the ranges of millions of tons (megatons) of TNT equivalent. For these larger weapons, the blast effects can be calculated approximately by means of a scaling law, namely, the distance at which a given blast intensity is produced varies as the cube roots of the yields of the explosions.

9. Similarly, the heat and burn effects of nuclear explosions can be estimated from accumulated data. These effects, of course, are influenced by prevailing atmospheric conditions. The time element also is a prime factor. Very large weapons deliver heat over an appreciably greater period of time than smaller weapons. A given quantity of heat from a high-yield weapon, delivered over a longer period of time, will produce somewhat less severe burns than the same quantity of heat from a nominal detonation.

PROTECTION AGAINST BLAST AND HEAT

10. The hazard from both burn and blast effects in the outer affected areas would be reduced greatly by shelter. Clothing or almost any kind of shelter would reduce the danger of direct burns, although there might be some danger of clothing and structures becoming ignited. Also, shelter would materially reduce the hazard of blast injury by affording protection against flying or falling debris.

FALLOUT PATTERN OF 1954 TEST IN THE PACIFIC

16. The very large thermonuclear device fired at the Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954, was exploded on a coral island. Coral consists of calcium carbonate, thus the detonation's radioactivity was spread by particles consisting largely of unslaked lime which, during the hours of descent, was slaked by moisture in the atmosphere. These particles ranged between 1/1000th and 1/50th of an inch in diameter and were, on the average, somewhat adhesive. The prevailing winds were westerly so the bomb cloud moved generally to the east and deposited the radioactive particles in varying amounts over an elliptical or cigar-shaped area. About 160 (statute) miles down-wind from the point of burst the early fallout was observed in the form of fine particles which looked like snow. Fallout began there about eight hours after the detonation and continued for several hours.

17. The roentgen is the commonly accepted unit of measurement of radiation dosage. A dose of about 25 roentgens of radioactivity received by a person over a brief space of time will produce temporary changes in the blood. A dose of some 100 roentgens received in a short interval may produce nausea and other symptoms of radiation sickness. About 450 roentgens delivered over a day or so might be fatal to approximately half of the persons so exposed. However, because of the body's repair processes, a total radiation dose which would be serious if incurred in a few minutes would produce much less effect if spread over a period of years. These statements may be helpful in understanding the data which follow.

18. The test explosion, at ground surface, contaminated a cigar-shaped area extending approximately 220 statute miles down-wind and varying in width up to 40 miles. In addition, there was a contaminated area up-wind and cross-wind extending possibly 20 miles from the point of detonation. Data was collected from 25 points on 5 atolls located from 10 to 330 miles down-wind (generally east) from Bikini Atoll. Due to an unexpected shift in the direction of the prevailing winds in the higher altitudes, the fallout missed the observation rafts that had been placed farther north previous to the test firing. The estimated contour of the pattern of fallout is, therefore, based only in part on data obtained from actual measurements and partly on extrapolation, i.e., calculations based on known data, including factual information obtained during previous tests of smaller devices.

19. Data from this test permits estimates of casualties which would have been suffered within this contaminated area if it had been populated. These estimates assume: (1) that the people in the area would ignore even the most elementary precautions; (2) that they would not take shelter but would remain out of doors completely exposed for about 36 hours; and (3) that in consequence they would receive the maximum exposure. Therefore, it will be recognized that the estimates which follow are what might be termed extreme estimates since they assume the worst possible conditions.

20. On the basis of our data from this and other tests, it is estimated that, following the test explosion on March 1, 1954 there was sufficient radioactivity in a down-wind belt about 140 miles in length and of varying width up to 20 miles to have seriously threatened the lives of nearly all persons in the area who did not take protective measures. During the actual tests, of course, there were no people in this zone. Inside Bikini Atoll at a point 10 miles down-wind from the explosion it is estimated that the radiation dosage was about 5000 roentgens for the first 36 hour period after the fallout. The highest radiation measurement outside of Bikini Atoll indicated a dosage of 2300 roentgens for the same period. This was in the northwestern part of the Rongelap Atoll, about 100 miles from the point of detonation. Additional measurements in Rongelap Atoll indicated dosages, for the first 36 hour period, of 2000 roentgens at 110 miles, 1000 roentgens at 125 miles, and, farther south, only 150 roentgens at 115 miles from Bikini.

21. Some distance farther from the point of detonation, at about 160 miles down-wind and along the axis of the ellipse, the amount of radioactivity would have seriously threatened the lives of about one-half of the persons in the area who failed to take protective measures. It is estimated that the radiation dosage at that point was about 500 roentgens for the first 36 hour period.

22. Near the outer edge of the cigar-shaped area, or approximately 190 miles down-wind, it is estimated that the level of radioactivity would have been sufficient to have seriously threatened the lives of 5 to 10 percent of any persons who might have remained exposed out of doors for the first 36 hours. In this area the radiation dosage is estimated at about 300 roentgens for the first 36 hour period.

23. Thus, about 7,000 square miles of territory down-wind from the point of burst was so contaminated that survival might have depended upon prompt evacuation of the area or upon taking shelter and other protective measures.

24. At a distance of 220 miles or more down-wind, it is unlikely that any deaths would have occurred from radioactivity even if persons there had remained exposed up to 48 hours and had taken no safety measures.

25. The estimates cited above do not apply uniformly throughout the contaminated area inasmuch as the intensity of radioactivity within a region of heavy fallout will vary from point to point due to such factors as air currents, rain, snow, and other atmospheric conditions. Because of this and because most persons, if given sufficient warning, probably would evacuate the area or take shelter and other precautionary measures, the actual percentage of deaths could reasonably be presumed to be considerably smaller than these extreme estimates.

PROTECTION AGAINST FALLOUT

26. In an area of heavy fallout the greatest radiological hazard is that of exposure to external radiation. Simple precautionary measures can greatly reduce the hazard to life. Exposure can be reduced by taking shelter and by utilizing simple decontamination measures until such times as persons can leave the area. Test data indicate that the radiation level, i.e., the rate of exposure, indoors on the first floor of an ordinary frame house in a fallout area would be about one-half the level out of doors. Even greater protection would be afforded by a brick or stone house. Taking shelter in the basement of an average residence would reduce the radiation level to about one-tenth that experienced out of doors. Shelter in an old-fashioned cyclone cellar, with a covering of earth three feet thick, would reduce the radiation level to about 1/5000, or down to a level completely safe, in even the most heavily contaminated area. Designs of shelters of simple yet effective construction have been prepared by the Civil Defense Administration and are available to the public.

27. Radioactive material deposited during fallout may or may not be visible but would be revealed by radiation

detection instruments such as Geiger counters. Any falling dust or ash that can be seen down-wind within a few hours after a nuclear explosion should be regarded as radioactive until measured by a radiation detection instrument and found to be harmless.

28. Care should be taken to avoid the use of solid foods or liquids that may contain fallout particles.

29. If fallout particles come into contact with the skin, hair or clothing, prompt decontamination precautions such as have been outlined by the Federal Civil Defense Administration will greatly reduce the danger. These include such simple measures as thorough bathing of exposed parts of the body and a change of clothing.

30. If persons in a heavy fallout area heeded warning or notification of an attack and evacuated the area or availed themselves of adequate protective measures, the percentage of fatalities would be greatly reduced even in the zone of heaviest fallout.

FALLOUT FROM NEVADA TESTS

31. Only relatively small nuclear test explosions are conducted at the Nevada Test Site, in contrast to the tests of high-yield thermonuclear devices at the Pacific Proving Grounds. In Nevada, as well as in the Pacific, all tests are planned for times when forecast weather conditions minimize the possibility of fallout hazard. Methods of forecasting weather patterns in these areas are improving steadily. High air bursts at the Nevada Test Site have produced no significant fallout; heavy fallout from near-surface explosions has extended only a few miles from the point of burst. The hazard has been successfully confined to the controlled area of the Test Site. The highest actual dose of radiation at an off-site community has been estimated to be less than one-third of the greatest amount of radiation which atomic energy workers are permitted to receive each year under the Atomic Energy Commission's conservative safety standards.

INTERNAL RADIATION EFFECTS

32. Several basic facts should be kept in mind in evaluating the hazard from fallout radiation. First, radiation

is not a new phenomenon created by the explosions of fission and thermonuclear weapons. Since the beginning of life, living things have been exposed constantly to radiation from natural sources. Cosmic rays from space constantly pass through our bodies. We are exposed to "background" radiation from radium and radon in the soil, water and air. Our bodies have always contained naturally radioactive potassium and carbon.

33. As pointed out earlier, detonations of all atomic weapons produce radioactivity, a portion of which is carried to high altitudes and over great distances in the form of fine particles. The percentage of this radioactivity which travels beyond the relatively near area of the explosion depends largely on the conditions under which the bomb is fired, the percentage being higher for in-the-air bursts where the fire-ball does not touch the earth's surface. The most widespread radioactivity is produced only by the longer-lived fission products, since the radioactivity of the shorter-lived products decays and disappears before the particles come down to earth in a matter of days, weeks, months, and even years. The longer-lived radioactive products may be distributed over the entire earth. However, as the particles are carried farther and farther to remote areas, the possibility of significant amounts of fallout decreases.

RADIOSTRONTIUM FALLOUT

34. One of the most biologically important radioactive substances found in fallout is strontium-90. It has a long lifetime--nearly 30 years on the average. Radiostrontium has a chemical similarity to calcium and, therefore, when taken into the body it has a tendency to collect in the bones. Radiostrontium can enter the body in two ways -- by inhaling or by swallowing. Normally, the amount inhaled would be small compared with the amount one might swallow. Fallout material deposited directly on edible parts of plants may be eaten along with the plants, but washing the plants before they are eaten would remove most of this radioactive material. However, rainfall carrying the radiostrontium down to earth may deposit it in the soil where it can be taken up, in part, by plants and incorporated into plant tissues, later to be eaten by humans or by grazing animals which, in turn, provide food for humans.

35. Since the start of nuclear tests, careful measurements have been made of the distribution of radiostrontium over the earth's surface, in the soils, in plants and animal tissues, in the oceans, in rain, in the atmosphere and in all forms in which it might be expected to occur. The results of this study are reassuring. The amount of radiostrontium now present in the soil as a result of all nuclear explosions to date would have to be increased many thousand times before any effect on humans would be noticeable.

RADIOIODINE FALLOUT

36. Among the shorter-lived fission products involved in the study of internal radiation, the most biologically important is radioiodine-131 with an average life of only 11.5 days. Even though this product may be widely spread after a nuclear explosion, the possibility of serious hazard is limited by its relatively short life. Like the non-radioactive form of the element, it concentrates in the thyroid gland and, in excessive quantity, conceivably could damage the thyroid cells.

37. Scientists of the Atomic Energy Commission have estimated that the average exposure of people in the United States from radioiodine in the fallout from the entire series of tests in the spring of 1954 was only a few percent of the annual dose that can be received year after year and still have no noticeable effects.

38. These two isotopes -- radiostrontium and radioiodine -- constitute the principal internal hazards from the radioactivities produced by the detonations of atomic weapons, both fission and thermonuclear. The Atomic Energy Commission has been engaged for three years in a broad study of the radioactive forms of these isotopes and conducts year-round monitoring of these radioactivities in many locations. Any accumulation of these materials can be detected with great sensitivity so that ample warning of potential hazard could be given long before any actual danger occurred from test detonations. The amounts of radiostrontium and radioiodine which have fallen outside the areas near the test sites as a result of all atomic tests up to now are insignificant compared to concentrations that would be considered hazardous to health.

GENETIC EFFECTS OF RADIATION

39. One other effect of radiation must be considered in evaluating the long-range possibilities of hazard from nuclear detonations. This is the possible genetic effect upon the germ cells which transmit inherited characteristics from one generation to another. At our present stage of genetic knowledge, there is a rather wide range of admissible opinion on this subject.

40. In general, the total amount of radiation received by residents of the United States from all nuclear detonations to date, including the Russian and British tests and all of our own tests in the United States and the Pacific, has been about one-tenth of one roentgen. This is only about 1/100th of the average radiation exposure inevitably received from natural causes by a person during his or her reproductive lifetime. It is about the same as the exposure received from one chest x-ray.

41. The medical and biological advisers of the Atomic Energy Commission believe that the small amount of additional exposure of the general population of the United States from our nuclear weapons testing program will not seriously affect the genetic constitution of human beings. Nevertheless, we are continuing our thorough study of the entire question and will continue to report our findings to the American people.

SUMMARY

42. The Atomic Energy Commission hopes that the information on nuclear weapons effects contained in the foregoing report will never be reflected in human experience as the result of war. However, until the possibility of an atomic attack is eliminated by a workable international plan for general disarmament, the study and evaluation of weapons effects and civil defense protection measures must be a necessary duty of our government.

43. Inevitably, a certain element of risk is involved in the testing of nuclear weapons, just as there is some risk in manufacturing conventional explosives or in transporting inflammable substances such as oil or gasoline on our streets and highways. The degree of risk must be balanced against the great importance of the test programs to the security of

the nation and of the free world. However, the degree of hazard can be evaluated with considerable accuracy and test conditions can be controlled to hold it to a minimum. None of the extensive data collected from all tests shows that residual radioactivity is being concentrated in dangerous amounts anywhere in the world outside the testing areas.

44. In the event of war involving the use of atomic weapons, the fallout from large nuclear bombs exploded on or near the surface would create serious hazards to civilian populations in large areas outside the target zones. However, as mentioned in the foregoing Report, there are many simple and highly effective precautionary measures which must be taken by individuals to reduce casualties to a minimum outside the immediate area of complete or near-complete destruction by blast and heat. Many of these protective measures, such as shelter and decontamination procedures, have been detailed by the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

cue

FOR SURVIVAL

OPERATION CUE

A. E. C. NEVADA TEST SITE

MAY 3, 1955

A REPORT BY THE

**FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE
ADMINISTRATION**

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

BY HAROLD L. GOODWIN,
Director, Atomic Test Operations, FCDA

A great deal of information has been released over the past several years on the effects of atomic explosions, yet many of these effects are still poorly understood by the general public. For that reason, the principal effects of a nuclear explosion are reviewed, with a brief discussion of factors of particular importance to civil defense.

This entire section is based on information available in published sources. There is a widespread but erroneous view that most information on the effects of nuclear explosions is classified, and hence is not available to the general public. Information that exists only in classified form generally is information which deals with refinements of weapons effects. A considerable amount of gross information on any major effect is available in a number of publications.

The best reference in this field is still the basic handbook, *The Effects of Atomic Weapons*. Despite the fact that this useful work was first published in 1950, queries daily to the Federal Civil Defense Administration indicate that it has not been widely studied or understood. A thoughtful reading will be of value to any person with civil defense responsibility. A revision, now in process, may be issued in the next few months.

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The time of travel of the shock wave is not generally understood by many persons. The concept of "duck and cover," which would still be of great value in case of attack without warning, is based on the comparatively large time interval between the burst and arrival of the shock wave at a given point.

It takes several seconds for the shock wave of a nominal bomb to reach a point 2 miles from the burst. A person who moved promptly at the first light of the detonation would have time to get under or behind a convenient piece of furniture, or other protection. At greater distances there would be even more time.

This time lapse between the detonation and arrival of the shock wave was graphically demonstrated to persons watching from the observer areas in the Test Site. The detonation takes place, a phenomenon without sound from the viewpoint of the observer. So much time elapses between the detonation and arrival of the shock wave that observers sometimes forget that the shock wave is on its way and the loud bang of its arrival finds them unprepared. Persons are frequently startled and have even been pushed off balance by the shock wave. The pause between a lightning flash and the thunder is comparable.

The question may be asked, how will one know when a burst has gone off if the sound does not arrive for some time? The answer is that the light from the explosion is its own warning.

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BIOMEDICAL EFFECTS OF THERMAL RADIATION

BY DR. HERMAN ELWYN PEARSE, *Professor of Surgery at the University of Rochester. Consultant to several Government departments, notably the Atomic Energy Commission's Division of Biology and Medicine. Consultant to the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project*

After the Bikini test, I was asked to go to Japan as a consultant for the National Research Council to survey the casualties in Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Being a surgeon, I was greatly impressed with the magnitude of the medical problem from burns and wounds very largely caused by flying missiles. They constituted roughly 85 percent of the casualties in Japan.

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In Japan it was an August day, the people were lightly clothed, and they were out in the open.

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Then we observed the healing of the wounds, and we found again that the wounds healed in the same manner as those that we had produced in the laboratory. There was some difference in these lesions from the ordinary burns of civil life, but I would predict, from what I learned from experiments, that the difference is on the good side. The burns look worse; they are often charred, but they may not penetrate as deeply, and the char acts as a dressing, nature's own dressing. The scab solidifies, and the healing process goes on under that scab, after which the scab is sequestered, and the healed surface is revealed beneath.

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I didn't care what happened to the fabrics; I wanted to know what happened to the man under the fabric. So we conceived this idea, that the important factor in studying clothing was what happened under the clothing; how it shielded the animal with cloth of different composition, weight, texture, weave, and color. We have made a great many studies both in the laboratory and in the field on this problem of the protective effect of clothing...

For example, if you have 2 layers, an undershirt and a shirt, you will get much less protection than if you have 4 layers; and if you get up to 6 layers, you have such great protection from thermal effects that you will be killed by some other thing. Under 6 layers we only got about 50 percent first degree burns at 107 calories.

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If we can just increase the protection a little bit, we may prevent thousands and thousands of burns.

... For example, to produce a 50-percent level of second-degree burns on bare skin required 4 calories. When we put 2 layers of cloth in contact, it only took 6 calories. But separate that cloth by 5 millimeters, about a fifth of an inch, and it increases the protective effect 5 times. The energy required to produce the same 50-percent probability of a second-degree burn is raised up to 30 calories. So if you wear loose clothing, you are better off than if you wear tight clothing.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER
Atomic Energy Project
P. O. Box 287, Station 3
Rochester 20, New York

Contract W-7401-eng-49

* * *

STUDIES ON FLASH BURNS: THE PROTECTION

AFFORDED BY 2, 4 AND 6 LAYER FABRIC COMBINATIONS

by:

George Mixter and Herman E. Pearse

Division: Special Programs

Division Head: H. A. Blair

Section: Flash Burn

Section Head: H. D. Kingsley

Submitted by: Henry A. Blair,
Director

Date of Report: 6/4/53

THE PROTECTION AFFORDED BY 2, 4 AND 6 LAYER FABRIC COMBINATIONS

by

George Mixter, Jr., M. D. and Herman E. Pearse, M. D.

ABSTRACT

Fabric interposed between a carbon arc source and the skin of Chester White pigs increased the amount of thermal energy required to cause 2+ burns. For the 2, 4 and 6 layers of fabric studied this increase was 3.6, 38 and over 104 cal/cm² respectively when the inner layer of fabric was in contact with the skin. Separation of the inner layer from the skin by 5 mm increased the protective effect of the 2 layer combination from 7.4 to 29 cal/cm², provided the outer layer was treated for fire retardation. If the outer layer was not so treated, sustained flaming occurred which in itself added to the thermal burn.

INTRODUCTION

In the past, work in this laboratory has been directed toward a study of flash burns in unshielded skin. It is well known from the atomic bombing in Japan that this type of burn was modified by clothing. A laboratory analysis of the protective effect of fabrics against flash burns was begun (5) by shielding the skin with a few representative fabrics and their com-

- | | | |
|------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|
| binations. | 1. <u>2 Layers</u> | 2. <u>4 Layers</u> |
| | a. light green oxford | olive green sateen |
| | knitted cotton underwear | thin cotton oxford |
| | | wool-nylon shirting |
| | b. light green oxford (HPM) | knitted cotton underwear |
| | knitted cotton underwear | |
| | | 3. <u>6 Layers</u> |
| | | olive green sateen |
| | | thin cotton oxford |
| | | mohair frieze |
| | | rayon lining |
| | | wool-nylon shirting |
| | | knitted wool underwear |

5. Morton, J. H., Kingsley, H. D., and Pearse, H. E., "Studies on Flash Burns: The Protective Effects of Certain Fabrics", Surgery, Gynecology and Obstetrics, 94, 497-501 (April 1952).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY TECHNICAL MANUAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

MARINE CORPS PUBLICATIONS

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NAVMC 1104 REV

CAPABILITIES OF ATOMIC WEAPONS (U)



Prepared by
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY, THE NAVY
AND THE AIR FORCE

REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1957

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

c. Indirect Blast Injury.

(1) *General.* Indirect blast casualties result from burial by debris from collapsed structures with attendant production of fractures and crushing injuries, from missiles placed in motion by the blast wave, or from fire or asphyxiation where individuals are prevented from escaping the wreckage.

(2) *Personnel in structures.* A major cause of personnel casualties in cities is structural collapse and damage. The number of casualties in a given situation may be reasonably estimated if the structural damage is known. Table 6-1 shows estimates of casualty production in two types of buildings for several damage levels. Data from Section VII may be used to predict the ranges at which specified structural damage occurs. Demolition of a brick house is expected to result in approximately 25 percent mortality, with 20 percent serious injury and 10 percent light injury. On the order of 60 percent of the survivors must be extricated by rescue squads. Without rescue they may become fire or asphyxiation casualties, or in some cases be subjected to lethal doses of residual radiation. Reinforced concrete structures, though much more resistant to blast forces, produce almost 100 percent mortality on collapse. The figures of table 6-1 for brick homes are based on data from British World War II experience. It may be assumed that these predictions are reasonably reliable for those cases where the population is in a general state of expectancy of being subjected to bombing and that most personnel have selected the safest places in the buildings as a result of specific air raid warnings. For cases of no prewarning or preparation, the number of casualties is expected to be considerably higher. To make a good estimate of casualty production in structures other

than those listed in table 6-1, it is necessary to consider the type of structural damage that occurs and the characteristics of the resultant missiles. Glass breakage extends to considerably greater ranges than almost any other structural damage, and may be expected to produce large numbers of casualties at ranges where personnel are relatively safe from other effects, particularly for an unwarned population.

Table 6-1. Estimated Casualty Production in Structures for Various Degrees of Structural Damage

	Killed outright	Serious injury (hospitalization)	Light injury (No hospitalization)
1-2 story brick homes (high explosive data):	Percent	Percent	Percent
Severe damage.....	25	20	10
Moderate damage.....	< 5	10	5
Light damage.....	-----	< 5	< 5
Reinforced-concrete buildings (Japanese data, nuclear):			
Severe damage.....	100	-----	-----
Moderate damage.....	10	15	20
Light damage.....	< 5	< 5	15

Note. These percentages do not include the casualties which may result from fires, asphyxiation, and other causes from failure to extricate trapped personnel. The numbers represent the estimated percentage of casualties expected at the maximum range where the specified structural damage occurs.

Personnel in a prone position are less likely to be struck by flying missiles than those who remain standing.

6-3

Table 6-2. Critical Radiant Exposures for Burns Under Clothing

(Expressed in cal/cm² incident on outer surface of cloth)

Clothing	Burn	1 KT	100 KT	10 MT
Summer Uniform.....	1°	8	11	14
(2 layers).....	2°	20	25	35
Winter Uniform.....	1°	60	80	100
(4 layers).....	2°	70	90	120


6-4

Morrison Shelters in Recent Air Raids.

A report of Ministry of Home Security experts on 39 cases of bombing incidents in different parts of Britain covering all those for which full particulars are available in which Morrison shelters were involved shows how well they have stood up to severe tests of heavy bombing.

All the incidents were serious. Many of the incidents involved direct hits on the houses concerned a risk against which it was never claimed these shelters would afford protection. In all of them the houses in which shelters were placed were within the radius of damage by bombs; in 24 there was complete demolition of the house on the shelter.

A hundred and nineteen people were sheltering in these "Morrison's" and only four were killed. So that 115 out of 119 people were saved. Of these only 7 were seriously injured and 14 slightly injured while 94 escaped uninjured. The majority were able to leave their shelters unaided.



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January 15th, 1941.

W A R C A B I N E T.

AIR RAID SHELTER POLICY.

Memorandum by the Minister of Home Security.

6. Shelter in the home: The Anderson shelter was originally intended for indoor use but for a number of reasons including the danger of fire an outdoor variant was adopted. Experience has shown that the objections to the indoor use of the Anderson or somewhat similar shelter are not so serious as was thought and two designs have been produced which can be erected indoors without support. These new types, although they may give slightly less protection than a well covered Anderson shelter out of doors, would fill the needs of a large section of the public, especially the middle class. One design allows the use of the shelter as part of the furniture of the room.

7. I regard shelters of this type as of the first importance and wish to provide them on a big scale. Each shelter will use over 3 cwt. of steel and will allow at a pinch two adults and one to two children to sleep inside. For an outlay of about 65,000 tons of steel, as a first instalment, I could therefore produce 400,000 shelters with accommodation for at least 1,000,000 persons. I should wish to complete such a programme within the first three months of production and thereafter at a similar or increasing rate. From enquiries I believe that manufacture can be arranged provided steel is supplied and if the Cabinet approves my policy I shall require their direction that the steel be made available.

10. Conclusions.

I ask for a general endorsement of the policy I have outlined in this paper and in particular for the agreement of my colleagues:

- (i) that proposals for building shelters of massive construction should be rejected;
- (ii) that steel should be made available to carry out the programme outlined in paragraph 7 for the provision of steel shelters indoors;
- (iii) that the limit of income for the provision of free shelter for insured persons should be raised from £250 to £350 per annum.

H.M.

MINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY.

January 15th, 1941.

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Printed for the War Cabinet. May 1941.

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58

W.P. (G) (41) 44.

May 5, 1941.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET.

AIR RAIDS ON LONDON, SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1940.

Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security.

Framed buildings.

Most valuable information has been gained on the effects of bombs on framed buildings. Such buildings are practically immune to anything but a direct hit. Blast damage from bombs outside is usually confined to windows and internal partitions. Even parachute mines falling immediately outside the building or exploding on the roof produce negligible damage to structure or floors.

Relation of Casualties to Bombs Dropped.

From a knowledge of the number of bombs dropped and the casualties occurring in different boroughs, some idea can be gained of the effectiveness of bombs in producing casualties. The number of casualties per bomb varies widely from 1.59 in the least to 6.94 in the most populated boroughs, but it follows closely the apparent densities of population as shown in figure 1. The number of casualties per bomb is roughly a twelfth of the number of persons per acre, and the number of deaths per bomb about 1/60th of the number of persons per acre. From this it can be deduced that the mean distance at which injury from a bomb is likely to occur is 35 ft., and that at which the bomb is lethal is 15 ft.

The casualties per bomb in Central London fell steadily from an average of 3.7 in September to 2.7 in October and 1.7 in November. This corresponds to the considerable fall in population in most of the boroughs concerned.

Conclusion.

We may now say that we have a good general understanding, both qualitative and quantitative, of the effects of bombs on buildings and on cities. New types of bombs, particularly heavier bombs, may be used, but we can anticipate no startling change in the effects apart from increase in minor damage. With bombing of the present type the results of our work are to show that in urban areas, such as that of the County of London, *for one ton of bombs approximately 10 houses will be destroyed or will need pulling down. 25 more will be temporarily uninhabitable, and another 80 will be slightly damaged. 80 people will be made temporarily homeless and 35 will lose their homes permanently. 25 people, mostly among the latter category, will be wounded, the greater part of them slightly, and 6 will be killed or die from wounds.*

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER

A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED PER TONNE OF BOMBS DURING WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II

BOMB SIZES

=> ~ 175 kg

For World War II the average bomb weight was between 150 - 200 kg. (R.C. 268, Table 6), whereas for World War I the majority of bombs were 12 or 50 kg.

TABLE 5

Relative safeties in World War II deduced from
population and casualty distribution

	In the open	Under cover	In shelter
Population exposure	5%	60%	35%
Location people killed	19%	62%	19%
Relative safety	72%	20%	10%
RELATIVE DANGER!			

- (1) A house about $3\frac{1}{2}$ times as safe as in the open.
- (2) A shelter about twice as safe as a house.

Table 6 also shows the location of killed which is implied by each of the possible population exposures. The only evidence available on this point is that, for the day raid on June 13th, 1946, in which the total number killed was 59, 69.5% of the people killed in the City were in the open.

THE EFFECTS OF
THE ATOMIC BOMBS
AT HIROSHIMA
AND NAGASAKI



REPORT OF THE BRITISH
MISSION TO JAPAN

PUBLISHED
FOR THE HOME OFFICE AND THE AIR MINISTRY BY
HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
LONDON

1946



Photo No. 17. HIROSHIMA. Typical, part below ground, earth-covered, timber framed shelter 300 yds. from the centre of damage, which is to the right. In common with similar but fully sunk shelters, none appeared to have been structurally damaged by the blast. Exposed woodwork was liable to "flashburn." Internal blast probably threw the occupants about, and gamma rays may have caused casualties. See paragraph 40.



Photo No. 18. NAGASAKI. Typical small earth-covered back yard shelter with crude wooden frame, less than 100 yds. from the centre of damage, which is to the right. There was a large number of such shelters, but whereas nearly all those as close as this one had their roofs forced in, only half were damaged at 300 yds., and practically none at half a mile from the centre of damage. See paragraph 41.

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RESEARCH ON BLAST EFFECTS IN TUNNELS

With Special Reference to the Use of London Tubes as Shelter

by F. H. Pavry

Summary and Conclusions

The use of the London tube railways as shelter from nuclear weapons raises many problems, and considerable discussion of some aspects has taken place from time to time. But - until the results of the research here described were available - no one was able to say with any certainty whether the tubes would provide relatively safe shelter or not.

This research, consisting of a series of model experiments, has demonstrated that the risk from blast in the tubes would be less than the risks above ground. The results are considered to be consistent enough to provide a good estimate of full-scale conditions, and reliable enough to be used as a basis for Home Office shelter policy regarding the London tube railways.

Introduction


When the Advisory Group on Structural Research for Civil Defence was formed in 1957, the Chairman recommended that a study of the effects of blast on tunnels should be one of the main research projects. The relevant paragraphs of his proposals⁽¹⁾ for a research programme were:-

"In any consideration of tunnels as shelter the crucial problem is the entry of blast, either through existing openings or from a crater formed by a ground-burst bomb. It is particularly important to know if the collapse of a tunnel by earth shock would prevent the blast from entering it, and also whether the collapse would provide a seal against the entry of water from the crater. It is probable that some data could be derived from model experiments using H.E. charges. But it is for consideration whether the results would be so conclusive that the behaviour of full-size tunnels when damaged by megaton weapons could be forecast with the confidence that a major shelter programme would demand."

At the second meeting⁽²⁾ the Group agreed that model experiments with H.E. charges would be worthwhile, and that the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (A.W.R.E.) should carry out this research, which has now been accepted by the Advisory Group as successfully completed. A summary record of the progress follows.

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100 ton TNT test on 1000 ft section of London
Underground tube at Suffield, Alberta, 3 Aug 1961



Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, "1/40th Scale Experiment to Assess the Effect of Nuclear Blast on the London Underground System", Report AWRE-E2/62, 1962, Figure 30. (National Archives ES 3/57.)

~~RESTRICTED~~

These trials are described in a preliminary report⁽⁵⁾ prepared for the Advisory Group by A.W.R.E. It was shown that the blast pressure inside a tunnel system, having openings at intervals to ground level, is less than the pressure at ground level at any distance from the explosion, by a factor of about 3. This reduction in pressure was apparently caused by the station entrances acting as expansion chambers. This observation was of outstanding significance to the consideration of London tubes as shelter.

All previous research on blast in tunnels - and a great amount of work was done on this in the last war - had been conducted with blast entering the open end of a tunnel without side openings. This research had shown that the blast, once it had got into a tunnel, tended to travel great distances without appreciable diminution. This had, therefore, led to the general belief that the London tubes could be death traps rather than shelters.

The more recent research here described showed for the first time that a person sheltering in a tube would be exposed to a blast pressure only about $\frac{1}{3}$ as great as he would be exposed to if he was above ground. (In addition, of course, he would be fully protected from fallout in the tube.)

In fact A.W.R.E. carried out two further tests, with more accurate scaling of station volumes based on more detailed information from the London Transport Executive. A full report on all four tests is in preparation.

These later tests showed that the pressure in station tunnels was only about $\frac{1}{6}$ th of the ground-level pressure, but that the reduction was not so great in the smaller-diameter train tunnels.

At this stage the Advisory Group were reasonably satisfied that this problem - of blast entry from stations - had been solved. But the other major question of blast entry direct from the crater remained in doubt, on account of the very small scale of the tests to date. Therefore, when the opportunity arose of testing at a really large scale at Suffield, Canada, it was naturally accepted.

Large-Scale Field Test ($\frac{1}{40}$) at Suffield, Alberta

The test is fully described in an A.W.R.E. report⁽⁶⁾. The decision of the Canadian Defence Research Board to explode very large amounts of high explosive provided a medium for a variety of target-response trials that was welcome at a time when nuclear tests in Australia were suspended. A.W.R.E. used the 100-ton explosion in 1961 to test, among other items, the model length of the London tube, at $\frac{1}{40}$ th scale, that had already been tested at $\frac{1}{117}$ scale.

Blast Entry from Stations

There was remarkable agreement with the $\frac{1}{117}$ th scale trials: "maximum overpressure in the train tunnels was of the order of $\frac{1}{3}$ rd the corresponding peak shock overpressure in the incident blast. The pressures in the stations were about $\frac{1}{6}$ th those in the corresponding incident blast". In comparing the results at the two scales it was noted that the pressures in the train tunnels (between stations) was higher at Suffield than at the smaller scale; this may, the report suggests, have been due to some blast entry from the crater at Suffield.

Blast Entry from the Crater

There may - as has just been noted - have been some entry of blast at the crater. But the all-important fact is that it was nowhere enough to bring the pressure in the tunnel up to more than a $\frac{1}{3}$ rd of the free-air pressure (see fig. 30 reproduced, and attached to this note.) From this, and from a detailed study of tunnel rings ejected by the explosion over a wide area, it can be concluded that the instantaneous crushing of the tube near the crater sealed it against the entry of any significant blast pressure.

Air Flow in Stations

The Report indicates that there would be turbulence generated by blast entry at stations and that there would be a danger to occupants there, on account of blast "windage" acting on them and on missiles that could injure them. This danger would be less in the train tunnels between stations.

Conclusion

The Advisory Group discussed the Suffield Test on tunnels on Nov. 1st 1962, and concluded that model experiments have successfully demonstrated that the risks from blast inside the London tubes would be less than above ground. The Group considered that the results obtained were consistent enough to provide as good an estimate of full-scale effects from megaton weapons as was likely to be obtainable, and that the Chairman could advise the Home Office confidently on the basis of these results. The Group accepted that there would be a risk of casualty-producing air flow in stations, but decided to defer a decision on whether further research on this problem would be profitable. The Chairman said that he would first convey the results of the completed research to the Shelter Division of the Home Office before asking the Group whether it was worth studying this remaining, but less important, problem.

3rd October, 1963.

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(Official Use Only.)

The Effects of **Nuclear Weapons**



SAMUEL GLASSTONE
Editor

Prepared by the
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Published by the
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
June 1957

Foreword

This handbook, prepared by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant government agencies and published by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, is a comprehensive summary of current knowledge on the effects of nuclear weapons. The effects information contained herein is calculated for yields up to 20 megatons and the scaling laws for hypothetically extending the calculations beyond this limit are given. The figure of 20 megatons however is not to be taken as an indication of capabilities or developments.

CHARLES E. WILSON
Secretary of Defense

LEWIS L. STRAUSS
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission

THE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION commends this publication as the definitive source of information on the effects of nuclear weapons for the use of organizations engaged in Civil Defense activities. Its detailed treatment of the physical phenomena associated with nuclear explosions provides the necessary technical background for development of countermeasures against all nuclear effects of Civil Defense interest.

VAL PETERSON

Administrator

Federal Civil Defense Administration

TABLE 3.11

OVERPRESSURE, DYNAMIC PRESSURE, AND WIND VELOCITY IN AIR AT SEA LEVEL

<i>Peak overpressure (pounds per square inch)</i>	<i>Peak dynamic pressure (pounds per square inch)</i>	<i>Maximum wind velocity (miles per hour)</i>
72	80	1,170
50	40	940
30	16	670
20	8	470
10	2	290
5	0.7	160
2	0.1	70

3.12 At a given location, the dynamic pressure changes with time in a manner somewhat similar to the change in the overpressure, but the rate of pressure decrease behind the shock front is different. This may be seen from Fig. 3.12 which indicates qualitatively how the two pressures vary in the course of the first second or so following arrival of the shock front.




Figure 3.12. Variation of overpressure and dynamic pressure with time at a fixed location.

DUCTILITY

3.73 The term ductility refers to the ability of a material or structure to absorb energy inelastically without failure; in other words, the greater the ductility, the greater the resistance to failure. Materials which are brittle have poor ductility and fail easily.

3.74 There are two main aspects of ductility to be considered. When a force (or load) is applied to a material so as to deform it, as is the case in a nuclear explosion, for example, the initial deformation is said to be "elastic." Provided it is still in the elastic range, the material will recover its original form when the loading is removed. However, if the "stress" produced by the load is sufficiently great, the material passes into the "plastic" range. In this state the material does not recover completely after removal of the stress, that is to say, the deformation is permanent, but there is no failure. Only when the stress reaches the "ultimate strength" does failure, i. e., breakage, occur.

3.75 Ideally, a structure which is to suffer little damage from blast should have as much elasticity as possible. Unfortunately, structural materials are generally not able to absorb much energy in the elastic range, although many common materials can take up large amounts of energy in the plastic range before they fail. The problem in blast-resistant design, therefore, is to decide how much permanent (plastic) deformation can be accepted before a particular structure is rendered useless. This will, of course, vary with the nature and purpose of the structure. Although deformation to the point of collapse is definitely undesirable, some lesser deformation may not seriously interfere with the continued use of the structure.

3.76 It is evident that ductility is a desirable property of structural materials required to resist blast. Structural steel and steel reinforcement have this property to a considerable extent. They are able to absorb large amounts of energy, e. g., from a blast wave, without failure and thus reduce the chances of collapse of the structure in which they are used. Steel has the further advantage of a higher yield point (or elastic limit) under dynamic than under static loading.

3.77 Although concrete alone is not ductile, when steel and concrete are used together, as in reinforced-concrete structures, the ductile behavior of the steel will usually predominate. The structure will then have considerable ductility and, consequently, resistance to blast. Without reinforcement, masonry walls are completely lacking in ductility and readily suffer brittle failure, as stated above.

The curves show the variation of peak overpressure with distance for a 1 KT surface burst and for a 1 KT free-air burst (based on the $2W$ assumption in § 3.94) in a standard sea level atmosphere.

Scaling. For yields other than 1 KT, the range to which a given overpressure extends scales as the cube root of the yield, i. e.,

$$d = d_0 \times W^{1/3},$$

where, for a given overpressure,

d_0 is the distance from the explosion for 1 KT,

and

d is the distance from the explosion for W KT.

Example

Given: A 1 MT surface burst.

Find: The distance to which 2 psi extends.

Solution: From Fig. 3.93 the cube root of 1000 is 10. From Fig. 3.94a, a peak overpressure of 2 psi occurs at a distance of 0.53 mile from a 1 KT surface burst. Therefore, for a 1 MT surface burst,

$$d = d_0 \times W^{1/3} = 0.53 \times 10 = 5.3 \text{ miles. } \textit{Answer}$$




Figure 3.94a. Peak overpressure for a 1-kiloton surface burst and free air burst.

TABLE 6.12

DAMAGE CRITERIA FOR SHALLOW BURIED OR EARTH COVERED SURFACE STRUCTURES

Type of structure	Damage class	Peak overpressure (psi)	Nature of damage
Light, corrugated steel arch, surface structure (10-gage corrugated steel with a span of 20 to 25 feet) with 3 feet of earth cover over the crown.	A	35-40	Complete collapse.
	B	30-35	Collapse of portion of arch facing blast.
	C	20-25	Deformation of end walls and arch, possible entrance door damage.
	D	10-15	Possible damage to ventilation system and entrance door.
Light, reinforced-concrete surface or underground shelter with 3 feet minimum earth cover. (Panels 2 to 3 inches thick, with beams spaced on 4-foot centers.)	A	30-35	Collapse.
	B	25-30	Partial collapse.
	C	15-25	Deformation, severe cracking and spalling of panels.
	D	10-15	Cracking of panels, possible entrance door damage.

6.13 An illustration of B-type damage to a 10-gage corrugated steel-arch, earth-covered, surface structure is shown in Fig. 6.13. It will be noted that about half of the arch has collapsed. This failure was attributed primarily to the dynamic pressure acting on the forward slope of the earth mound.

6.14 The peak overpressure for the complete collapse of the corrugated steel-arch structure, with 3 feet of earth cover, is given in Table 6.12 as 35 to 40 pounds per square inch. However, it has been estimated that if this structure had been completely buried, so that no earth mound was required, an overpressure of 40 to 50 pounds per square inch would have been necessary to cause it to collapse. This increase in the required overpressure is due to the fact that the dynamic pressure is minimized under these conditions. It may be mentioned



Figure 6.13. B-type damage to earth-covered 10-gage corrugated steel structure.

that, using standard engineering techniques, it is possible to design underground structures which will withstand blast overpressures in excess of 100 pounds per square inch at the surface (see Chapter XII).




Figure 8.47. Attenuation of initial gamma radiation.

HOME OFFICE
SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT

MANUAL OF CIVIL DEFENCE

Volume I

PAMPHLET No. 1

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

LONDON
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1956

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- 30 Research into the causes of fire in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, combined with a study of the secondary fire risk from the flying bomb damage in this country during the last war has shown that with nuclear attack the secondary fire risk is likely to be small compared with the primary risk of direct ignition by thermal radiation.

Fire precautions

- 31 Although the fire risk even from a nominal bomb is always serious, targets in this country, where the great majority of buildings are of brick, stone or concrete, are less vulnerable to fire than were those in Japan, where most of the buildings were of wood. Moreover, if people do what they can to keep heat radiation out of buildings, the risk of fire can be further reduced, although these precautions would be effective only beyond the central area of blast destruction (see Chapter IV).
- 32 It might be advisable to brick up certain windows of important buildings, but since the thermal radiation has no great penetrating power, any opaque screen, especially a white one, will keep it out: the simple process of whitewashing windows will keep out about 80 per cent. of the heat. The windows may be broken by the blast wave but as this travels more slowly it arrives after the thermal radiation is over (except of course in the central area of blast destruction), whether the bomb is a hydrogen bomb or an atomic bomb.
- 33 Another obvious fire precaution is the removal of all readily combustible material from the direct path of any heat radiation that could possibly enter windows or other openings.
- 34 Both these precautions apply only to those windows and other openings that have a direct view of some part of the sky. In a built-up area they would apply more particularly to the windows of upper floors; even for a high airburst, in a closely built-up area one building shields another to a considerable extent.

The probable fire situation in a British city

- 35 Within $\frac{1}{2}$ mile of an airburst nominal bomb the heat flash is very intense indeed, but in this area there would be almost complete destruction of buildings by blast, and this would tend to impede the development of fire. This did not happen in Japan because most Japanese houses are constructed of wood and once they were set on fire they continued to burn even when knocked over. In this country only about 10 per cent. of all the material in the average house is combustible, and under conditions of complete collapse, where air would be almost entirely excluded, it is doubtful whether a fire could continue on any vigorous scale. The main fire zone will be around this central area of heavy destruction, in the region where buildings are damaged but standing sufficiently to allow free burning. For a nominal bomb, this zone is likely to reach as far as $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles.
- 36 The range of ignition is affected to some extent by the state of the atmosphere and on a dull misty day will be reduced, although it is impossible to say precisely to what degree.

The possibilities of a fire storm

- 37 The chief feature of a fire storm is the generation of high winds which are drawn into the centre of the fire area to feed the rising column of hot air and flames. These in-rushing winds prevent the spread of fire outwards, but ensure the almost complete destruction by fire of

everything within the fire area. This inevitably increases the number of casualties, since it becomes impossible for people to escape by their own efforts because they succumb to the effects of suffocation and heat stroke.

- 38 The Hiroshima bomb (but not the Nagasaki one) caused a fire storm. A fire storm occurred in Hamburg and possibly also in several other German cities as a result of accurate and very dense attacks with incendiary and high explosive bombs by the R.A.F. Information on the subject is limited, but it has been fairly well established that during these particular raids on Germany half the buildings in the target area were set on fire in about half an hour. In such circumstances it seems that nothing can prevent all the fires from joining together into one mass fire engulfing the whole area.
- 39 Whether a fire storm develops depends also on the nature of the target; where there are tall buildings closely packed together with plenty of combustible material to burn, the risk is much greater than in areas less densely built up.
- 40 It seems unlikely from the evidence available that an initial density of fires equivalent to one in every other building would be started by a nuclear explosion over a British city. Studies have shown that a much smaller proportion of buildings than this would be exposed to thermal radiation and even then it is not certain that continuing fires would develop. Curtains may catch fire, but it does not necessarily follow that they will set light to the room; in the last war it was found that only one incendiary bomb out of every six that hit buildings started a continuing fire. Moreover after a nuclear explosion the large and almost completely flattened central area would counteract the development of a fire storm, since one essential requirement seems to be a continuous mass of fire over a large area. It is unlikely, therefore, that a fire storm would develop after a nuclear attack on a British city, though the possibility cannot be ruled out. The risk can be reduced by clearing or partially clearing the top floors of buildings which are likely to be exposed to the heat radiation, and by adopting the other precautions mentioned above.
- 41 There would, however, in any case be many serious fires and fire areas.

Scaling laws

- 42 For more powerful bombs the total heat output is roughly proportional to the power of the bomb, so that a 10 megaton bomb, which is 500 times more powerful than a nominal bomb, radiates 500 times as much heat. Because of the inverse square law, the distance at which a given amount of heat is received (measured per unit area of receiving surface) varies as the square root of the power of the bomb. For example, if a nominal airburst bomb produces 5 calories per square centimetre at 1 mile, a 10 megaton airburst bomb will produce the same amount at 22 miles ($22 = \sqrt{500}$). However, although at 1 mile from a nominal bomb an intensity of 5 calories per square centimetre would ignite easily combustible materials and start fires, it would not do so at 22 miles from a 10 megaton bomb because the heat is applied more slowly. From a 10 megaton bomb, with its longer lasting thermal radiation (see paragraph 21), it takes about 20 calories per square centimetre to start fires because so much of the heat (spread out over the longer emission) is wasted by conduction into the interior of the combustible material and by convection and re-radiation whilst the

temperature of the surface is being raised to the ignition point. But the distance at which 20 calories per square centimetre can be produced is only 11 miles, so that the scaling factor for a 10 megaton airburst bomb is therefore 11 and not 22.


- 43 For a ground burst bomb, however, several other factors contribute to a further reduction in the fire range. Apart from an actual loss of heat by absorption into the ground and from the pronounced shielding effect of buildings, the debris from the crater tends to reduce the radiating temperature of the fireball and a greater proportion of the energy is consequently radiated in the infra red region of the spectrum—this proportion being more easily absorbed by the atmosphere. The magnitude of this absorption effect is not known with certainty, but it is important in hydrogen bomb explosions because of the longer ranges involved and because—as later explained in paragraph 81—the likelihood of ground bursts has been increased with the advent of the hydrogen bomb. For all these reasons it has been estimated that the scaling factor for the fire range for a ground burst 10 megaton bomb is about 8. This will mean a fire ring extending from about $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 10 miles instead of, as in the case of a nominal airburst bomb, from $\frac{1}{2}$ to $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles. Isolated fires may occur at greater distances, depending on the combustibility of material within buildings, but it is impossible to apply precise scaling laws to such haphazard incidents.
- 44 An important point in relation to personal protection against the effects of hydrogen bomb explosions is that because the thermal radiation lasts so long there is more time for people who may be caught in the open, and who may be well beyond the range of serious danger from blast, to rush to cover and so escape some part of the exposure. For example, people in the open might receive second degree burns (blistering) on exposed skin at a range of 16 miles from a 10 megaton ground burst bomb (8×2 —see paragraph 24). If, however, they could take cover in a few seconds they would escape this damage. Moreover, at this range the blast wave would not arrive for another minute and a half so that any effects due to the blast in the open (e.g. flying glass, etc.) could be completely avoided.

Practical protection

- 88 Large buildings with a number of storeys, especially if they are of heavy construction, provide much better protection than small single-storey structures (see Figure 4). Houses in terraces likewise provide much better protection than isolated houses because of the shielding effect of neighbouring houses.

GOOD PROTECTION

Solidly constructed multi-storeyed building with occupants well removed from fall-out on ground and roof. The thickness of floors and roof overhead, and the shielding effect of other buildings, all help to cut down radiation



BAD PROTECTION

Isolated wooden bungalow




FIGURE 4

Examples of good and bad protection afforded by buildings against fall-out.

- 89 It is estimated that the protection factor (the factor by which the outside dose has to be divided to get the inside dose) of a ground floor room in a two-storey house ranges from 10 to about 50, depending on wall thickness and the shielding afforded by neighbouring buildings. The corresponding figures for bungalows are about 10–20, and for three-storey houses about 15–100. An average two-storey brick house in a built-up area gives a factor of 40, but basements, where the radiation from outside the house is attenuated by a very great thickness of earth, have protection factors ranging up to 200–300. A slit trench with even a light cover of boards or corrugated iron without earth overhead gives a factor of 7, and if 1 ft. of earth cover is added the

factor rises to 100. If the trench can be covered with 2 or 3 feet of earth then a factor of more than 200–300 can be obtained (see Figure 5).




FIGURE 5

Protection factors in slit trenches (the factor by which the outside dose is divided to get the inside dose).

Choosing a refuge room

- 90** In choosing a refuge room in a house one would select a room with a minimum of outside walls and make every effort to improve the protection of such outside walls as there were. In particular the windows would have to be blocked up, e.g. with sandbags. Where possible, boxes of earth could be placed round an outside wall to provide additional protection, and heavy furniture (pianos, bookcases etc.) along the inside of the wall would also help. A cellar would be ideal. Where the ground floor of the house consists of boards and timber joists carried on sleeper walls it may be possible to combine the high protection of the slit trench with some of the comforts of the refuge room by constructing a trench under the floor.

Once a trap door had been cut in the floor boards and joists and the trench had been dug, there would be no further interference with the peace-time use of the room.

Estimated under-cover doses in the fall-out area

- 91** Taking an average protective factor of 40 for a two-storey house in a built-up area, the doses accumulated in 36 hours for the ranges referred to in the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Report (paragraph 84) would have been:—

190 miles downwind	7½r
160 " "	12½r
140 " "	20r

*15 Megatons
Bravo 1954*

which are all well below the lowest figure of 25r referred to in Table 1. At closer ranges along the axis of the fall-out, the doses accumulated in 36 hours would have been much higher, but over most of the contaminated area—with this standard of protection—the majority of those affected would have been saved from death, and even from sickness, by taking cover continuously for the first 36 hours.

5. Radiation sickness

Assume dose incurred in a single shift (3–4 hours) by the “average” man, over the whole body:—

25 roentgens	—No obvious harm.
100 ,,	—Some nausea and vomiting.
500 ,,	—Lethal to about 50 per cent. people (death up to 6 weeks later).
800 ,,	or more—Lethal to all (death up to 6 weeks later).

Note: If dose spread uniformly over 2–3 days, then 60 roentgens could be incurred with no more effect than 25 roentgens in a single exposure of 3–4 hours.




FIGURE 11

Combined effects (excluding residual radioactivity) from a 10 megaton ground burst bomb. Heat and immediate gamma radiation effects relate only to UNPROTECTED people.

A FALLOUT FORECASTING TECHNIQUE WITH RESULTS OBTAINED AT THE ENIWETOK PROVING GROUND

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ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

The work described herein is a part of the research sponsored by BuShips and the United States Army and locally designated as program 2, problem 3, phase 3. Its technical objective is AW-7 and it is described on RDB card NS 081-001.

SUMMARY

The problem: A fallout forecasting technique is needed to qualitatively describe the fallout hazard resulting from nuclear detonations. This technique should have such flexibility that its employment is valid for field use.

Findings: A summary of the latest experimental and theoretical considerations has resulted in the development of a technique whose complexity is dependent on the required accuracy of the results desired. This technique has been satisfactorily tested at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds for land surface and water surface bursts.

Particle size distribution in source model

All particle sizes were assumed at all elevations within the cloud except the lower two-thirds of the stem. However, to obtain agreement with past fallout measurements and with the optical diameter of the mushroom, it was necessary to fractionate the particle size distribution radially within the cloud. Otherwise, the computed fallout area about ground zero would be too large. The fractionation was specified as follows: particles of 1,000 microns in diameter and larger were restricted to the inner 10 percent of the mushroom radius or approximately the stem radius; those from 500 to 1,000 microns in diameter were limited to the inner 50 percent of the cloud radius. Since the relation of activity to particle size is some function of the particle diameter this fractionation tends to concentrate the activity about the axis of symmetry of the cloud.

Falling speeds (feet/hour)

J. M. Dallavalle, Mircomeritics, Pittman Publishing Corp., 1948.

Altitude	75 μ	100 μ	200 μ	350 μ	Altitude	75 μ	100 μ	200 μ	350 μ
0-----	3,060	5,040	11,700	21,600	65-----	4,190	7,480	26,100	51,100
5-----	3,120	5,240	12,300	22,900	70-----	4,110	7,320	27,600	55,200
10-----	3,200	5,480	12,900	24,100	75-----	4,010	7,150	28,100	59,700
15-----	3,270	5,750	13,700	25,500	80-----	3,910	6,960	27,800	61,900
20-----	3,360	5,980	14,400	27,100	85-----	3,800	6,770	27,100	67,800
25-----	3,470	6,160	15,300	28,800	90-----	3,720	6,640	26,500	71,300
30-----	3,570	6,380	16,300	30,800	95-----	3,620	6,470	25,800	77,300
35-----	3,720	6,640	17,500	33,000	100-----	3,550	6,340	25,300	80,200
40-----	3,870	6,910	18,600	35,300	105-----	3,470	6,180	24,800	75,800
45-----	4,040	7,200	19,800	37,800	110-----	3,400	6,050	24,000	74,200
50-----	4,210	7,520	21,400	40,600	115-----	3,330	5,930	23,700	72,600
55-----	4,420	7,860	23,200	44,600	120-----	3,260	5,800	23,400	71,100
60-----	4,200	7,700	24,400	47,200					

Experimental data from past tests at Eniwetok Atoll indicated that the particles were irregular in shape and had a mean density of 2.36 g/cu cm.

Time variation of the winds aloft

In most of the observations made at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, the winds aloft were not in a steady state. Significant changes in the winds aloft were observed in as short a period as 3 hours. This variability was probably due to the fact that proper firing conditions which required winds that would deposit the fallout north of the proving ground, occurred only during an unstable synoptic situation of rather short duration.

The forecasting technique described was employed by the fallout program at the Eniwetok Proving Ground to satisfy certain project requirements. One project had three ships equipped to collect fallout and their positions had to be determined for most efficient collection; another sampled the ocean for fallout; while another made an aerial survey of the contaminated area. The navigational schedules for these latter projects were based on the forecast fallout pattern. Operations were controlled through the program control center aboard the task force command ship where the forecasts were prepared.

The meteorological data was received from the weather ship at Bikini Atoll as well as from weather stations at Rongerik Atoll and Eniwetok Atoll. Furthermore all forecasts made by the task force weather central at Eniwetok Atoll were usually available aboard the command ship by facsimile through the ships weather station.

Upper air measurements were made at Bikini, Rongerik, and Eniwetok Atolls every 3 hours starting at H-24 hour and continuing until H+24 hour for any given detonation. The frequency of observations was usually increased during the period from H-6 to H-2 hours. The altitudes reached on the wind runs were remarkably high and gave perhaps the best set of winds aloft measurements to date. The average termination altitude was approximately 90,000 feet with many runs over 100,000 feet. Such excellent coverage of the winds aloft was a major help in the fallout forecasting.

Fallout forecasts were made every 3 hours starting at H-24 hour using the *measured* winds available at the time. This process was continued up to shot time and from then on the technique of correcting for time variation was employed every 3 hours until the fallout event was completed. It was not feasible to correct for space variation and vertical motions during this period because of lack of time and data.

Fallout plots

The fallout forecasts determined at the weapons-test operation were based entirely on measured data and quantitatively considered time variation of the wind. No space variation corrections or computed values of vertical motions were employed in their construction.


A and B were land-surface detonations, C and D were water-surface shots.

The comparison is excellent for all shots except B.


SUMMARY

The fallout forecasting technique described in this report was successfully employed for both land surface and water surface detonations at the Eniwetok Proving Ground. With known meteorological data such a technique will successfully qualify the area of fallout and indicate qualitatively the relative intensity of radiation.


"Height lines" are deposit locations for all particles falling from a fixed altitude within the mushroom cloud. "Size lines" are deposit locations of a fixed particle size from various altitudes. A height line from the base of the mushroom disc is the "hot line".




Comparison of fallout forecast with test results—shot A



Comparison of fallout forecast with test results—shot B.



Comparison of fallout forecast with test results—shot C.



Comparison of fallout forecast with test results—shot D.

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WT-615

This document consists of 84 pages

No. 254 of 265 copies, Series A

Report to the Scientific Director

NATURE, INTENSITY, AND DISTRIBUTION OF FALL-OUT FROM MIKE SHOT

By

W. B. Heidt, Jr., LCDR, USN

E. A. Schuert

W. W. Perkins

R. L. Stetson

U. S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory
San Francisco, California
April 1953

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


Fig. 3.2—Differential fall-out collector.




Fig. 3.8—A typical land station.






Fig. 3.9—A typical lagoon station.



1,000
MICRONS

Fig. 4.4—Inverted view of typical particles removed from life-float decking.




Fig. 4.5—Typical life-float section.




Fig. 4.6—Particle deposition on life-float decking (lower deck of Fig. 4.5).




Fig. 4.8—Mass distribution of fall-out (g/sq ft).




Fig. 6.1—Predicted area of primary fall-out.

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OPERATION CASTLE

Project 2.5a

DISTRIBUTION AND INTENSITY OF FALLOUT

REPORT TO THE SCIENTIFIC DIRECTOR

by

R. L. Steton
E. A. Schuert
W. W. Perkins
T. H. Shirasawa
H. K. Chan

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January 1956

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


Fig. 5.3 Composite Gamma Ionization Decay Curve




Fig. 5.10 Shot 1, Fallout Particulate, Station 250.04

This is a raft downwind in Bikini Lagoon, which received a land equivalent of 113 R/hr (1 hour reference gamma dose rate), according to Figures 2.2 and 6.1. Land equivalent dose rates were 7 times the raft dose rate in the lagoon.




Fig. 5.11 Shot 1, Integrated Gamma Dose, Station 251.03

Bikini (How) Island in Bikini Atoll, which received a land equivalent of about 725 R/hr gamma at 1 hour reference time, according to Figures 2.2 and 6.1.

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TECHNICAL ANALYSIS REPORT - AFSWP NO. 507-~~SAN~~

SANITIZED
VERSION

RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT HAZARDS FROM SURFACE BURSTS OF
VERY HIGH YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *Sanitized Version*

by

D. C. Borg
L. D. Gates
T. A. Gibson, Jr.
R. W. Paine, Jr.

WEAPONS EFFECTS DIVISION

This Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
Technical Analysis Report is a staff study
prepared for the Chief, AFSWP on a subject
of military interest. The conclusions may
be modified as new data become available.

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MAY 1954

HEADQUARTERS, ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT
WASHINGTON 13, D. C.

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Robert L. Lipp
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1

Idealised Fall-out Contours for a 15 MT Land-surface Burst with a 15 Knot Effective Wind



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The shielding afforded by an ordinary frame house may effectively reduce the size of the hazard areas by a factor of about two, and a basement shelter by a factor of ten or more. Virtually complete protection against the lethal effects of radioactive fall-out can be obtained if personnel have protection equal to or better than that afforded by a simple underground shelter with at least three feet of earth cover, and if they are evacuated after a week or ten days in such a shelter.

One may draw the following conclusions from this analysis:

- a. Very large areas, of the order of 5,000 square miles or more, are likely to be contaminated by the detonation of a 15 megaton yield weapon on land surface, in such intensities as to be hazardous to human life.
- b. The fact that a large percentage of the radiologically hazardous area will lie outside the range of destructive bomb effects for normal wind conditions, extending up to several hundred miles downwind, makes the radiological fall-out hazard a primary anti-personnel effect.
- c. Accurate pre-shot prediction of the location of the hazardous area with respect to the burst point is virtually impossible without extensive wind data at altitudes up to about 100,000 feet, owing to the sensitive wind-dependence of the distribution mechanism.
- d. The fall-out contaminant can be expected to decay at such a rate that all but the most highly contaminated areas could be occupied by previously unexposed personnel on a calculated risk

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basis within a few days after the contaminating event; and even these highly contaminated areas may then be entered briefly by decontamination teams.

e. Passive defense measures, intelligently applied, can drastically reduce the lethally hazardous areas. A course of action involving the seeking of optimum shelter, followed by evacuation of the contaminated area after a week or ten days, appears to offer the best chance of survival. At the distant downwind areas, as much as 5 to 10 hours after detonation time may be available to take shelter before fall-out commences.

f. Universal use of a simply constructed deep underground shelter, a subway tunnel, or the sub-basement of a large building could eliminate the lethal hazard due to external radiation from fall-out completely, if followed by evacuation from the area when ambient radiation intensities have decayed to levels which will permit this to be done safely.

g. It is of vital importance for individuals in hazardous areas to seek optimum shelter at once, since the dosage received in the first few hours after fall-out has commenced will exceed that received over the rest of a week spent in the contaminated area.

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Table II

Total Isodose Contour: 500r from Fall-out to H+50 Hours

Yield (MT)	15	1	10	60	* 60
Downwind extent (mi)	180	52	152	340	(307)
Crosswind axis (mi)	40	12	34	70	
GZ circle radius (mi)	11.5	3.85	9.7	21	
GZ circle displacement (mi)	3.5	1.2	3	5.75	
Area (mi ²)	5400	470	3880	17,900	(16,250)
Area of true ellipse (mi ²)	(5650)	(491)	(4055)	(18,700)	

* Using Part D, Chapter II.

Table VII

Minimum Dosages Within Areas
For City Decontamination
15 MT Surface Burst

Case When Decontamination Takes 2.2 Days and Starts at H+2 Days

<u>AREA</u>	<u>1000 mi²</u>	<u>3000 mi²</u>	<u>5000 mi²</u>	<u>8000 mi²</u>
Damage dose after staying in best average shelter (fall-out time to H+2 days)	160 r	65 r	40 r	23 r
Damage dose during decontamination effort received by 66% of population which is engaged (H+2 days to H+4.2 days)	120 r	50 r	30 r	17 r
Total Damage dose received up to H+4.2 days	280 r	115 r	70 r	40 r
Acute biological effect	LD/1 SD/55	None	None	None

Case When Decontamination Takes 13 Days and Starts at H+6 Days

<u>AREA</u>	<u>1000 mi²</u>	<u>3000 mi²</u>	<u>5000 mi²</u>	<u>8000 mi²</u>
Damage dose before decontamination begins when in best average shelter (fall-out time to H+6 days)	240 r	110 r	60 r	30 r
Damage dose during decontamination effort received by 60% of population which is engaged (H+6 Days to H+19 days)	(No additional damage dose received due to biological recovery)			
Total damage dose received up to H+19 days	240 r	110 r	60 r	30 r
Acute biological effect	SD/25	None	None	None

**Proceedings of the Symposium
held at Washington, D. C.**

April 19-23, 1965 by the

**Subcommittee on Protective Structures,
Advisory Committee on Civil Defense,
National Academy of Sciences—
National Research Council**

Protective Structures for

CIVILIAN POPULATIONS

1966

MODEL ANALYSIS


Mr. Ivor Ll. DAVIES
Suffield Experimental Station
Canadian Defense Research Board
Ralston, Alberta, Canada

Nuclear-Weapon Tests


In 1952 we fired our first nuclear device, effectively a "nominal" weapon, at Monte Bello, off north-west Australia. To the blast loading from this weapon we exposed a number of reinforced-concrete cubicle structures that had been designed for the dynamic loading conditions, and for which we made the best analysis of response we were competent to make at that time. Our estimates of effects were really a dismal failure. The structures were placed at pressure levels of 30, 10, and 6 psi, where we expected them to be destroyed, heavily damaged with some petaling of the front face, and extensively cracked, respectively. In fact, the front face of the cubicle at 30 psi was broken inwards; failure had occurred along both diagonals, and the four triangular petals had been pushed in. At the 10-psi level, where we had three cubicles, each with a different wall thickness (6, 9, and 12 in.), we observed only light cracking in the front face of that cubicle with the least thick wall (6 in.). The other two structures were apparently undamaged, as was the single structure at the 6-psi level.

In 1957, the first proposals were made for the construction of the underground car park in Hyde Park in London. The Home Office was interested in this project since, in an emergency, the structure could be used as a shelter. Consequently a request was made to us at Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (A.W.R.E.) to design a structure that would be resistant to a blast loading of about 50 psi, and to test our design on the model scale.

Using the various load-deformation curves obtained in this test, an estimate was made of the response of the structure to blast loading. Of particular interest was the possible effect of 100 tons of TNT, the first 100-ton trial at Suffield in Alberta.



10 p.s.i.



34 p.s.i.

Dynamic tests, Monte Bello cubicles.

A total of seven more models was made; six were shipped to Canada and placed with the top surface of the roof flush with the ground and at positions where peak pressures of 100, 80, 70, 60, 50, and 40 psi were expected. The seventh model was kept in England for static testing at about the time of firing. The results were not as expected. In the field, the four models farthest from the charge were apparently undamaged; we could see no cracking with the eye, nor did soaking the models with water reveal more than a few hair cracks. The model nearest the charge was lightly cracked in the roof panels and beams, and one of the columns showed slight spalling at the head. This model had been exposed to a peak pressure of 110 psi.

BLAST AND OTHER THREATS

Harold Brode
The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

Chemical High-Explosive Weapons

As in past aerial warfare, bombs and missiles carrying chemical explosives to targets are capable of extensive damage only when delivered in large numbers and with high accuracy.

Biological Warfare

Most biological agents are inexpensive to produce; their effective dissemination over hostile territories remains the chief deterrent to their effective employment. Twenty square miles is about the area that can be effectively covered by a single aircraft; large area coverage presents a task for vast fleets of fairly vulnerable planes flying tight patterns at modest or low altitudes. While agents vary in virulence and in their biologic decay rate, most are quite perishable in normal open-air environments. Since shelter and simple prophylactic measures can be quite effective against biological agents, there is less likelihood of the use of biological warfare on a wholesale basis against a nation, and more chance of limited employment on population concentrations—perhaps by covert delivery, since shelters with adequate filtering could insure rather complete protection to those inside.

Chemical Weapons

Chemical weapons, like biological weapons, are relatively inexpensive to create, but face nearly insurmountable logistics problems on delivery. Although chemical agents produce casualties more rapidly, the greater amounts of material to deliver seriously limit the likelihood of their large-scale deployment. Furthermore, chemical research does not hold promise of the development of significantly more toxic chemicals for future use.

Radiological Weapons

The advantages of such modifications are much less real than apparent. In all weapons delivered by missiles, minimizing the payload and total weight is very important. If the total payload is not to be increased, then the inclusion of inert material to be activated by neutrons must lead to reductions in the explosive yield. If all the weight is devoted to nuclear explosives, then more fission-fragment activity can be created, and it is the net difference in activity that must be balanced against the loss of explosive yield. As it turns out, a fission explosion is a most efficient generator of activity, and greater total doses are not achieved by injecting special inert materials to be activated.

Perret, W.R., Ground Motion Studies at High Incident Overpressure, The Sandia Corporation, Operation PLUMBBOB, WT-1405, for Defense Atomic Support Agency Field Command, June 1960.

The Neutron Bomb

The neutron bomb, so called because of the deliberate effort to maximize the effectiveness of the neutrons, would necessarily be limited to rather small yields—yields at which the neutron absorption in air does not reduce the doses to a point at which blast and thermal effects are dominant. The use of small yields against large-area targets again runs into the delivery problems faced by chemical agents and explosives, and larger yields in fewer packages pose a less stringent problem for delivery systems in most applications. In the unlikely event that an enemy desired to minimize blast and thermal damage and to create little local fallout but still kill the populace, it would be necessary to use large numbers of carefully placed neutron-producing weapons burst high enough to avoid blast damage on the ground, but low enough to get the neutrons down. In this case, however, adequate radiation shielding for the people would leave the city unscathed and demonstrate the attack to be futile.

The thermal radiation from a surface burst is expected to be less than half of that from an air burst, both because the radiating fireball surface is truncated and because the hot interior is partially quenched by the megatons of injected crater material.

SUPERSEISMIC GROUND-SHOCK MAXIMA (AT 5-FT DEPTH)

Vertical acceleration: $\alpha_{vm} \approx 340 \Delta P_g / C_L \pm 30$ per cent. Here acceleration is measured in g's and overpressure (ΔP_g) in pounds per square inch. An empirical refinement requires C_L to be defined as the seismic velocity (in feet per second) for rock, but as three fourths of the seismic velocity for soil.

OUTRUNNING GROUND-SHOCK MAXIMA (AT ~10-FT DEPTH)

Vertical acceleration: $\alpha_{vm} \approx 2 \times 10^5 / C_L r^2$ + factor 4 or -factor 2. Acceleration is measured in g's, and r is the scaled radial distance—i.e., $r = R/W^{1/3}$ kft/(mt)^{1/3}.

Data taken on a low air-burst shot in Nevada indicate an exponential decay of maximum displacement with depth. For the particular case of a burst of ~40 kt at 700 ft, some measurements were made as deep as 200 ft below the surface of Frenchman Flat, a dry lake bed, which led to the following approximate decay law, according to Perret.

$$\delta = \delta_0 \exp(-0.017D),$$

where δ represents the maximum vertical displacement induced at depth D , δ_0 is the maximum displacement at the surface, and D is the depth in feet.

THE PROTECTION AGAINST FALLOUT RADIATION AFFORDED BY CORE SHELTERS IN A TYPICAL BRITISH HOUSE

Daniel T. Jones
Scientific Adviser, Home Office, London

Protective Factors in a Sample of British Houses (Windows Blocked)

Protective Factor	Percentage of Houses
< 25	36%
25-39	28%
40-100	29%
> 100	7%

"A very much improved protection could be obtained by constructing a shelter core. This means a small, thick-walled shelter built preferably inside the fallout room itself, in which to spend the first critical hours when the radiation from fallout would be most dangerous."⁽¹⁾

The full-scale experiments were carried out at the Civil Defense School at Falfield Park.⁽²⁾


In the staircase construction, the shelter consisted of the cupboard under the stairs, sandbags being placed on treads above and at the sides.

A 93 curies cobalt-60 source was used.

1. Six sandbags per tread, and a double layer on the small top landing. 96 sandbags were used.

2. As (1), together with a 4-ft-high wall of sandbags along the external north wall. 160 sandbags were used.

3. As (2), together with 4-ft-high walls of sandbags along the kitchen/cupboard partition wall and along the passage partition. 220 sandbags were used.




sandbags 24 in. x 12 in. when empty; 16 in. x 9 in. x 4 in. when filled with 25 lb of sand.

9 in. brick walls The windows and doors were not blocked	contribution r/hr/c/ft ²		Protective Factor	
	Position	Ground	Roof	
House only	E2	15.0	8.4	21
Lean-to	E2	10.4	2.4	39
Staircase cupboard:				
Stairs only sandbagged	N2	29.2	5.3	14
Stairs and outer wall sandbagged	N2	16.4	4.6	24
Stairs, outer wall, kitchen wall and corridor partition sandbagged	N2	8.8	1.8	47

1. Civil Defence Handbook No. 10, HMSO, 1963.

2. Perryman, A. D., Home Office Report CD/SA 117.



Foreword

If the country were ever faced with an immediate threat of nuclear war, a copy of this booklet would be distributed to every household as part of a public information campaign which would include announcements on television and radio and in the press. The booklet has been designed for free and general distribution in that event. It is being placed on sale now for those who wish to know what they would be advised to do at such a time.

May 1980




Protect and Survive
ISBN 0 11 3407289

If Britain is attacked by nuclear bombs or by missiles, we do not know what targets will be chosen or how severe the assault will be.


If nuclear weapons are used on a large scale, those of us living in the country areas might be exposed to as great a risk as those in the towns. The radioactive dust, falling where the wind blows it, will bring the most widespread dangers of all. No part of the United Kingdom can be considered safe from both the direct effects of the weapons and the resultant fall-out.

The dangers which you and your family will face in this situation can be reduced if you do as this booklet describes.

Use tables if they are large enough to provide you all with shelter. Surround them and cover them with heavy furniture filled with sand, earth, books or clothing.



Use the cupboard under the stairs if it is in your fall-out room. Put bags of earth or sand on the stairs and along the wall of the cupboard. If the stairs are on an outside wall, strengthen the wall outside in the same way to a height of six feet.



What to do after the Attack:

After a nuclear attack, there will be a short period before fall-out starts to descend. Use this time to do essential tasks. This is what you should do.

Do not smoke.

Check that gas, electricity and other fuel supplies and all pilot lights *are* turned off.


Go round the house and put out any small fires using mains water if you can.

If anyone's clothing catches fire, lay them on the floor and roll them in a blanket, rug or thick coat.



If there is structural damage from the attack you may have some time before a fall-out warning to do minor jobs to keep out the weather – using curtains or sheets to cover broken windows or holes.

If you are out of doors, take the nearest and best available cover as quickly as possible, wiping all the dust you can from your skin and clothing at the entrance to the building in which you shelter.



SEPTEMBER 1964

HOME OFFICE

SCIENTIFIC ADVISER'S BRANCH

CD/SA 121

IGNITION AND FIRE SPREAD IN URBAN AREAS FOLLOWING A NUCLEAR ATTACK

G. R. Stanbury

INITIAL FIRE INCIDENCE


For a 1 MT groundburst bomb the height of the top of the fireball above ground is about 0.72 miles. Because this distance is large compared with the height of most buildings, the exposed upper floors do actually see a large part of the fireball and not just the top of it, but in assuming that the radiation is just as intense from the top as from the middle we were overestimating the fire risk.

On the above basis the following table gives the number of exposed upper floors (to the nearest $\frac{1}{2}$ floor) for a range of distances from the explosion and a range of street widths.

Effect of Shielding: Estimation of the number of exposed floors

Assuming that buildings on opposite sides of a street which is receiving heat radiation from a direction perpendicular to its length are of the same height

Thermal pulse precedes the blast wave



Distance from explosion miles	Angle of arrival α°	$\tan \alpha$	Width of street (units of 10 ft.)						
			2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	35	.72	1.5	2	3	3.5	4.5	5	6
$1\frac{1}{2}$	26	.48	1	1.5	2	2.5	3	3.5	4
2	20	.36	.5	1	1.5	2	2	2.5	3
3	$13\frac{1}{2}$.24	.5	.5	1	1	1.5	1.5	2
4	10	.18	.5	.5	.5	1	1	1.5	1.5
5	8	.15	.5	.5	.5	.5	1	1	1

we take the average depth of a floor to be 10 ft.


Angle between heat flash and street (degrees)	90-75	75-60	60-45	45-30	30-15	15-0
Proportion of heat flash entering windows %	99	92.5	80	60	40	14

SPREAD OF FIRE

From last war experience of mass fire raids in Germany it was concluded that the overall spread factor was about 2; i.e. about twice as many buildings were destroyed by fire as were actually set alight by incendiary bombs

Number of fires started per square mile in the fire-storm raid on Hamburg, 27th/28th July, 1943

Bombs dropped



However, the important thing to note is that the total number of fires started in each square mile (2,500) was nearly half that of the total number of buildings; in other words, almost every other building was set on fire during the raid itself. When this happened no fire-fighting organisation, however efficient could hope to prevent the fires from joining together and engulfing the whole area.

When the figure of 1 in 2 for the German fire storms is compared with the figures for initial fire incidence of ~ 1 in 15 to 30 obtained in the Birmingham and Liverpool studies it can only be concluded that a nuclear explosion could not possibly produce a fire storm.

Fire situation from 1,499 fly bombs in the built-up
part of the London Region

WWII V1 high explosives (1 ton TNT warhead) (cruise missiles)

Where dropped	Number of fly bombs	Fly Bombs Caused				
		No fire	Small fire	Medium fire	Serious fire	Major fire
City	119 199	47	49	17	4	2
West-End	33	8	22	2	-	1
Closed Residential	430	207	203	20	-	-
Open Residential	804	478	296	28	2	-
Docks	113	64	39	8	1	1
Grand Totals	1,499	804	609	75	7	4

Discussion of results

Two important points emerge from a study of these results:-

- (i) The small proportion of fly bombs - less than 20% - which started fires of any greater category than "small" even in the most heavily built-up areas; and
- (ii) The large proportion which started no fires at all even in the most heavily built-up areas.

All these fly bombs fell in the summer months of 1944 which were unusually dry. In winter in this country in residential areas there are many open fires which may provide extra sources of ignition. The domestic occupancy is a low fire risk however, and as the proportion of such property in the important City and West End areas is small this should not introduce any serious error. Moreover, in winter, the high atmospheric humidity and the correspondingly high moisture content of timber would tend to retard or even prevent the growth of fire.

In order to determine how many fly bombs are equivalent to one nominal atomic bomb one method is to compare the areas over which a given category of house damage is produced by each. If we do this for a $\frac{3}{8}$ th mile air burst as at Hiroshima, the result is that 1 atomic bomb does as much damage as about 1,200 fly bombs.

This in itself is not a serious fire situation and it is doubtful whether it could ever give rise to a fire storm. In Hamburg 2,500 fires were started per square mile by a bomb density (combined H.E. and I.B.) of 200 tons per square mile, and for the area of destruction produced by an atomic bomb this would correspond to a total of about 10,000 fires.



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Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Detonations in Urban Environments

R. E. Marrs, W. C. Moss, B. Whitlock

June 7, 2007


An obvious next step (left for future work) would be a calculation of burn injuries and fires. Even without shadowing, the location of most of the urban population within buildings causes a substantial reduction in casualties compared to the unshielded estimates. Other investigators have estimated that the reduction in burn injuries may be greater than 90% due to shadowing and the indoor location of most of the population [6].

We have shown that common estimates of weapon effects that calculate a “radius” for thermal radiation are clearly misleading for surface bursts in urban environments. In many cases only a few unshadowed vertical surfaces, a small fraction of the area within a thermal damage radius, receive the expected heat flux.


In future work, our code could be extended to tally the total surface area receiving various amounts of heat, and to account for reflected radiation.

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The Effects of Nuclear Weapons



SAMUEL GLASSTONE
Editor

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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April 1962


Foreword

This book is a revision of "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" which was issued in 1957. It was prepared by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant governmental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the combined judgment of a number of the most competent scientists working on the problem.

There is a need for widespread public understanding of the best information available on the effects of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible, within the limits of national security, a comprehensive summary of this information.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Robert S. McNamara". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Robert" and last name "McNamara" clearly legible.

Secretary of Defense

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Glenn T. Seaborg". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Glenn" and last name "Seaborg" clearly legible.

Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission




Figure 7.33a. Thermal effects on wood-frame house 1 second after explosion (about 25 cal/sq cm).




Figure 7.33b. Thermal effects on wood-frame house about $\frac{3}{4}$ second later.




Figure 7.55. Frequency of exterior ignition points for various areas in a city

the formation of a significant fire, capable of spreading, will require appreciable quantities of combustible material close by, and this may not always be available.

7.57 The fact that accumulations of ignitable trash close to a wooden structure represent a real fire hazard was demonstrated at the nuclear tests carried out in Nevada in 1953. In these tests, three miniature wooden houses, each having a yard enclosed with a wooden fence, were exposed to 12 calories per square centimeter of thermal radiation. One house, at the left of Fig. 7.57, had weathered siding showing considerable decay, but the yard was free from trash. The next house also had a clean yard and in addition, the exterior siding was well maintained and painted. In the third house, at the right of the photograph, the siding, which was poorly maintained, was weathered, and the yard was littered with trash.

7.58 The state of the three houses after the explosion is seen in Fig. 7.58. The third house, at the right, soon burst into flame and was burned to the ground. The first house, on the left, did ignite but it did not burst into flame for 15 minutes. The well maintained house in the center with the clean yard suffered scorching only. It is of interest to recall that the wood of a newly erected white-painted



Figure 7.57. Wooden test houses before exposure to a nuclear explosion, Nevada Test Site.




Figure 7.58. Wooden test houses after exposure to a nuclear explosion.

house exposed to about 25 calories per square centimeter was badly charred but did not ignite (see Fig. 7.33b).

7.59 The value of fire-resistive furnishing in decreasing the number of ignition points was also demonstrated in the tests. Two identical, sturdily constructed houses, each having a window 4 feet by 6 feet facing the point of burst, were erected where the thermal radiation exposure was 17 calories per square centimeter. One of the houses contained rayon drapery, cotton rugs, and clothing, and, as was expected, it burst into flame immediately after the explosion and burned completely. In the other house, the draperies were of vinyl plastic, and rugs and clothing were made of wool. Although much ignition occurred, the recovery party, entering an hour after the explosion, was able to extinguish the fires.

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THERMAL RADIATION AND ITS EFFECTS

7.76 It should be noted that the fire storm is by no means a special characteristic of nuclear weapons. Similar fire storms have been reported as accompanying large forest fires in the United States, and especially after incendiary bomb attacks in both Germany and Japan during World War II. The high winds are produced largely by the updraft of the heated air over an extensive burning area. They are thus the equivalent, on a very large scale, of the draft of a chimney under which a fire is burning. Because of limited experience, the conditions for the development of fire storms in cities are not well known. It appears, however, that some, although not necessarily all, of the essential requirements are the following: (1) thousands of nearly simultaneous ignitions over an area of at least a square mile, (2) heavy building density, e.g., more than 20 percent of the area is covered by buildings, and (3) little or no ground wind. Based on these criteria, only certain sections—usually the older and slum areas—of a very few cities in the United States would be susceptible to fire storm development.

THERMAL RADIATION EFFECTS

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12.35. The major part of the thermal radiation travels in straight lines, and so any opaque object interposed between the fireball and the exposed skin will give some protection. This is true even if the object is subsequently destroyed by the blast, since the main thermal radiation pulse is over before the arrival of the blast wave.

12.36 At the first indication of a nuclear explosion, by a sudden increase in the general illumination, a person inside a building should immediately fall prone, as described in § 12.30, and, if possible, crawl behind or beneath a table or desk or to a planned vantage point. Even if this action is not taken soon enough to reduce the thermal radiation exposure greatly, it will minimize the displacement effect of the blast wave and provide a partial shield against splintered glass and other flying debris. An individual caught in the open should fall prone to the ground in the same way, while making an effort to shade exposed parts of the body. Getting behind a tree, building, fence, ditch, bank, or any structure which prevents a direct line of sight between the person and the fireball, if possible, will give a major degree of protection. If no substantial object is at hand, the clothed parts of the body should be used to shield parts which are exposed.

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Introduction

This manual of technical guidance on the design of domestic nuclear shelters has been prepared by a working group set up by the Emergency Services Division of the Home Office. The working group was asked to consider designs of nuclear shelters which could be made available to members of the public in the United Kingdom who might wish to purchase and install shelters for the use of themselves and their families.

The working group realised that the range of designs which it might produce would not be exhaustive. However, it was aware of the need to give technical guidance to professional engineers to assist them in producing reliable shelter designs. Thus the first three chapters of this book are written to give such guidance.

The other four chapters of the book give detailed designs of five shelters. These five cover a range of types which are applicable to different sorts of houses; they also cover a wide price range. These designs are not intended to be exhaustive, and as explained in the text, the working group is already giving attention to other designs, particularly those which might be incorporated into existing or new houses and also underground shelters of shapes other than box-like and using materials other than concrete. It is planned to publish details of this work at a later date.

The members of the working group are:

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Directorate of Civil Engineering Services
Property Services Agency, Department
of Environment

Directorate of Civil Engineering Services
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Engineering Services
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Any enquiries concerning this manual should be addressed to the Home Office, F6 Division, and not to individual members of the working group.

To obtain some protection from the heat it is necessary to move out of the direct path of the rays from the fireball; any kind of shade will be of some value. In shelter design, any materials affording protection against ionising radiation or blast will give more than adequate protection against the heat. However it is important to ensure that no exposed parts of the shelter (such as the facings of doors) are made of flammable materials. In the case of shelters made from plastic materials such as GRP (glass reinforced plastic) it is essential that no surfaces should be exposed to the heat pulse. It is unlikely that such plastic materials would catch fire, but they may melt or distort. Since the blast wave follows the heat pulse, such distorted areas may result in lowered blast resistance.

It is considered unlikely that the heat flash from a nuclear explosion would give rise to fire-storms. In the last war, fire-storms were caused in the old city of Hamburg as a result of heavy incendiary attacks and at Hiroshima but not at Nagasaki. A close study of these cities and of German cities where fire-storms did and did not occur revealed several interesting features. A fire-storm occurred only in an area of several square miles, heavily built up with buildings containing plenty of combustible material and where at least every other building in the area had been set alight. It is not considered that the initial density of fires, equivalent to one in every other building, would be caused by a nuclear explosion over a British city. Studies have shown that due to shielding, a much smaller proportion of buildings than this would be exposed to the heat flash. Moreover, the buildings in the centres of most British cities are now more fire-resistant and more widely spaced than they were 30 to 40 years ago. This low risk of fire-storms would be reduced still further by the control of small initial and secondary fires.

There are two main hazards from a large area of fire to the occupants of shelters. One is the transmission of heat through the earth and shelter wall. In most cases this would make for discomfort rather than danger, particularly in underground shelters. The major danger is the possibility that the gaseous products of combustion, mainly carbon dioxide and perhaps carbon monoxide, might be drawn into the shelter. These dangers may be mitigated by taking advantage of the fact that the arrival of fallout is unlikely to occur for about half an hour after the explosion and a fallout warning will be given (for details see the booklet *Protect and Survive*). The intervening time might be used to try to extinguish or damp down any nearby fires. This may not be possible in many cases where a fallout warning has already been given based on ground bursts further upwind than the local bomb.

Crater formation and ground shock

When a nuclear weapon bursts near the ground much of the energy is expended in making a crater. At the same time a shock wave is transmitted outwards through the ground.

Crater formation

A large amount of vapourised or pulverised material is sucked up by the ascending fireball. Larger amounts are gouged out and deposited on the perimeter of the crater making an elevated lip roughly equal in width to the radius of the crater itself. The size of the crater, for a weapon of given power, will depend on the nature of the ground and

Fig. 6 Approximate ranges of blast damage to UK houses (from 1 MT groundburst)

Designation	Radial distance	Overpressure	Effect	Death/injury
A ring	Up to 2.5 km (1½ mi)	77 kPa plus. (11 psi)	Houses totally destroyed	High probability of death or serious injury
B ring	2.5 to 3.5 km (1½ to 2¼ mi)	77 to 42 kPa (11 to 6 psi)	Houses irreparably damaged	About 10% killed; 35% trapped; others injured
C ring	3.5 to 9 km (2¼ to 5½ mi)	42 to 10 kPa (6 to 1.5 psi)	Houses with moderate to severe damage	About 25% trapped or seriously injured at inner edge of ring
D ring	9 to 14 km (6 to 9 mi)	10 to 5 kPa (1.5 to 0.75 psi)	Houses lightly damaged	No deaths; few injuries expected

(WWII house damage vs injury data)

The debris problem

From Fig. 6 it can be deduced that the problems of debris around buried shelters might be serious in some locations near to ground zero. It is important that entrances or escape hatches and ventilation pipes where included should be as far as possible from nearby buildings — at least a distance equal to one-half the height (measured to the eaves) of the nearest building.

Trees are very vulnerable to long duration blast waves and in some areas these might cause obstruction to shelter entrances. The blast from a 1 MT groundburst would blow down 90 per cent of trees at a distance of 6 km (3½ miles), 30 per cent at 7 km (4½ miles) and cause damage to branches out to 10 km (6¼ miles).

Initial nuclear radiation (INR)

Neutrons and gamma rays are emitted instantaneously by a nuclear explosion and these are followed by the gamma radiation from the intensely radioactive products in the fireball. This radiation is called initial nuclear radiation and is defined as that radiation emitted within one minute after detonation. In fact most of this hits the ground within a few seconds since the rapid rise of the fireball quickly takes the gamma rays and neutrons out of range. The phenomenon of initial nuclear radiation is very complex and not completely understood, but four facts are of importance for shelter design.

1. Range of INR

The intensity of INR falls off very rapidly with distance. The dose of INR received by a person in the open 2.5 km (1½ miles) from a 1 MT burst would give only a 50 per cent chance of survival. At 2.8 km (1¾ miles) the dose received would be negligible. At those distances, of course, anyone in the open would be killed by the blast. One important difference between kiloton and megaton weapons is the relationship between blast and INR ranges. With the smaller kiloton weapons the range of INR extends beyond the range of lethal blast; the reverse is true for megaton weapons. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki weapons were in the kiloton range and produced lethal INR effects. Fig. 7 gives the approximate exposures in roentgens of INR at locations where the blast overpressures are significant. Shelters designed to withstand a given overpressure should also be designed to protect against this level of INR. Overpressures are given in kiloPascals (psi).

Fig. 7 Exposures of INR from surface burst (in roentgens)

Overpressure	315 (45)	105 (15)	77 (11)	42 (6)	10 (1.5)	5 (0.75)
100 KT	300,000	20,000	9000	500	< 1	< 1
1 MT	70,000	1,000	250	2	< 1	< 1
10 MT	20,000	15	< 1	< 1	< 1	< 1
20 MT	9,000	1	< 1	< 1	< 1	< 1

Exposure would be lower from air bursts of the same weapon power. The figures given refer to thermonuclear weapons with 50 per cent fission yield. These figures may vary from 25 per cent to 150 per cent of the values given in the chart.

2. Shielding for INR

INR has greater energy and penetration than the radiation from fallout. The intensity of both INR and fallout radiation are reduced in proportion to the density of the shielding material. This can be expressed in terms of the 'half-value thickness' which is the thickness of a particular shielding material required to halve the radiation dose-rate. The approximate half-value thicknesses of some shielding materials against INR are given in Fig. 8.

Fig. 8 *Half-value thicknesses of shielding materials*

	Against INR		Against fallout radiation	
	mm	(inches)	mm	(inches)
Steel	38	(1.5)	18	(0.7)
Concrete	152	(6.0)	56	(2.2)
Earth	190	(7.5)	84	(3.3)
Water	330	(13.0)	122	(4.8)
Brickwork	157	(6.2)	71	(2.8)

The half-value thicknesses of these materials against fallout radiation are given for comparison. They will be referred to later.

3. Slant incidence of INR

Most of the INR from a nuclear explosion arriving at a given point comes in a direct line from the fireball. There is a certain amount of scattering known as 'skyshine' which means that some initial gamma radiation might be received by a person shielded by a barrier from the light and heat flash (see Fig. 10). The amount of scattering of initial gamma radiation depends upon a number of factors, but probably amounts to about 10 per cent of that in the main beam. This means that though an underground or semi-sunk shelter might be shielded from the major part of the initial gamma radiation a certain amount could be received through the roof or sides of the shelter (if semi-sunk) by what is known as 'angular distribution'. However this benefit of shielding by nearby buildings cannot be taken into account in calculating the protection afforded by a shelter since the location of the source of the initial gamma radiation cannot be known.

4. Rate of emission of INR

The rate of delivery of initial nuclear radiation has some relevance to actions that might be taken immediately after a nuclear burst. Fig. 9 gives the percentage of initial gamma radiation dose received as a function of time for 20 KT and 5 MT air bursts. It can be seen that in the former case about 65 per cent and in the latter case 5 per cent of the total initial gamma radiation dose is received during the first second. In the case of the higher yield weapon it can be seen that if some shelter could be obtained within one second of seeing the explosion flash, such as by falling prone behind some substantial object, it could make the difference between life and death. Such an action would also help to prevent the translational effect of the blast.

Residual radiation from fallout

Nature of fallout

Fallout from a groundburst weapon consists of molten and solidified particles of earth on to which the radioactive products of the detonation have condensed. It has the consistency of fine to coarse sand particles with size varying from 20 to 700 micrometres. Particles smaller than about 20 micrometres would most probably remain in the stratosphere and come down as late fallout weeks, months, or even years later; by this time their radioactivity would have decayed considerably. The fall times from various heights of particles of various sizes are given in Fig. 11.

The time taken for fallout to be deposited in any one place varies from about half an hour close to the explosion to many hours further downwind. It is particularly important that people get under some kind of cover during this period to avoid fallout particles getting on the skin. Anyone who is caught out during fallout deposition should certainly cover the head and exposed skin and remove the contaminated clothing before entering shelter. No special protective clothing is required since no kind of clothing will prevent the gamma radiation from fallout reaching the body. If anyone has to emerge from shelter after the fallout has been deposited on the ground it would be useful to wear waterproof boots and gloves with a coat over the indoor clothing. Again these should be removed before re-entering the shelter. Any exposed skin should be washed after any contact with fallout particles.

Fig. 9 *Percentage of total initial gamma dose received*





Fig. 10 *Target exposed to scattered gamma radiation from a nuclear burst*

The nature of fallout particles has an influence on the filtration requirements for shelters. If the air coming into the shelter follows a tortuous path such as is provided by an inverted U shape or a cowl over the air intake, the need for filtration is minimised, if not entirely eliminated. The fallout particles will tend to fall to the earth rather than be carried along by the air current into the air duct. In any case the fallout particles are in the air for a limited period of time in the early hours after the burst so that if filtration is thought desirable, it need only be for that limited time. It would however be better to avoid drawing air into the shelter whilst the fallout is being deposited, if it is possible to know when this is taking place.

If a filter is incorporated into shelter design two points should be considered. The first is that a coarse filter is all that is necessary; a fine filter runs the risk of becoming blocked by ordinary atmospheric dust with resultant reduction of air supply. The second point is that if a filter is likely to become contaminated with radioactive dust then it should be placed outside the shelter.

Protection from fallout radiation

Protection against the radiation from fallout can be achieved in three ways. Consideration must be given to *duration* of exposure, *distance* from the fallout, and *density* of materials between the person and the fallout.

Duration. The damage caused by radiation to the body is cumulative (although the body does show a capability of some recovery). Thus it is important to reduce the time of exposure to radiation. In addition to this the radioactivity from fallout decays in a predictable manner by what is known as the '7/10 law'. Thus a dose rate of 1000 roentgens per hour at one hour after burst will decay to 100 roentgens per hour at seven hours after burst and 10 roentgens per hour at 49 hours (or two days) after burst and so on. This rapid decay means that, except in very severely contaminated areas, it is unlikely that anyone would have to stay continuously in shelter for two or three weeks. Local authorities will tell people when the intensity of the radiation has fallen to levels which make it safe to emerge from shelter for one or more hours. This time, which will gradually increase, can be used to ventilate the shelter better and attend to necessary tasks.

Distance. Protection can be achieved too by keeping as far away from the fallout as possible. A person standing on ground evenly contaminated by fallout would receive half his radiation dose from a circle of about 7.5 metres around him. Thus the floor of an underground shelter or a position in a house as far as possible from the roof and outside walls offers the best protection.

Density. The most important way of reducing the intensity of radiation is by sheltering behind some dense material. As explained, the level of radiation is reduced as it passes through any material but the greater the density of the material, the greater the reduction. The thickness of some materials required to reduce the intensity of fallout radiation to one half were given in Fig. 8. Glass gives little or no protection against radiation and many light materials, such as clothing, bedding etc., afford little protection. However, shelters can be constructed from such materials as glass reinforced plastic (GRP) which does not give much protection itself but can be buried in the ground; the earth cover then will give protection. A layer of 375 mm (15 inches) of earth or 250 mm (10 inches) of concrete over a shelter area would reduce the intensity of the radiation inside the shelter to 1/100th of the intensity outside. This reduction is called a protective factor (PF). A method for calculating protective factors is given in Chapter 2. It is designed for calculating the PFs of buildings. When applied to buried shelters the table dealing with penetration through the roof may be all that is needed.

Fig. 11 *Time in hours for rough particles of different sizes to fall to the ground from specific heights*

Particle diameter in microns	500	350	200	100	75	50
Falling from metres (feet)						
25,000 (80,000)	1.6	2.3	4.5	12	22	49
18,000 (60,000)	1.3	2.0	3.7	9.5	17	36
12,000 (40,000)	1.0	1.5	2.8	6.8	12	25
9,000 (30,000)	0.8	1.2	2.2	5.3	9	19

Further comments on protection against INR and fallout radiation

From Fig. 7 it can be seen that a person on the outer edge the 'A' ring at 77 kPa (11 psi) from a one megaton explosion might receive a dose of about 250 rads INR. This would not in itself be lethal and even some rudimentary shelter would reduce the dose. At this same point the proportion of the population in houses surviving though injured might be about 40 per cent. Nearer to the point of burst the survivors would be fewer but the INR higher. It is in fact in the areas where blast shelters can give the greatest saving of life that INR becomes important, and so must be protected against. As a general rule, shelters designed to protect against 77 kPa (11 psi) and above should also give protection against INR. In most cases however, the required thicknesses of earth, concrete, etc. to give blast protection will also give the required INR protection.

Fig. 12 gives a comparison of the protective factors against INR gamma, neutrons and fallout radiation of some typical buildings. The data has been taken from *Effects of Nuclear Weapons* and the choice has been made of those buildings which are reasonably comparable with structures in the UK. The wide range of values is due partly to uncertainty in the data (since some have been calculated and others derived from weapons trials) and partly to the fact that protection to some extent is determined by the position in the building where the protective factor is measured.

Fig. 12 *Protective factors of various buildings against initial gamma, neutron and fallout gamma radiation*

Structure	Initial gamma	Neutrons	Fallout gamma
1 metre underground	250–500	100–500	5000
Shelter partly above ground: with 600 mm earth 900 mm earth	15–35 50–150	12–50 20–100	50–200 200–1000

Classification of shelters

Summary of effects of nuclear weapons

From this brief review of the effects of nuclear weapons we can list the order of events from the detonation of a weapon. These are:

- (a) Light and heat flash – immediate, and lasting some seconds.
- (b) Initial nuclear radiation – following within one second of the commencement of the light flash.
- (c) Blast wave – following from about a half second to several seconds after the light and heat flash.
- (d) Fires – these may have been ignited by the heat flash but would be either extinguished or increased in intensity by the wind from the blast wave.
- (e) Fallout – about one half hour to several hours after burst.

Protection against all these effects can be summed up by stating that distance from the source of the hazard and density of shielding materials give the best, and indeed the only, means of avoiding serious injury or death. The two major hazards in this list are blast and radiation. Adequate protection against these two will include protection against the others. It can indeed be said that adequate protection against blast will usually involve protection against radiation. The reverse however is not true. In spite of this, however, it is worthwhile looking at the need for protection in the whole of the United Kingdom.

Considerations arising from the probable attack pattern

In section 1.1.1 reference was made to the fact that an expected attack pattern on the United Kingdom might use 200 megatons on about 80 targets. If we now make an assumption that this attack would be in the form of 100 weapons of 1 MT airbursts and 100 weapons of 1 MT groundbursts we can use the information given in Fig. 6 to indicate the probability of areas being subject to various effects.

On this assumption, we should find that about 2.2 per cent of the land area of the UK would be subject to overpressures in the 'A' ring of 77 kPa (11 psi) and above about 1.8 per cent would be subject to overpressures of between 42 and 77 kPa (6-11 psi) in the 'B' ring and about 10 per cent of the land area would be subject to overpressures of between 10 and 42 kPa (1.5 to 6 psi). The rest of the land area, about 85 per cent, would be subject to blast in the D ring of 5 to 10 kPa (0.75 to 1.5 psi) or to no blast at all. Blast effects in the D ring will cause minor damage to buildings and no lethalties. It is impossible to determine the extent of the total D ring areas since many of these will overlap from adjacent bombs. Any part of the country might be subject to radiation from fallout.

There is of course no certainty of where the weapons will fall – and city centres are not necessarily the prime targets – but this consideration leads us to group shelters into various types and assess the probability of survival in given circumstances. It should of course be obvious that within about 450 metres (1500 feet) of a 1 MT groundburst no shelter can give any hope of protection. But the following grouping of shelters has some cogency.

Fig. 13 Classification of shelters

	Type 1 Improvised	Type 2 Indoor Kit	Type 3 Outdoor Kit	Type 4 Purpose built
Blast protection kPa (psi)	Up to 10 (1.5)	Up to 42 (6)	Up to 77 (11)	In excess of 77 (11)
Fallout radiation protection	Not less than 40	Not less than 70	Not less than 200	In excess of 300. This type must also protect against INR
'Safety distance' from 1 MT airburst km (miles)	11.5 (7)	5 (3)	3.3 (2)	3.3 (2) for 77 kPa (11 psi) 3 (1.8) for 105 kPa (15 psi) 2 (1.2) for 315 kPa (45 psi) shelter
Ventilation	Natural	Natural or forced	Forced	Forced
Site of installation	In house [†] or garden	In house	In garden. Sectional for access through house	In garden. Appropriate access to garden necessary (See 1.3.4)
Forethought and planning	During crisis period. Some materials can be prepared in advance	Obtain in peace-time. Install in crisis period	Obtain in peace-time. Install in peace-time or crisis period. (2-3 days needed for installation (see 6.5))	Install in peace-time using professional advice and help.
Habitability	Not very comfortable. Suitable for few days occupancy. May be damp. Floor covering desirable	Able to sit up but not stand. May be able to use parts of house depending on radiation and damage situation	Rather cramped for 6 people; advance planning can improve comfort	Can be made very comfortable and habitable
Approximate expected cost (1980 prices)	Nominal if local materials used. Scaffold frame about £250	Kit: £500-£800 Bricks: £300	Kit: £900-£1800 Plus installation costs*	£6000-£10,000

*Installation costs will vary with nature of soil and nature of access to garden.

[†]E.g. The measures described in *Protect and Survive*.

Further comments on Home Office shelter designs

Chapters 4 to 7 of this book give details of the Home Office shelter designs and, where appropriate, detailed instructions for construction. It will be useful however to discuss here the reasons why this range of shelters has been chosen. Other designs are under consideration and it is planned to make details of these available later.

Limitations related to houses and gardens

In making recommendations for shelters it has been necessary to keep in mind the varying needs governed by the types of housing in the United Kingdom. Very roughly housing can be divided into the following groups:

- a. Detached or semi-detached houses where there is appropriate access to the rear garden. (About 34%).
- b. Semi-detached and terrace housing where there is no access to the rear garden, except through the house. (About 20%).
- c. Houses with no rear garden. Such houses usually have a passage between the rows of terraces with access to a back yard. (About 25%).
- d. Multi-storey blocks of flats. (About 12%).
- e. Flats resulting from the conversion of 2, 3 and 4 storey houses. There is usually some garden space available attached to such property. (About 7%).
- f. Bungalows, usually with accessible gardens. (About 2%).
- g. Caravans.

The shelter types in Fig. 13 are designed for use in these housing groups as follows:

Type 1 Groups a, b, c, f, possibly d, e and g.

Type 2 Groups a, b, c, f, possibly d.

Type 3 Groups a, b, f, possibly e.

Type 4 Groups a and f.

It will be seen that all groups of housing are covered except possibly for d and only minimally for e and g. Further consideration will be given to shelter provision for those in group d and also upper storeys of group e. However, we believe that one or more of our shelter types will be suitable for installation in the majority of the houses in the country.

Type 1 shelters



A 'core shelter' for use inside a house has already been described in *Protect and Survive*. Its life-saving potential should not be minimised. The details of the two improvised shelters in Fig. 13 are given in later chapters. The construction of these shelters has been carried out by volunteers satisfactorily. They were given a short time to read the instructions before carrying out the work. Although these are all designated improvised shelters, some thought can be given in advance to the procurement of materials for their construction, thereby eliminating the need to remove doors, etc. from the house.

Type 2 shelters

This type is designed for houses where there is no suitable ground attached to the house on which to install a shelter. It is in essence a 'core shelter' which will protect the occupants from the debris of a house that is severely damaged. The radiation protection factor is obtained by shielding it with bricks, blocks, sand, furniture, books, bags of soil, etc. It is designed to withstand the debris from a two- or three-storey house falling on it. However, it is probable that the debris from a three-storey house may make it difficult for the occupants to dig themselves out. The 'blast protection' indicated is that at which most houses would receive irreparable damage and there would be a considerable amount of debris on the shelter.

The details of this shelter are given in Chapter 5. This is not the only possible shape; further studies are underway which should result in different designs of the 'Indoor kit-type' shelter.

Fig. 27 Typical end-of-terrace house



Plan of Ground Storey of Terrace (scale 1:100)

Chapter 5

Indoor kit shelter design

"Morrison shelter" of 1941 (indoor steel table shelter)

General

This chapter gives information about an indoor shelter suitable for erection in homes that have basements or rooms that can be converted into a fallout room. It can be used as the 'inner refuge' referred to in the Home Office booklet *Protect and Survive* and anybody considering purchasing or using such a shelter should read *Protect and Survive* and be totally familiar with its contents.

The shelter will accommodate two adults and two small children. Two or more shelters can be placed together to gain more shelter area.

It should be stored in a clean dry place, ready for erection if required, *and could be used for other purposes, e.g. a workbench in a garage or garden shed.*

Shelter details

The indoor kit-type shelter is shown in Fig. 64.

A specialist steelwork fabricator will need to cut, weld, paint and drill bolt holes for the steel parts. However, once the units have been manufactured the shelter can be erected by unskilled labour. (Two persons two hours each.) Steelwork shop fabrication drawings are given in section 5.11, a steelwork specification in 5.10 and a guide to putting up the shelter in 5.12.

The basic unit has been designed to be capable of sustaining the debris load resulting from the complete collapse of a typical two-storey house, and when surrounded with brickwork, sandbags or other protective materials it will provide good protection against fallout.

Location of shelter

Where the shelter can be used

In two-storey houses and the lower floors of blocks of flats of substantial reinforced concrete or steel-framed construction, in areas where the density of building is comparatively low.

Where the shelter should not be used

1. Houses that have more than two storeys.
2. On the upper floors of houses or any ground floor that has a basement directly below it.
3. Blocks of flats having load bearing brickwork, blockwork or precast concrete panel construction.
4. The top two floors of a block of flats.
5. Lightly clad buildings.

Location of shelter in fallout room

As explained in *Protect and Survive* the shelter should be placed within the fallout room. Choose the place furthest from the outside walls and from the roof, or the room which has the smallest amount of outside wall or openings. The entrance should be positioned facing a solid internal wall wherever possible (see Fig. 65). A gap of 600 mm should be left between the outside of the fallout protection around the shelter and the walls of the fallout room to facilitate emergency escape.

The shelter should be placed on the most solid base available. When the shelter is to be placed on a suspended ground floor, this floor may require strengthening by providing additional piers, walls or props to support the floor joists.

Protecting the shelter against fallout radiation

Fallout protection to the shelter can be obtained by surrounding it with dry-laid brickwork, blockwork, sandbags, or heavy furniture filled with sand, earth or books (see Figs. 66 and 67). Recommended thicknesses of shielding materials are given in the following table:

Fig. 61 Recommended thicknesses of shielding materials

	Thicknesses		
	To sides		To top
	Sides facing external walls	Sides facing solid internal walls	
Brickwork	1½ bricks (343 mm)	1 brick (225 mm)	4 courses bricks (260 mm)
Dense blockwork	1½ blocks (330 mm)	1 block (225 mm)	3 courses blocks (300 mm)
Sandbags	350 mm	250 mm	300 mm

If bricks or blocks are used they should be dry-laid, but closely packed and bonded so as to stagger the joints as much as possible. Suggested bonding is shown in Fig. 68.

Fallout room

External windows and doors in the room containing the shelter should be blocked up with material of the same weight as the surrounding wall. A 600 mm by 600 mm dry-laid area should be left within the blocked-up area to provide an escape exit.

For shelters protected as described, protective factors are given in the following table:

Fig. 62 Approximate protective factor

House type	Protective factors	
	House with all exterior windows blocked	House with exterior windows blocked plus shelter and bricks
Terraced: traditional modern	15 11	260 140
Semi-detached: traditional modern	12 9	210 130
Detached: traditional modern	10 8	180 110

Provision of emergency escape tunnel

Materials

Use tables, doors and other items of heavy furniture to form an emergency escape tunnel. As for *ad hoc* shelters, other structural commodities might be utilised for building escape tunnels. Fig. 69 shows how scaffold poles could be used for the purpose.

Location of escape tunnel

The escape route should be planned so that it emerges near to an opening in an external wall. If external openings are blocked up, a weaker escape knock-out area (e.g. dry-laid bricks or blocks 600 mm by 600 mm) should be provided.

Tools and materials required

For construction

16 mm and 10 mm spanners (1 open, and 1 ring, of each).

Steel lever for lining up holes.

Work gloves.

For shelter

Recommended quantities of materials for fallout protection are given in the following table. (Figures in table for entrance shielding wall, but do not consider materials required for blocking up openings in external walls.)

Fig. 64 Indoor kit-type shelter





Fig. 65 Location of shelter







Fig. 66 *Shelter surrounded with bricks*

Fig. 67 *Shelter surrounded with sandbags*



ENTRANCE TO BE POSITIONED
FACING A SOLID WALL





Fig. 80

Fig. 81






Fig. 82



CAR-OVER-TRENCH FALLOUT SHELTER (EXPEDIENT SHELTER HANDBOOK)




PLASTIC COVER OVER ENTRANCE AND VENTILATION OPENINGS


DOORS OR LOGS CAN BE
USED IN PLACE OF CAR.

FOR INDOOR SHELTER, USE
BAGS OF WATER INSIDE
BOXES AROUND & ON TABLE

COVER FLOOR AND TRUNK WITH PLASTIC SHEET
PLACE 1 FOOT OF EARTH ON FLOOR AND TRUNK



BANK EXCAVATED EARTH 20 INCHES HIGH AROUND CAR
PLACE 8" OF EARTH ON CAR HOOD
DIG SHALLOW DRAINAGE DITCH AROUND FILL



PLASTIC COVER OVER ENTRANCE
AND VENTILATION OPENINGS

PLACE SAND-FILLED BAGS (SANDBAGS) AROUND
ENTRANCE AND BANK EARTH AROUND THEM



HOME OFFICE

THE PROTECTION OF YOUR HOME AGAINST AIR RAIDS

**READ THIS BOOK THROUGH
THEN
KEEP IT CAREFULLY**

Why this book has been sent to you

If this country were ever at war the target of the enemy's bombers would be the staunchness of the people at home. We all hope and work to prevent war but, while there is risk of it, we cannot afford to neglect the duty of preparing ourselves and the country for such an emergency. This book is being sent out to help each householder to realise what he can do, if the need arises, to make his home and his household more safe against air attack.

The Home Office is working with the local authorities in preparing schemes for the protection of the civil population during an attack. But it is impossible to devise a scheme that will cover everybody unless each home and family play their part in doing what they can for themselves. In this duty to themselves they must count upon the help and advice of those who have undertaken the duty of advice and instruction.

If the emergency comes the country will look for her safety not only to her sailors and soldiers and airmen, but also to the organised courage and foresight of every household. It is for the volunteers in the air raid precautions services to help every household for this purpose, and in sending out this book I ask for their help.

Samuel Hoare

HOW TO CHOOSE A REFUGE-ROOM

Almost any room will serve as a refuge-room if it is soundly constructed, and if it is easy to reach and to get out of. Its windows should be as few and small as possible, preferably facing a building or blank wall, or a narrow street. If a ground floor room facing a wide street or a stretch of level open ground is chosen, the windows should if possible be specially protected (see pages 30 and 31). The stronger the walls, floor, and ceiling are, the better. Brick partition walls are better than lath and plaster, a concrete ceiling is better than a wooden one. An internal passage will form a very good refuge-room if it can be closed at both ends.

The best floor for a refuge-room

A cellar or basement is the best place for a refuge-room if it can be made reasonably gas-proof and if there is no likelihood of its becoming flooded by a neighbouring river that may burst its banks, or by a burst water-main. If you have any doubt about the risk of flooding ask for advice from your local Council Offices.

Alternatively, any room on any floor below the top floor may be used. Top floors and attics should be avoided as they usually do not give sufficient protection overhead from small incendiary bombs. These small bombs would probably penetrate the roof but be stopped by the top floor, though they might burn through to the floor below if not quickly dealt with.




A cellar or basement is the best position for a refuge-room if it can be made reasonably gas-proof



In a house with only two floors and without a cellar, choose a room on the ground floor so that you have protection overhead

*How to seal up
the door*



Doors which have to be opened and closed should be sealed against gas. This is how to do it.


Nail a piece of wood, padded with felt, to the floor so that the door, when closed, presses tightly against it. Take care not to nail this piece of wood on the wrong side of the door so that it cannot be opened. Strips of felt may also be nailed round the inside of the door to exclude draughts. Fix a blanket outside the door if the door opens inwards, or inside the door if the door opens outwards, with strips of wood. The top of the blanket should be fixed to the top of the door frame. One side of the blanket should be fastened down the whole length of the door frame, on the side where the hinges are, by means of a strip of wood nailed to the frame. The other side of the blanket should be secured not more than two feet down, so that a flap is left free for going in and out. Arrange the blanket so that at least 12 inches trails on the floor to stop air from blowing underneath it. See illustration above. If the blanket is kept damp during an air raid, it will give better protection.

IF THERE SHOULD EVER BE A WAR


Strengthening the room

If your refuge-room is on the ground floor or in the basement, you can support the ceiling with wooden props as an additional protection. The illustration shows a way of doing this, but it would be best to take a builder's advice before setting to work. Stout posts or scaffold poles are placed upright, resting on a thick plank on the floor and supporting a stout piece of timber against the ceiling, at right angles to the ceiling joists, i.e. in the same direction as the floor boards above.

*How
to support
a ceiling*



*The illustration
below
shows the
detail of
how to fix
the props*



The smaller illustration shows how the posts are held in position at the top by two blocks of wood on the ceiling beam. The posts are forced tight by two wedges at the foot, driven in opposite ways. Do not drive these wedges too violently, otherwise you may lift the ceiling and damage it. If the floor of your refuge-room is solid, such as you might find in a basement,

you will not need a plank across the whole floor, but only a piece of wood a foot or so long under each prop.

How to deal with an incendiary bomb

You can tackle a small incendiary bomb yourself (better if you have someone to help you) if you will follow these directions. You will also be able to get proper instruction about it.

The bomb will burn fiercely for a minute or so, throwing out burning sparks, and afterwards less fiercely. It will set fire to anything inflammable within reach. You should try to deal with it before it has caused a big fire.

Before you can get close enough to do anything, you will probably have to cool down the room with water, preferably with a line of hose. (See page 20 for a simple hand pump.)

There are two ways of dealing with the bomb itself.

- 1 It can be controlled by means of the Stirrup Hand Pump (see page 20), with a *spray* of water which, although it does not extinguish the bomb, makes it burn out quickly and helps to prevent the fire spreading. Water must *not* be used on a bomb in any other way.
- 2 If it has fallen where you can get at it, it can be smothered with dry sand or earth. A bucket full of sand or earth is enough to cover and control a small bomb. The best method of applying it is by the Redhill sand container and scoop (see page 19); but a bucket will do if you have a long-handled shovel to use with it.

Immediately the bomb is smothered, shovel or scoop it into the sand container or bucket and take it out of doors.

If a bucket is used, 2 or 3 inches of sand or earth must be kept in the bottom to prevent the bomb burning through.


Remember that the bomb might burn through the floor before you have had time to remove it, and you might have to continue to deal with it on the floor below.

ACT PROMPTLY. PROMPT ACTION MAY BE THE MEANS OF SAVING LIVES. PROMPT ACTION WILL SAVE PROPERTY. PROMPT ACTION WILL PREVENT SERIOUS DAMAGE. PROMPT ACTION WILL DEFEAT THE OBJECT OF THE RAID.

EXTRA PRECAUTIONS AGAINST EXPLOSIVE BOMBS

TRENCHES. Instead of having a refuge-room in your house, you can, if you have a garden, build a dug-out or a trench. A trench provides excellent protection against the effects of a bursting bomb, and is simple to construct. Full instructions will be given in another book which you will be able to buy. Your air raid wardens will also be able to advise.

SANDBAGS. Sandbags outside are the best protection if your walls are not thick enough to resist splinters. Do not rely on a wall keeping out splinters unless it is more than a foot thick. Sandbags are also the best protection for window openings. If you can completely close the window opening with a wall of sandbags you will prevent the glass being broken by the blast of an explosion, as well as keeping out splinters. But the window must still be sealed inside against gas.



A basement window protected by boxes of earth

Any bags or sacks, including paper sacks such as are used for cement, will do for sandbags.

ALL persons involved in accidents suffer from shock, whether or not they suffer physical injury. Shock is a disturbance of the nervous system. It varies in its severity. The signs of shock are faintness, paleness, weak pulse, and weak breathing.

TREATMENT OF SHOCK

- 1 Place the patient flat on his back on a bed or a rug or on cushions. If you think a bone may be broken do not move the patient more than can be helped.
- 2 Loosen the clothing at the neck, chest and waist to make the breathing freer.
- 3 Cover the patient warmly with rugs and blankets. In cases of shock the body loses heat. A hot-water bottle is helpful, but take care that it does not lie in contact with the skin.
- 4 Give hot drinks. If you cannot make hot drinks, give cold water *in sips*. But only if the patient is conscious and able to swallow.
- 5 Soothe the patient by speaking reassuring words in a calm voice and in a confident way.

TREATMENT OF WOUNDS

The first thing to do is to stop the bleeding and to keep the wound clean. This can be done by covering it with a clean dressing bound on tightly. Do not touch a wound with your fingers because of the risk of poisoning from dirt. Treat the patient for shock in addition to attending to the wound, because the loss of blood, if the wound is serious, and the pain do in themselves cause shock.

WOUNDS IN THE HEAD AND BODY

- 1 Cover the wound with a clean folded handkerchief or a double layer of dry lint.
- 2 Apply another handkerchief or a layer of cotton wool as a pad to distribute the pressure over the wound.
- 3 Tie the dressing in position with a bandage, a strip of linen, or a necktie. This can be done quite firmly, unless there is any foreign body, especially glass, in the wound, or unless the bone is broken. In this case the dressing should be tied on lightly.
- 4 Treat the patient for shock.



ORNL/TM-10423

**OAK RIDGE
NATIONAL
LABORATORY**

MARTIN MARIETTA

Technical Options for Protecting Civilians from Toxic Vapors and Gases

C. V. Chester

Date Published - May 1988

**OPERATED BY
MARTIN MARIETTA ENERGY SYSTEMS, INC.
FOR THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY**

**Prepared for
Office of Program Manager
for
CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland**

Table 1. Chemical Agent Toxic Properties¹

Agent	Volatility (mg/m ³ , 25°C)	Median Lethal Concentration X Time (mg/m ³ *min)		Median Incapacitation Concentration X Time (mg/m ³ *min)
		Respiratory	Percutaneous	
Chlorine (CL)	2.2 X 10 ⁷	19,000	-	1,800
Phosgene (CG)	4 X 10 ⁶	3,200	-	1,600
Hydrogen Cyanide (AC)	1 X 10 ⁶	2,000-4,500	-	>2,000
Cyanogen Chloride (CK)	1 X 10 ⁶	11,000	-	7,000
Sulfur Mustard (HD) ²	920	1,500	10,000	200
Nitrogen Mustard (HN-1)	2,000	1,500	20,000	200
Lewisite (L) ²	6,000	1,200-1,500	100,000	300
Mustard Lewisite (HL)	4,200	1,500	>10,000	200
Tabun (GA) ²	610	400	40,000	300
Sarin (GB) ²	22,000	100	15,000	35-75
Soman (GD)	3,900	100	1,000	35-75
VX ²	10.5	100	1,000	50
Methyl Isocyanate		1500		

¹ Taken from U.S. Department of the Army (1975) and WHO (1970).

² Chemical agents in the stockpile to be destroyed in this program.

DISTANCE AND ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION

As a toxic cloud moves downwind it mixes with ever increasing amounts of air, becoming larger and more dilute. Diffusion of the vapor vertically and at right angles to direction of motion reduces the exposure to someone standing in the path of the cloud. Diffusion forward and backwards along the direction of travel in general does not reduce the amount inhaled by someone in the path of the cloud.

The rate of vertical and lateral mixing of the toxic cloud with the surrounding air can vary enormously depending on weather conditions. A bright, sunshiny day promoting convection of the atmosphere close to the ground will cause rapid vertical mixing. A turbulent wind will promote lateral mixing. High windspeeds also reduce the time that a person is immersed in a passing cloud and directly reduces the amount they will inhale for given quantity going by. The worst conditions providing the greatest threat to people at the greatest distance downwind occur under conditions of light, steady winds, a clear night with cooling of the ground to cause vertical stability in the atmosphere and the existence of a temperature inversion not too far above the ground to trap the chemical close to the ground. Conditions very close to these were responsible for the large casualties at the Bhopal incident in India.

Figure 1 shows the downwind hazard from clouds of 1000 kilograms of each of several toxic gases moving at 1 meter per second (approx. 2 miles per hour) in a highly stable atmosphere (Pasquill type E). These conditions also assume an inversion at 750 meters. Calculations use the Army's D2PC code (Whitacre et al, 1986). The dependent variable in Fig. 1 is given as the protection factor offered by protective measures required to prevent 99 percent of the fatalities at each location downwind. For example for GB, to keep the dose down to 1 percent fatalities at 1 kilometer downwind, the population would have to have masks or other protection giving a protection factor of a little less than 700. The




Fig. 1 Dose vs Downwind Distance for Some Very Toxic Gases

protection factor is the ratio of the dose people would get with no mask compared to what they would get if they were wearing a gas mask.

As can be seen from Fig. 1 the requirement for gas masks diminishes rapidly as one gets further away from the point of release of a quantity of agent. Under sunny conditions with a higher wind speed the requirement for protection would decrease even more rapidly. For the purposes of this study, these relatively pessimistic meteorological conditions (1.0 m/s. wind velocity, type E stability, inversion at 750 m) will be assumed in all cases.

EVACUATION

Evacuation is a way of increasing the distance between the population and a hazard and is the countermeasure to toxic chemical releases with which there is the most experience. Sorensen and his colleagues have reviewed the subject thoroughly (1987). It is very effective for slowly (few hours) developing hazards and in areas where emergency plans employing evacuation have been developed. Slowly developing chemical hazards can include a relatively small leak of a volatile toxic chemical, a large spill of a low volatility but highly toxic substance, or a progressive accident (e.g. fire) which doesn't at first cause release of toxic chemicals but has the potential of spreading to nearby equipment, tanks or drums containing toxics. Where small areas are threatened, evacuation can be quite effective.

Situations where taking shelter may be preferable to evacuating include quick release of small quantities of volatile toxic chemicals, or circumstances where an evacuation is likely to result in a traffic jam. This latter is a possibility where the area at risk is large, the population density is high, and the time available is short.




Fig. 2 Protection Factor of Leaky Enclosures




Fig. 3 Infiltration Rates of American Residences

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Energy Division

Will Duct Tape and Plastic Really Work? Issues Related To Expedient Shelter-In-Place

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Expedient sheltering involves the use of common materials to enhance the safety of a room inside a building against the impacts of a chemical plume. The central premise behind taping and sealing with duct tape and plastic is to reduce airflow into a room. Vapors penetrate into a room through cracks and openings in the walls, floors and ceilings, around doors and windows, and through openings for ducts, light fixtures, fans, pipes, electrical outlets, chimneys, door handles, and locks. The goal of taping and sealing is to significantly reduce infiltration at these points.

Expedient sheltering was suggested by NATO (1983) using the term “ad-hoc shelter” to protect civilian populations from chemical warfare agent exposure. The concept was to use plastic sheeting to seal off a room by fashioning a simple airlock at the entrance to the room and sealing off doors, windows or louvered vents. The NATO guidelines also stressed the need for rapid exit from the ad-hoc shelter once the plume had passed to avoid further exposure (NATO 1983, p. 143).

This strategy was further developed by the Israeli Civil Defense in the mid-1980s to protect the public against a chemical weapons attack (Yeshua 1990). The tape and seal strategy was in place when the Gulf War occurred in 1991 and received considerable media attention. The Israeli strategy was to have citizens prepare a “safe room” in their house or apartment with the use of weatherization techniques to permanently reduce infiltration. Citizens were also instructed to take expedient measures, such as sealing

doors and windows with plastic sheets, in the event of a chemical weapons attack. The use of plastic over a window was developed to reduce air infiltration and to provide a vapor barrier in the event of glass breakage from bomb explosions. A modification of the Israeli strategy was proposed for use in CSEPP (Sorensen 1988; Rogers et al. 1990).

Although vapors, aerosols, and liquids cannot permeate glass windows or door panes, the amount of possible air filtration through the seals of the panes into frames could be significant, especially if frames are wood or other substance subject to expansion and contraction. To adequately seal the frames with tape could be difficult or impractical. For this reason, it has been suggested that pieces of heavy plastic sheeting larger than the window be used to cover the entire window, including the inside framing, and sealed in place with duct or other appropriate adhesive tape applied to the surrounding wall.

Another possible strategy would be to use shrink-wrap plastic often used in weatherization efforts in older houses. Shrink-wrap commonly comes in a 6 mil (0.006-in.) thickness and is adhered around the frame with double-faced tape and then heated with a hair dryer to achieve a tight fit. This would likely be more expensive than plastic sheeting and would require greater time and effort to install. Because double-faced tape has not been challenged with chemical warfare agents, another option is to use duct tape to adhere shrink-wrap to the walls. Currently, we do not recommend using shrink-wrap plastics because of the lack of information on its suitability and performance.

3. WHY WERE THESE MATERIALS CHOSEN?

Duct tape and plastic sheeting (polyethylene) were chosen because of their ability to effectively reduce infiltration and for their resistance to permeation from chemical warfare agents.

3.1 DUCT TAPE PERMEABILITY

Work on the effectiveness of expedient protection against chemical warfare agent simulants was conducted as part of a study on chemical protective clothing materials (Pal et al. 1993). Materials included a variety of chemical resistant fabrics and duct tape of 10 mil (0.01-in.) thickness. The materials were subject to liquid challenges by the simulants DIMP (a GB simulant), DMMP (a VX simulant), MAL (an organophosphorous pesticide), and DBS (a mustard simulant). The authors note that simulants should behave similarly to live agents in permeating the materials; they also note that this should be confirmed with the unitary agents. The study concluded that “duct tape exhibits reasonable resistance to permeation by the 4 simulants, although its resistance to DIMP (210 min) and DMMP (210 min) is not as good as its resistance to MAL (>24 h) and DBS (> 7 h). Due to its wide availability, duct tape appears to be a useful expedient material to provide at least a temporary seal against permeation by the agents” (Pal et al. 1993, p. 140).

3.2 PLASTIC SHEETING PERMEABILITY

Tests of the permeability of plastic sheeting (polyethylene) challenged with live chemical warfare agents were conducted at the Chemical Defense Establishment in Porton Down, England in 1970 (NATO 1983, p. 133). Agents tested included H and VX, but not GB. Four types of polyethylene of varying thickness were tested: 2.5, 4, 10 and 20 mil (0.0025, 0.004 in., 0.01 in., and 0.02 in.). The results of these tests are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Permeability of plastic sheeting to liquid agent		
Thickness	Breakthrough time (h)	
	VX	H
0.0025	3	0.3
0.004	7	0.4
0.01	30	2
0.02	48	7

Source: NATO 1983, p. 136.

The data shows that at thickness of 10 mil or greater, the plastic sheeting provided a good barrier for withstanding liquid agent challenges, offering better protection against VX than for H. Because the greatest challenge is from a liquid agent, the time to permeate the sheeting will be longer for aerosols and still longer for vapors, but the exact relationship is unknown due to a lack of test data.

In Fig. 1 we plot the data in Table 1 to determine the nature of the relationship between thickness and breakthrough time. The data suggest a somewhat linear relationship, thus allowing some interpolation for various thickness of plastic sheeting. For reference, commercially available sheeting is typically sold at 0.7, 1, 1.2, 1.5, 2, .25, 3, 4, 6, and 10 mil. although thicker material is available (up to 100 mil). Plastic painter drop cloths are sold between 0.5 and 2 mil.

4. HOW HAVE THEY PERFORMED IN TESTS OR REAL EVENTS?

Although the “safe room” strategy was used in the many scud missile attacks against Israel in the Gulf War, no chemical agents were released during these attacks. Sheltering has been recommended as a protective action in several chemical releases in the United States and Canada. Some anecdotal information exists about sheltering effectiveness in those events, but no empirical studies of actual effectiveness in a real event have been conducted. Such data would be extremely difficult to capture. Two sets of experiments have been conducted on the effectiveness of in-place sheltering (Rogers et al. 1990; Blewett et al. 1996).




Fig. 1. Breakthrough as a function of the thickness of plastic sheeting.

The results of the two sets of experiments or trials using tracer gas methods provide some insight into the effectiveness of expedient sheltering. These trials were conducted in the vicinity of Oak Ridge, TN., in the late 1980s and Edgewood, MD in the mid 1990's. The Oak Ridge tests involved 12 single-family homes. The trials measured the air exchange for the whole house, the expedient room (mainly bathrooms) with a towel against the door, and the bathroom fully taped and sealed by a household member. Materials used included duct tape, flexible insulation cord, and plastic sheeting. In each test, subjects were given written instructions and checklists, but were left to make the decision how to seal the room.

Infiltration or air exchange is measured by the number of air changes per hour (ach). The average air exchange rate for the houses tested in the Oak Ridge trials was 0.45 ach. The bathrooms with a towel averaged only 0.94 ach. The fully sealed bathrooms averaged

0.33 ach, a reduction of 0.61 ach or 65% (0.61/0.94). One factor not assessed in the study was the air exchanged between the sealed room and the whole house versus the sealed room and the outside. If one assumes that the air exchanged by the room is mostly with the rest of the house, an added protection factor would be achieved because the contaminated air concentrations outside the house are reduced by mixing with air in the whole house and then reduced again in the expedient room. If it is assumed that most of the exchange is between the room and the outside, little added protection beyond that provided by the room would be achieved.

The tests in Edgewood, Maryland, involved 10 residential buildings and 2 mobile homes. Three types of rooms were tested: bathrooms with windows, windowless bathrooms, and walk-in closets. The expedient measures were applied by technicians, and the doors were taped from the outside of the room. A total of 36 trials were performed using different configurations of protection. The results (Table 2) show the air exchange rate for the whole house and for the room in which the expedient measure(s) was applied. The most aggressive strategy (Method 2) proved to be fairly effective, reducing average air exchange rates to between 0.15 and 0.21 ach.

Table 2: Results of Edgewood trials

Room and method	Average house ach	Average room ach
Bathroom—no expedient measures	0.29	0.27
Method 1: Bathroom—wet towel and taped vent	0.28	0.23
Method 2: Bathroom—door taped, plastic sheet on window, wet towel and taped vent	0.32	0.21
Windowless bathroom—no expedient measures	0.37	0.29
Method 1: Windowless bathroom—wet towel and taped vent	0.33	0.29
Method 2: Windowless bathroom—door taped, wet towel and taped vent	0.34	0.15
Walk in closet—no expedient measures	0.39	0.28
Method 1: Walk in closet—wet towel and taped vent	0.44	0.30
Method 2: Walk in closet—door taped, wet towel and taped vent	0.21	0.15

A good way of examining the numbers in the table is to compare the baseline case (door closed with no expedient protection) to the case with the greatest amount of expedient protection (Method 2). For the bathroom, the ach dropped from 0.27 to 0.21 (22%). For the windowless bathroom, the ach dropped from 0.29 to 0.15 (48%). For the closet, the ach dropped from 0.28 to 0.15 (46%).

The results of the two studies are consistent. Both studies showed a reduction of average air exchange rates from expedient protective measures. In some of the specific rooms tested such measures substantially reduced air infiltration into the sealed room when compared to the unsealed room. Infiltration was reduced in one trial by 90% in the

Oak Ridge study and by 57% in Edgewood study. In addition, fairly low air exchanges were achieved in some of the specific expedient room trials (0.11 ach in both studies). The effectiveness of individual trials varied. In the Oak Ridge study, the lowest reduction was 13% and highest air exchange rate was 0.58 ach. In the Edgewood study, the highest air exchange rate for the most aggressive strategy (Method 2) was 0.31 ach. The greater variability in the Oak Ridge data likely results from the variability in the way individuals implemented the taping and sealing, which was more uniform in the Edgewood study because taping was done in a consistent manner by a skilled technician.

5. TIMING OF EXPEDIENT SHELTER

In the ORNL study (Rogers et al. 1990), the time to implement the expedient protection was recorded. Overall times ranged between 3 and 44 min in total, with a mean of 19.8 min. The time to close up the house was relatively short, with a mean of 3.2 min with a range of 1 to 6 min. Times to tape and seal ranged between 2.3 and 38.6 min, with a mean of 16.7 min. These data are shown in Fig. 2.




Fig. 2: Expedient shelter trial times.

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FINAL REPORT

11 March 1963

**Recovery and Decontamination
Measures after
Biological and Chemical Attack**

This report has been reviewed in the Office of Civil Defense and approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Office of Civil Defense.

Contract OCD-OS-62-183

**Prepared for
Office of Civil Defense
Department of Defense**

by

**Science Communication, Inc.
1079 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
Washington 7, D. C.**

To plan for countermeasures against any weapons one must understand the problem—the nature, the potentials, and the limitations. This research project and the resultant final report were intended to bring together current information most applicable to civil defense. It was particularly intended for those who are responsible for planning preparatory, reclamation and countermeasures effort to minimize the damage from a BW/CW attack.

William J. Lacy
Project Coordinator
Postattack Research

Decontaminants

An important class of decontaminants comprises the common substances or natural influences such as time, air, earth, water, and fire.

Natural Effects

Biological agents are living organisms and tend to die off with time unless they are in a favorable environment with moisture, food, warmth, and other factors necessary for their survival. In addition, most biological organisms are very sensitive to the conditions of temperature and humidity -- and, particularly to the ultra-violet portion of sunlight. Adverse exposure to the elements -- air, sunlight, high temperature, low humidity -- is effective, in fact, against all biological agents except the spore forms of bacterial organisms.

It is generally assumed that in the vegetative form bacteria (as contrasted to the spore form) can persist for less than two hours during daytime and about eighteen hours at night. Since these short-lived bacteria are the most probable agents, outdoor decontamination is usually not called for unless the agent has been identified, either by laboratory tests or by the character of the disease, as one which forms spores or is otherwise known to be persistent.

The persistent, low-volatile, agents such as the liquid nerve agents (V-agents) and the blister gases present the principal chemical decontamination problem. Even these evaporate in time. The speed of evaporation and dissipation is enhanced by higher temperatures and wind. Thus, if it is possible to avoid the area or the use of contaminated objects for a reasonable length of time, decontamination may be unnecessary. Such periods might run from hours to a few days, depending on the degree of contamination and weather conditions. In cold weather the agents will persist for longer periods.

Water

Next to weathering, the most important natural decontaminant is water, used either to remove the agent, with or without soap or detergents to assist, or by boiling. One caution -- water used to wash away contamination becomes contaminated and must be disposed of accordingly. Boiling destroys most chemical agents and all biological agents. When it is feasible, boiling is one of the most generally desirable methods -- particularly for household use by individuals.

Earth and fire, the other natural decontaminants, would have relatively little application in civil defense BW/CW decontamination operations. Earth may be used to cover contamination temporarily to keep it out of contact with people while natural processes either dissipate or destroy the agent. This involves substantial effort with bulldozers and earth-moving equipment and usually is neither practical or necessary.

Chemical Decontaminants

These are preferred when they are available. Chemical decontaminants fall in two classes -- those which destroy or neutralize the agents, and those which simply assist in their removal.

The principal decontaminants which destroy or neutralize are:

- Chlorine-containing materials, such as calcium hypochlorite (HTH) and sodium hypochlorite solutions. Many household disinfectants available under various brand names -- Clorox, Purex, etc. -- are sodium hypochlorite solutions.
- Alkalies, such as caustic soda (lye) and sodium carbonate (washing soda, or soda ash).

The chlorine-containing materials, in proper concentrations, are effective against both biological and chemical agents. As solutions they are used to decontaminate surfaces, as in washing off sealed food containers; for decontaminating cotton fabrics by soaking or addition during the washing process; and for sterilizing water. Hypochlorite solutions have the disadvantage of corroding metals and so must be rinsed off thoroughly.

The hypochlorites -- calcium and sodium -- are the preferred decontaminants for blister gases and liquid nerve agents. For most such applications they are used as solutions but for vertical surfaces or porous surfaces a "whitewash" of calcium hypochlorite (HTH), hydrated lime, and water (called a "slurry") is more effective

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
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
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**United States Department of State
Bureau of Diplomatic Security**

Responding to a Biological or Chemical Threat IN THE UNITED STATES



- Basic decontamination procedures are generally the same no matter what the agent. Thorough scrubbing with large amounts of warm soapy water or a mixture of 10 parts water to 1 part bleach (10:1) will greatly reduce the possibility of absorbing an agent through the skin.

Sealing a Room

- Close all windows, doors, and shutters.
- Seal all cracks around window and door frames with wide tape.
- Cover windows and exterior doors with plastic sheets (6 mil minimum) and seal with pressure-sensitive adhesive tape. (This provides a second barrier should the window break or leak).
- Seal all openings in windows and doors (including keyholes) and any cracks with cotton wool or wet rags and duct tape. A water-soaked cloth should be used to seal gaps under doors.
- Shut down all window and central air and heating units.

Suggested Safehaven Equipment

- Protective equipment—biological/chemical rated gas masks, if available; waterproof clothing including long-sleeved shirts, long pants, raincoats, boots, and rubber gloves.
- Food and water—a 3-day supply.
- Emergency equipment—flashlights, battery-operated radio, extra batteries, can or bottle opener, knife and scissors, first aid kit, fire extinguisher, etc.
- Most chemical and biological agents that present an inhalation hazard will break down fairly rapidly when exposed to the sun, diluted with water, or dissipated in high winds.

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Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Reprinted July 2004

In 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese religious cult, launched a large-scale chemical attack on the Tokyo subway system. The attack focused on four stations using Sarin gas, a potent chemical warfare nerve agent. Twelve people were killed but the attack fell far short of the apparent objective to inflict thousands of casualties. Subsequent investigation by authorities revealed that the cult had previously conducted several unsuccessful attacks against a variety of targets using other chemical agents and the biological agents botulism toxin and anthrax.

More recently, the incidents of anthrax contamination in the United States served to illustrate the viability of this type of terrorist threat. Again, the attacks fell short of mass casualties, but some deaths did occur and the fear and disruption caused by a few positive anthrax findings were crippling. The U.S. Government continues working to meet the potential consequences of such attacks.

**EVALUATING PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR
CHEMICAL AGENT EMERGENCIES**

by

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APPENDIX G

INSTRUCTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING EXPEDIENT SHELTER IN CHEMICAL EMERGENCIES

Entering your dwelling or other buildings and following a few simple procedures can reduce exposure to released toxic chemical. These instructions can help you implement a series of actions to increase your protection. The series includes six basic steps:

1. preparing your dwelling to provide protection,
2. selecting an appropriate room within your dwelling to provide maximum shelter,
3. assembling the necessary materials needed to complete the procedures,
4. sealing a room within the dwelling to provide additional protection,
5. remaining in the shelter until notified that the hazard has passed, and
6. vacating the shelter upon plume passage.

Because each house is in some ways unique, you may need to adapt these procedures to your particular home. These instructions order the activities in terms of what is most important in obtaining maximum protection. Therefore, we recommend that you follow these steps in sequence wherever possible. Time is critically important to ensure adequate protection, so implement each step as quickly as you can without making mistakes and continue to the next step as soon as possible.

G.1. Preparing Your Dwelling

The objective is to prepare your dwelling to provide the maximum reduction of airflow from outside to inside. These preliminary steps also provide some protection while you carry out the procedures.

- 1a. Go or stay indoors.
- 1b. Close all exterior doors and windows (close storm windows if this can be done quickly). Don't forget garage doors in integral or attached garages as well as doors normally left open for ventilation.
- 1c. Close all interior doors.
- 1d. Turn off central heat/air conditioning fans, ceiling fans, kitchen hood fans, and circulating fans.

G.2. Selecting the Appropriate Room

The objective is to select the room that is best suited to reducing overall air infiltration while having at least 10 square feet of floor area per person. Under hot and humid conditions more space is advisable to avoid conditions that might lead to heat prostration within the shelter. Moreover, room air conditioners that recirculate internal

air may be used to create more comfortable shelter conditions. For example a 5 × 8 foot room has 40 ft², which would be appropriate for sheltering up to 4 people. This step can be completed in advance. If you have already preselected the room to provide maximum shelter, skip to Sect. G.3 below.

- 2a. The best room is a relatively small, has no outside walls, and is on the ground floor.
- 2b. If 2a is not available; select a small room with no windows.
- 2c. If 2a and 2b are not available: select the room with the smallest number of windows and doors.
- 2d. Avoid rooms with window air conditioners, windows that leak, vents to outside such as automatic dryer vents, and circulation vents.
- 2e. Do not select rooms with exhaust vents that automatically start when the light is turned on. These exhaust fans force external air into the room.
- 2f. If all the above elements are the same for two rooms, choose the room that is free of plumbing fixtures, because such fixtures increase the potential airflow and will require sealing as described in Sect. G.4 below.

G.3. Assembling Materials and Resources

This stage of the procedures is designed to collect all the needed materials to reduce the airflow as much as possible in the room you selected in Sect. G.2 above. This step can be performed ahead of time. Place the following materials in the selected room.

- 3a. the expedient shelter kit provided;
- 3b. verify that the kit still has the tape, plastic sheet, scissors, clay, and screwdriver;
- 3c. obtain a large towel (at least bath-towel size);
- 3d. a ladder, stool, or chair if required to seal any ceiling vents or the tops of windows and doors;
- 3e. a radio or television or other communication device (preferably portable) to let you to know when the plume has passed so you can exit at an appropriate time; and
- 3f. if the selected room does not have plumbing, drinking water and sanitary facilities (a covered bucket or other vessel containing approximately 1 cup of chlorine bleach).

G.4. Taping and Sealing

This set of procedures is designed to identify and seal the major sources of airflow between the room you have selected and the rest of the house, as well as restrict the flow of any toxic chemical that may be outside. These steps are sequenced to eliminate larger sources of air exchange first, so they should be implemented in the order listed whenever possible.

- 4a. Assemble people to be protected in the selected room and close the door. If windows were not closed as instructed in Sect. G.1 above, do so now.
- 4b. Jam the towel under the entire width of the door, sealing the whole area between the bottom of the door and the floor.
- 4c. VENTS: If there are no vents, skip to step 4d below. Locate any vents associated with the heating system, fan vents which are sometimes located in bathrooms, or vents to other rooms or to the outside such as dryer vents. Then, tape over small vents repeatedly, overlapping the tape to form a complete seal. For large vents, cut a piece of plastic sheeting large enough to cover the vent, place it over the vent, and tape the plastic loosely in place at the corners. Tape the plastic along each edge to ensure a complete seal. Repeat for each vent in the room.
- 4d. WINDOWS: If there are no windows, skip to step 4e below. If there are any broken or cracked windows, apply tape or cling-wrap over glass. Locate all leak points (any joints in the window frame, where movable parts of the frame come together), apply cling-wrap to each leak point. Then, cut a piece of plastic sheeting large enough to cover window and window frame, place it over the window and frame, and tape the plastic loosely in place at the corners. Tape the plastic along each edge to ensure a complete seal.
- 4e. Before you complete the seal on the door, check all supplies to ensure that you have enough material to completely seal the door. Do not open the door unless you clearly have inadequate materials to complete the seal; breaking the door seal will substantially reduce the protection provided by the refuge.
- 4f. DOOR: Tape along each edge of the door to seal off airflow, beginning with the parts you can reach from the floor and proceeding to the upper parts that may require the use of a ladder, stool, or chair. Place and tape cling-wrap over each hinge and the door handle.
- 4g. PLUMBING FIXTURES: If there are no plumbing fixtures, skip to step 4h below. Use putty or clay around all pipes that penetrate walls, ceiling, or floor (both intake and drainage pipes). To apply clay or putty, pull back the pipes decorative sealing ring (use screwdriver if necessary), wrap enough clay or putty around the pipe to fill any gaps between the wall and the pipe, and reset the decorative ring in clay by pressing the ring firmly against wall. Repeat for all pipe entry and exit points.
- 4h. CABINETS: If there are no built-in cabinets such as sink cabinets, linen closets, or medicine cabinets, skip to step 4i below. Close the cabinet doors and tape them closed according to the procedures described for doors in step 4f above. Note that, because cabinet hinges and handles are smaller than those on doors, tape will probably cover these areas adequately. Then, tape or use cling-wrap along all joints where the cabinet meets the wall. Pay particular attention to kickplates below cabinets, by checking the underside for holes and gaps. Smaller gaps may need to be plugged with clay.
- 4i. ELECTRICAL FIXTURES: Locate all electrical fixtures, including outlets, switch boxes, and lights. If a light is recessed or if it cannot be sealed without

turning it off, it will have to remain unsealed because covering a light without turning it off may start a fire. Put tape over the outlet boxes, and use cling-wrap or tape to cover all switch boxes. Put cling-wrap over light fixtures not in use. (Some light fixtures contain fans that run continuously with the light in the room. These fans should be turned off as early as practical; if they cannot be turned off, a different room should be selected as instructed in Sect. G.2 above.)

- 4j. **CHECKING YOUR WORK:** After, you have completed the procedures to seal the room you have selected, check each area you sealed by slowly passing your hand in front of all potential leak areas. If you can feel air flowing, try to seal it better. We do not recommend that you remove any previous seals, but you may want to add plastic sheeting over sealed areas or tape them more securely.

G.5. Remaining in Shelter

The objective of this stage is to relax as much as possible and wait to be notified of the appropriate time to exit the shelter.

- 5a. Shelter occupants should be as comfortable as possible; they should stand or move around as little as possible.
- 5b. Remain calm and relax; doing so adds additional protection by reducing your respiration rate.
- 5c. Turn on communication device so you can be contacted when it is safe to exit the shelter.
- 5d. Ask each occupant to periodically check for airflows near them. If any are discovered, seal them by following the above procedures.
- 5e. Wait for notification of plume passage.

G.6. Vacate Shelter

The objective of this step is to exit the shelter when the plume passes by and to avoid any further cumulative exposure.

- 6a. Put on protective clothing.
- 6b. Open all windows and doors.
- 6c. Evacuate to reception center for medical evaluation and decontamination.

EXPEDIENT SHELTER INSTRUCTION CHECKLIST

1. Prepare your dwelling to provide protection.

- 1a. Go or stay indoors.
- 1b. Close all exterior doors and windows.
- 1c. Close all interior doors.
- 1d. Turn off fans.

2. Select an appropriate room within your dwelling to provide maximum shelter, having at least 10 square feet of floor area per person.

- 2a. Choose a relatively small room with no outside walls on the ground floor.
- 2b. If not available: select a small room with no windows.
- 2c. If not available: select the room with the fewest windows and doors.
- 2d. Avoid rooms with window air conditioners, windows that leak, vents to the outside, and circulation vents whenever possible.
- 2e. Avoid rooms with plumbing fixtures whenever possible.

3. Assemble the necessary materials.

- 3a. Use the expedient shelter kit provided;
- 3b. Verify that its contents are complete;
- 3c. Large towel of at least bath-towel size;
- 3d. Ladder, stool, or chair if necessary;
- 3e. Radio, television, or other communication device;
- 3f. Drinking water and covered container with chlorine bleach for sanitary purposes.

4. Seal a room in the dwelling to provide additional protection.

- 4a. Enter the selected room and close the door.
- 4b. Jam the towel under the door.
- 4c. Seal vents.
- 4d. Seal windows.
- 4e. Check all supplies; replace if necessary.
- 4f. Seal door.
- 4g. Seal plumbing.
- 4h. Seal cabinets.
- 4i. Seal electrical fixtures.
- 4j. Check you work; reseal where necessary.

5. Remain in the shelter until notified that the plume has passed.

- 5a. Get as comfortable as possible.
- 5b. Remain calm, relax, and stay immobile.
- 5c. Turn on communication device.
- 5d. Periodically check for airflows in the shelter.
- 5e. Wait for notification of plume passage.

6. Vacate shelter.

- 6a. Don protective clothing.
- 6b. Open all windows and doors.
- 6c. Evacuate.

Energy Division

Expedient Respiratory and Physical Protection: Does a Wet Towel Work to Prevent Chemical Warfare Agent Vapor Infiltration?

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1. INTRODUCTION

Several public information efforts in the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) advocate the use of wet towels to (1) seal a door jam against the infiltration of chemical vapors and (2) provide expedient respiratory protection.

A wet towel has been a common respiratory protection practice for fires to reduce inhalation of soot and smoke, but will this strategy protect against chemical vapors? Using a wet towel to reduce infiltration of chemicals into a room by sealing the gap between the floor and the door is frequently cited in the shelter-in-place (SIP) literature (see Blewett et al. 1996).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of such measures to reduce exposure to vapors from chemical warfare agents. This evaluation includes an examination of the physical and the psychological effectiveness of these measures. Little research has been conducted to examine the effectiveness of expedient protection against chemical vapors and aerosols. More is known about the penetration of aerosols than vapor. In this paper, we summarize the research to date and offer several recommendations for CSEPP.

2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON EXPEDIENT PROTECTION

The first documented research on expedient respiratory protection was conducted by Guyton et. al. (1959). They performed a series of tests to determine whether common household items provided respiratory protection against a release of radiological or biological aerosols. The materials they tested included

- a man's cotton handkerchief,
- a women's cotton handkerchief,
- cotton clothing material,
- muslin bed sheet,
- cotton shirt,
- rayon slip,
- cotton terry bath towel, and
- toilet paper.

In total, 18 variations of the 8 materials were tested. The tests performed used human subjects who inhaled *B. globigii* (a bacteria aerosol) through the various materials into a mouthpiece collector. The results of the testing indicated that 5 of the variations had filtration efficiency of greater than 85%. These included a folded (16 and 8 thickness) or crumpled handkerchief, 3 thickness of toilet paper, and a bath towel folded in half. Tests

were performed on wetted items, but the efficiency was lower than for dry items. In addition, only the bath towel was feasible to breath through when wet. No testing for vapor protection was performed.

A series of experiments was performed by the Harvard School of Public Health in the early 1980's (Cooper, Hinds, and Price 1981; 1983; Cooper et al. 1983a,b; Price, Cooper, and Yee 1985). These efforts sought to build on the work of Guyten et al. by examining the penetration of expedient materials by particle size and by examining penetration by vapors. Materials similar to those in the earlier studies were used; but instead of human subjects, several test chambers were designed. Mineral oil was used for the aerosol tests and methyl iodide and iodine were used in the vapor tests. Methyl iodide is a difficult vapor to capture, while iodine, a highly reactive gas, was chosen because it is readily removed by wet filtration, thus setting the upper boundary for effectiveness against a gas.

The first set of tests examined the effectiveness of the materials in filtering the aerosols and vapors. For aerosols, the reductions by a factor of 30 were achieved with the dry materials across the range of aerosol sizes. Reductions by a factor of five were achieved with wet materials. No filtration was achieved with dry materials for both vapors. As predicted, wet materials had no effectiveness for methyl iodide but were effective in filtration of iodine vapors (60 % filtration) (Cooper, Hinds, and Price 1981; 1983).

Additional experiments were performed using a manikin to evaluate aerosol leakage around the protective materials assessed in the first experiments. These tests showed that the leakage rates around the edges of the expedient materials (in addition to the leakage of the materials), ranged as high as 63%. The study concluded that holding expedient materials over the face would not provide significant protection against aerosols due to the leakage problem. The study also concluded that some material, such as a panty hose, was needed to secure the expedient protective materials around the mouth and nose in order to minimize leakage (Cooper et al. 1983a,b). Although vapors were not included in this study, it is reasonable to assume that leakage around the perimeters of the materials would also be problematic for vapors.

Additional tests were performed with aerosols in the extremely small particle size range (Price, Cooper, and Yee 1985). These tests, as with the other aerosol tests, are not relevant for civilian protection in CSEPP SIP actions because of the extremely low likelihood of aerosol contamination off-post.

A major concern in all studies was the ability to inhale through the expedient materials. This proved problematic for all wet materials except for wet toweling. For the thick dry materials, such as the folded handkerchief—which was the most effective filter, breathing comfortably would be possible for only short periods of time.

Additional work on the effectiveness of expedient protection against chemical warfare agent simulants was conducted as part of a study on chemical protective clothing materials (Pal et al. 1993). Materials included a variety of chemical-resistant fabrics and duct tape. The materials were subject to liquid challenges by the simulants DIMP (GB

simulant), DMMP (VX simulant), MAL (organophosphorous pesticide), and DBS (mustard simulant). The study concluded that “Duct tape exhibits reasonable resistance to permeation by the 4 simulants, although its resistance to DIMP (210 min) and DMMP (210 min) is not as good as its resistance to MAL (>24 h) and DBS (> 7 h). Due to its wide availability, duct tape appears to be a useful expedient material to provide at least a temporary seal against permeation by the agents” (Pal et al. 1993, p. 140).

3. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Expedient respiratory protection may have social-psychological benefits as well as problems that need to be examined as well.

Problems

Expedient respiratory protection can cause or exacerbate problems by

- deterring oral communications among a family in a sheltered room and communications are very important in a SIP situation,
- deterring taping a room if people attempt to use expedient respiratory protection from the onset of SIP,
- being an additional resource for a SIP kit or materials that would need to be located at the time of a SIP warning,
- hampering driving ability during evacuation because of impairment of hand use and possible visual difficulty, and
- causing hyperventilation in some people with a tendency to be claustrophobic about impediments to breathing.

Benefits

Expedient respiratory protection can also

- have a placebo effect, making people believe they are safe while they are in a SIP and
- reinforcing the concept of proactive protection during SIP.

Overall, it appears that the non-physical benefits of expedient respiratory protection do not exceed the potential problems. However, it will be important to communicate to the public that expedient respiratory protection is beneficial in other emergency situations (such as a fire or for volcanic ash).

4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CSEPP

Respiratory protection for civilians has never been considered a viable option for population protection in the CSEPP. Problems of storage, ability to effectively don respirators, and questionable fit have been primary factors in rejecting this option. Expedient respiratory protection seems to offer little benefit for population protection.

Because chemical warfare agent vapors are not reactive with water—or, in some cases, not very soluble, even if easily hydrolyzed (Munro et al. 1999)—it is unlikely that wetted towels will provide significant respiratory protection while a person is sheltering in place. In no case would it be recommended that people attempt to evacuate through a vapor plume with or without expedient respiratory protection. Because of the physical ineffectiveness of the practice and the fact that the social-psychological benefits do not outweigh the social-psychological problems, we recommend that expedient respiratory protection should not be used in CSEPP protective action strategies.

Furthermore, we believe that using wet towels as a vapor barrier at the bottom of a door should be discouraged in favor of using duct tape to seal the bottom of doors. A wet towel provides no vapor filtration; and while it will reduce infiltration, its effectiveness in doing so is not known. A towel wetted with a 0.5% solution of hypochlorite (a 1:9 dilution of household bleach) may provide some protection. A hypochlorite solution is an effective decontaminant for nerve agent vapors and would provide dual protection, both physical and chemical (Munro et al. 1990). Taping the bottom of the door will still likely provide greater infiltration reduction and is recommended as the current method for use in SIP for CSEPP.

5. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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FM 3-10

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT



HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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FIELD MANUAL
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CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose

This manual provides guidance to commanders and staff officers in the employment of chemical and biological weapons. It contains a brief summary of background knowledge of chemical and biological agents and munitions and the procedures to be followed in planning their employment.

2. Scope

a. General. Considerations are limited to chemical and biological agents and delivery systems that are type-classified or expected to be type-classified during the period ending December 1965. The chemical agents are nerve agent GB, nerve agent VX, and blister agent HD. The agent delivery means are artillery and mortar shells, rocket and missile warheads, aircraft bombs, and spray devices. FM 3-10A contains the classification and characteristics of biological agents and information on biological munitions and delivery systems. Troop safety considerations are presented. This manual is applicable to nuclear and nonnuclear warfare.

b. Chemical Agents. Chapters 3 through 8 contain a discussion of chemical agents and their characteristics; factors affecting the employment of chemical agents; chemical munitions and delivery systems and the concepts for their employment; and target analysis, fire planning, and logistical considerations. Methods of chemical target analysis presented are suitable for fire planning and casualty assessment at all echelons of command having chemical fire planning and assessment responsibilities.

c. Biological Agents. Chapters 9 through 13 contain a discussion of biological agents and their characteristics; factors affecting the employment of biological agents; biological munitions and delivery systems and the concepts of their employment; and target analysis, effects assessments, and logistical considerations. Only the anti-personnel effects of biological agents are con-

sidered. The methods of biological weapons target analysis presented are suitable for biological fire planning and casualty assessment. The unique character of biological munitions supply and field management is presented.

d. Reliability. The data and procedures presented in this manual have been extracted or derived from official studies and from research and development documents. The potential performance of materiel is based on field trial data with simulants and selected live agents and on theoretical calculations and assumptions developed from mathematical models. The procedures are therefore subject to change as may be required by future developments or refinements. It should be noted that the flow of a chemical or biological agent cloud over the terrain cannot be predicted with a high degree of precision. This is due principally to the inability to predict accurately the prevailing atmospheric conditions of the area under consideration with respect to the diffusion and dissipation of an agent cloud. Nevertheless, the methods and procedures presented here provide information with sufficient accuracy to be used with reasonable confidence.

e. User Comments. Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the document. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to the Commandant, U.S. Army Chemical Corps School, Fort McClellan, Ala.

3. The Role of Chemical Agents in Military Operations

a. Chemical weapons increase the flexibility of the integrated weapons systems and place at the commander's disposal a highly effective means of conducting antipersonnel operations.

b. In the conduct of military operations involv-

ing chemical weapons, some factors that should be considered are—

- (1) The chemical agents discussed herein do not destroy materiel. On the contrary, they allow the physical preservation of industrial complexes, cultural institutions, lines of communications, and other facilities and materiel that may be useful to friendly forces or that merit preservation for political or economic reasons.
- (2) Chemical munitions do not produce physical obstacles to maneuver, since they cause minimal destruction, blowdown, rubble, and similar barriers. Agents that produce a persistent effect, however, will create a hazard to friendly troops.
- (3) Chemical agents may be employed to produce a variety of effects ranging from harassment to lethality.
- (4) Toxic chemical clouds penetrate fortifications and similar structures that are not airtight.
- (5) Because of their area coverage effect, chemical agents, used in mass, are particularly effective in attacking targets whose location is not precisely known.
- (6) Chemical munitions are particularly effective for producing casualties among dug-in personnel who are not provided with chemical protection.
- (7) Chemical agents increase the flexibility of the entire spectrum of firepower available to the commander.
- (8) Chemical agents may be used to follow up and exploit advantages gained by other means.

- (9) Because the effectiveness of chemical agents on the target is influenced by the type and quantity of agent employed and by the method of dissemination, meteorological factors, conditions of the target, and protection and training of enemy troops, it is difficult to predict the results of employment accurately.
- (10) Chemical agents may produce hazards to friendly forces because of residual contamination and cloud movement.

4. Chemical Agents

a. The following three type-classified chemical agents provide commanders flexibility in their employment of chemicals.

- (1) Nerve agent GB is a rapid-acting lethal agent that is used primarily for respiratory effects against unprotected personnel and for surprise attack against personnel having masks available.
- (2) Two agents are used in circumventing the protective mask.
 - (a) VX is a slow-acting lethal nerve agent when absorbed percutaneously. If inhaled as an aerosol or vapor, VX acts as rapidly as GB and is more toxic.
 - (b) HD is a slow-acting casualty agent with a limited lethal effect. It attacks the skin in liquid or vapor form and is also effective by inhalation.

b. The following figures describe GB and HD in more detail. Detailed information on VX is contained in FM 3-10A. More comprehensive data on chemical agents are in TM 3-215.

1. Primary use.....	Nonpersistent, rapid-acting lethal agent used primarily for respiratory effect.
2. Average time to incapacitation.....	15 minutes after exposure to an incapacitating dosage; for lethal dosages, death in 5 minutes after appearance of symptoms if untreated.
3. Duration of incapacitation.....	1 to 5 days for return to duty. (30 to 60 days for return to normal blood cholinesterase level.)
4. Signs and symptoms.....	Tightness of chest, pinpointing of eye pupils, dimness of vision, excessive sweating, drooling; followed by tension, giddiness, tremors, confusion, slurred speech, weakness, convulsions, and death.
5. Physiological effects.....	Nerve poison; slow detoxification by body (60 days); effects of successive small dosages considered cumulative for short periods of time (weeks).
6. Route of entry.....	Inhalation; percutaneous entry by liquid or high vapor concentration is unlikely in the field because of the high dosage required.
7. Protection.....	Mask against vapor; protective clothing against liquid agent.
8. Limitations.....	Mask offers adequate protection against vapor for trained and warned personnel.
9. Duration of hazard.....	The area in and around shell or bomb craters will be contaminated and will remain a hazard to unprotected personnel for periods ranging from 6 hours to several days.
10. Physical properties.....	Clear, colorless, odorless liquid; freezing point minus 56° C (–69° F.); boiling point 147° C (297° F.); evaporates at approximately the same rate as water.

Figure 1. Characteristics of nerve agent GB.

1. Primary use..... To cause delayed casualties by liquid and vapor effect on the skin and eyes and by vapor effect through the respiratory system.
2. Average time to incapacitation.. Eye effect 3 to 12 hours; skin effect 3 to 24 hours.
3. Duration of incapacitation..... Eye effect 1 to 7 days; skin effect 1 to 4 weeks.
4. Signs and symptoms..... Inflammation of eyes; redness of skin; blistering; ulceration.
5. Physiological effects..... Produces blisters and destroys tissues.
6. Route of entry..... Skin absorption of vapor or liquid and inhalation of vapor.
7. Protection..... Mask, ointment, and protective clothing.
8. Limitations..... Limited effectiveness in freezing weather; greater dosages are required for casualty production than are required with GB or VX.
9. Duration of hazard..... 36 hours to several days. See figure 2.1d.
10. Physical properties..... Clear oily liquid with garliclike odor; moderately volatile; freezing point 14° C. (57° F.); boiling point 228° C. (442° F.).

Figure 2. Characteristics of blister agent HD.

Times given indicate approximate time after contamination that personnel may operate in the area

Task	Terrain	Protection (Based on expenditures between 240 and 1,200 pounds of HD per hectare)			
		With protective clothing and wearing masks		Without protective clothing ¹	
		Temperature		Temperature	
		16°-27° C. (60°-80° F.)	Above 27° C. (80° F.)	16°-27° C. (60°-80° F.)	Above 27° C. (80° F.)
		Hours	Hours	Days	Days
TRAVERSAL ² (Walking across area up to 2 hr) -	Bare soil, sand, or short grass.....	0	0	³ 1½	³ 1½
	Low vegetation.....	4	2	³ 1½	³ 1½
	High vegetation, including jungle and heavy woods.	12	6	³ 4	³ 2
ADVANCE UNDER FIRE (Contact with ground, 1 hr; total time in area, 2 hr).	Bare soil or low vegetation.....	24	8	³ 3	³ 2
	High vegetation, including jungle and heavy woods.	48	24	³ 6	³ 4
OCCUPATION (Without hitting ground, 24 hr) -	Bare soil or low vegetation.....	1	1	⁴ 4	⁴ 3
	High vegetation, including jungle and heavy woods.	1	1	⁴ 4	⁴ 3
OCCUPATION (Involving advance under fire, 24 hr).	Bare soil or low vegetation.....	24	8	⁴ 4	⁴ 3
	High vegetation, including jungle and heavy woods.	48	24	⁴ 6	⁴ 4

¹ For men walking in a contaminated area for 2 hours without protective clothing, the limiting factor is the vapor.

² For men with protective clothing, when traversal is made in daylight and areas of heavy contamination can be avoided or decontaminated, the times can be reduced to about one-half of those indicated above.

³ Wearing masks.

⁴ Not wearing masks.

Figure 3. Duration of HD hazard in target area.

Additional micrometeorological characteristics of the zone of operations are obtained through the following methods:

- (1) Aerial reconnaissance and observations.
- (2) Ground reconnaissance and observations.
- (3) Observations of fog, smoke, and dust in the zone of operations.
- (4) Field expedient methods for obtaining micrometeorological data in the vicinity of the target area.
- (5) Statistical studies of weather in the theater of operations.

b. A suggested format for transmission and recording of basic weather data is illustrated in appendix II. It is emphasized that in chemical target analysis, the weather predictions are required for a period of time after the attack as well as for the time of the chemical attack.

c. Normally, Air Weather Service detachments are stationed at field army, corps and division headquarters. From these sources a target analyst may obtain weather data and weather briefings, or he may request detailed operational and planning forecasts and climatological information.

10. Temperature

The rate of evaporation of chemical agents increases as the temperature rises. High temperatures cause personnel to perspire more freely, thus opening the pores of the skin and accelerating penetration of the skin by the agent. At low temperatures, extra layers of clothing increase the barrier to the skin.

11. Temperature Gradient

The temperature gradient is an expression of the difference in air temperature at two levels. In the United States Army, it is determined by subtracting the air temperature (Fahrenheit) measured one-half meter above the ground from the air temperature 2 meters above the ground. The three characteristic conditions that are associated with the temperature gradient follow:

a. *Lapse*. A decrease in air temperature with an increase in height is known as a *lapse* condition. Such a condition normally exists on a clear or partially clear day and is characterized by heat turbulence. It is the least desirable condition

for chemical operations because of rapid dissipation of agent clouds.

b. *Inversion*. An increase in air temperature with an increase in height is known as an *inversion* condition. This condition exhibits a minimum of turbulence and usually exists on a clear or partially clear night or early morning. This is the most desirable condition for chemical operations since the agent cloud tends to remain in the cooler layers of the air near the ground.

c. *Neutral*. A condition intermediate between lapse and inversion is known as a *neutral* condition. Such a condition prevails when there are small differences in temperature at the two levels and usually exists on heavily overcast days or nights, and shortly after sunrise and near sunset.

12. Wind

The wind is also an important weather element affecting the field behavior of chemical clouds. Of the wind characteristics, velocity and direction have greatest influence. Both characteristics are influenced by terrain and temperature gradient.

a. *Velocity*. Air moving over an irregular surface sets up eddies, or mechanical turbulence. This turbulence is similar to heat turbulence in that it acts to dissipate a chemical cloud. High wind velocities also cause the agent cloud to pass rapidly over the target area, thus reducing the exposure time. Some air movement is desired to blend the individual clouds of agent formed by each shell burst into a uniform cloud covering the target. Ideal wind velocities for chemical operations are 3 to 9 knots (approximately 6 to 16 kilometers per hour). Wind velocities in excess of 16 knots (approximately 30 kilometers per hour) are not suitable for nonpersistent effects.

b. *Direction*. Wind directs the travel of a chemical cloud. This fact must be considered in the release of an agent for coverage of a particular target and in the determination of the downwind hazard to friendly troops. The wind direction is the direction from which the wind blows and is expressed in terms of azimuth in mils or degrees.

13. Precipitation

Precipitation has an adverse effect on the behavior of chemical agents, since rain will wash away the liquid agent contamination and snow will cover it. Precipitation also washes agent vapors or aerosol clouds from the air and destroys some agents by hydrolysis.

Line	1 Munition	2 Agent	3 Delivery system	4 User	5 Employment data			
					(a)		(b)	(c)
					Range (1) (Meters) (2)		Error	Fuze (Capability)
					Maximum	Minimum		
1	Shell, M2A1.....	HD	4.2-inch Mortar.....	US ARMY USMC	3,930.....	180.....	← Obtain from delivery unit or appropriate firing tables →	M8PD.....
2	Shell, M360.....	GB	105-mm Howitzer, M2A1, M2A2, M4, M4A2, M52.	US ARMY USMC	11,140.....	862.....		M508PD.....
3	Shell, M60.....	HD	105-mm Howitzer, M2A1, M2A2, M4, M4A2, M52.	US ARMY USMC	11,140.....			M51A5PD.....
4	Shell, M121.....	GB	155-mm Howitzer, M1, M1A1, M44.	US ARMY USMC	14,950.....			M508PD.....
5	Shell, M110.....	HD	155-mm Howitzer, M1, M1A1, M44.	US ARMY USMC	14,950.....			M51A5PD.....
6	Shell, T__ (M121).....	VX	155-mm Howitzer, M1, M1A1, M44.	US ARMY USMC	14,950.....			T76E6VT ¹
7	Shell, M122.....	GB	155-mm Gun, M2, M53.....	USMC.....	23,500.....			M508PD.....
8	Shell, M104.....	HD	155-mm Gun, M2, M53.....	USMC.....				M51A5PD.....
9	Shell, Gas, 175-mm.....	GB	M107 Gun (SP).....	US ARMY	31,500.....	180.....		
10	Shell, Gas, 175-mm.....	VX	M107 Gun (SP).....	US ARMY	31,500.....	180.....		VT-M514A1.....
11	Shell, T174.....	GB	8-inch Howitzer, M2, M2A1, M55.	US ARMY USMC	16,930.....			M51A5PD.....
12	Shell, T174.....	VX	8-inch Howitzer, M2, M2A1, M55.	US ARMY USMC.	16,930.....		← Obtain from delivery unit →	T2061 VT.....
13	Rocket, M55, 115-mm (BOLT)...	GB	Launcher, M91.....	US ARMY USMC.	10,970.....	2,740.....		M417PD.....
14	Rocket, M55, 115-mm (BOLT)...	VX	Launcher, M91.....	US ARMY USMC.	10,970.....	2,740.....		T2061 VT.....
15	Warhead, M79, 762-mm (HON- EST JOHN).	GB	Rocket, M31A1C Launcher, M386.	US ARMY USMC.	24,960.....	8,500.....		T2075 Mech Time.....
16	Warhead, E19R2, 762-mm (HONEST JOHN).	GB	Rocket, XM50 Launcher, M386.	US ARMY USMC.	33,830.....	8,500.....		T2075 Mech Time.....
17	Warhead, E19R2, 762-mm (HONEST JOHN).	VX	Rocket, XM50 Launcher, M386.	US ARMY USMC.	33,830.....	8,500.....		T2075 Mech Time.....
18	Warhead, E20, 318-mm (LIT- TLE JOHN).	GB	Rocket, XM51 Launcher, XM80.	US ARMY USMC.	18,290.....	3,200 ¹		T2075 Mech Time.....
19	Warhead, E21, (SERGEANT)...	GB	Rocket, Launcher.....	US ARMY	139 km.....	50 km.....	304m...	Preset Radar.....
20	Warhead, E21, (SERGEANT)...	VX	Rocket, Launcher.....	US ARMY	139 km.....	50 km.....	304m...	Preset Radar.....
21	Bomb, M34A1, 1000-lb, Cluster...	GB	Fighter, Bomber.....	USAF.....	Range of Aircraft.		← Obtain from delivery unit →	M152E3 Mech Time...
22	Bomb, MC-1, 750-lb.....	GB	Fighter, Bomber.....	USAF.....	Range of Aircraft.			M905BD.....
23	Projectile, 5"/38, MK53, MOD O.	GB	5-inch Gun.....	US NAVY	16,450.....			MK29MOD3PD.....
24	Projectile, 5"/54, MK54, MOD O.	GB	5-inch Gun.....	US NAVY	19,200.....			MK30MOD3PD.....
25	Warhead, Rocket, 5" MK40, MOD O.	GB	Launcher, MK 105 Rocket, M40, MOD O.	US NAVY	4,200.....			MK30MOD3PD.....
26	Warhead, Rocket, 5", MK40, MOD O.	HD	Launcher, MK 105 Rocket, M40, MOD O.	US NAVY	4,200.....			MK30MOD3PD.....
27	Bomb, MK94, MOD O.....	GB	Fighter, Bomber.....	US NAVY	Range of Aircraft.			AN-M103A1ND M195 BD (IM- PACT).
28	Bomb, M70A1.....	HD	Fighter, Bomber.....	US NAVY	Range of Aircraft.			AN-M158ND (IM- PACT).
29	Mine, Land, Chemical, M23.....	VX	N/A.....	US ARMY	N/A.....	N/A.....	N/A	
30	Mine, Land, Chemical, One- Gallon.	HD	N/A.....	US ARMY	N/A.....	N/A.....	N/A	

See notes at end of figure.

Figure 5. Chemical munitions and delivery systems.

5 Employment data—Continued						6 Functioning and physical characteristics of CML munitions				
(d)		(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
Time for delivery		Organization	Rate of fire per weapon	Height of burst	Diameter (meters) of impact area (single rd) ²	Weight of munition (kg)	Weight of agent (kg)	Effective weight of agent (kg) ³	Function- ing effi- ciency of munition (percent)	Agent dissemi- nation efficiency
(1)	(2) Target of opportunity									
Preplanned		6 Mort/Plt.....	30 Rds/2 min.....	GND.....	16.....	10.8	2.72		99	
	1-3 min.....	8 Mort/Btry.....	105 Rds/15 min.....							
		6 How/Btry.....	6 Rds/½ min.....	GND.....	27.....	16.1	.739		99	
	1-3 min.....	6 How/Btry.....	18 Rds/4 min.....							
			6 Rds/½ min.....	GND.....	11.....	15.2	1.22		99	
	1-5 min.....	6 How/Btry.....	18 Rds/4 min.....							
			3 Rds/½ min.....	GND.....	49.....	45.9	2.95		99	
	1-5 min.....	6 How/Btry.....	12 Rds/4 min.....							
			3 Rds/½ min.....	GND.....	20.....	42.0	4.4		99	
	1-5 min.....	6 How/Btry.....	12 Rds/4 min.....							
			3 Rds/½ min.....	20m ¹		45.9	2.95		99	
	1-5 min.....	4 Gun/Btry.....	12 Rds/4 min.....							
			2 Rds/½ min.....	GND.....	49.....	45.9	2.95		99	
	1-5 min.....	4 Gun/Btry.....	8 Rds/4 min.....							
			2 Rds/½ min.....	GND.....	22.....	43.0	5.31			
			8 Rds/4 min.....							
		4 Gun/Btry.....		GND.....		66.8	6.68			
		4 Gun/Btry.....		GND.....		66.8	6.04			
	½-6 hr.....	4 How/Btry.....	6 Rds/4 min.....	GND.....	76.....	97.0	7.12		99	
			10 Rds/10 min.....							
	½-6 hr.....	4 How/Btry.....	6 Rds/4 min.....	20m ¹		97.0	7.12		99	
			10 Rds/10 min.....							
	30 min.....	36 Lehr/Bn.....	45 Rkt/Lehr/15 sec.....	GND.....	46.....	26.4	4.80		99	
	30 min.....	36 Lehr/Bn.....	45 Rkt/Lehr/15 sec.....	20m ¹		26.2	4.54		99	
	15 min.....	2 Lehr/Bn.....	2/Hr.....	Variable.....	Variable.....	737	177.5	104.8	95	62 per- cent.
	15 min.....	2 Lehr/Btry.....	2/Hr.....	Variable.....	Variable.....	568	210	171	95	86 per- cent.
	15 min.....	2 Lehr/Btry.....	2/Hr.....	Variable.....	Variable.....	568	210			
	15 min.....	4 Lehr/Btry.....	2/Hr.....	Variable.....	Variable.....	119	30			
15 min.....	120 min.....	4 Lehr/Bn.....	2/Day.....	Intervals of 1,524m.....	Variable.....	744	190			
15 min.....	120 min.....	4 Lehr/Bn.....	2/Day.....	Intervals of 1,524m.....	Variable.....	744	190			
	15 min + flight time.....		2-6/Ftr.....	Variable.....	170.....	513	89.6		90	
	15 min + flight time.....		4-18/Bmbr.....							
			2-6/Ftr.....	GND.....	127.....	322	99.9			
			4-27/Bmbr.....							
				GND.....	35.....	25.1	1.47			
				GND.....	40.....	29.1	2.02			
			48 Rkt/Lehr/ 1 min.....	GND.....	49.....	22.9	2.18			
			48 Rkt/Lehr/ 1 min.....							
				GND.....	90.....	222	49.8			
				GND.....	29.....	58.0	272			
						10.50	5.23			
						5.45	4.50			

¹ Estimated.

² Instantaneous agent area coverage 30 seconds after detonation.

³ Values are the product of values given in columns 6(b), 6(d), and 6(e). Since values for 6(e) are not available, values for 6(c) cannot be computed at this time.

Figure 5.—Continued

Agent—GB.

Wind speed—5 knots (approx 9 km/hr).

Temperature gradient—inversion.

Temperature—60° F. (15.5° C.).

Terrain—open, level, scattered vegetation.

Precipitation—none.

Time limitations on the delivery of agent on target—4 minutes or less.

Casualty level desired—20 percent.

Find: Whether or not the mission can be fired with a 105-mm howitzer battery.

Solution:

- (a) Using figure 11, convert 20 percent casualties among protected personnel to the corresponding casualty level among unprotected personnel. This is 80 percent.
- (b) Using the “GB (over 30-sec attack)” column of figure 12, determine the total effects components to be 3.21 as follows:

Inversion.....	1. 09
Wind speed, 9 km/hr.....	1. 00
Temperature, 60° F. (15.5° C.).....	. 12
Open terrain.....	. 30
No precipitation.....	. 70
	<hr/>
	3. 21

- (c) Using figure 13, place a hairline between 80 percent on the percent casualties scale and 12 hectares on the target area scale. On the point of intersection on the reference line, pivot the hairline until it intersects 3.21 on the effects components scale. On the munitions expenditure scale, read 12 as the number of 155-mm equivalents required.
- (d) To find the number of 105-mm rounds required to fire the mission, multiply 12 by a factor of four (obtain this factor from figure 8); the product is 48 rounds.
- (e) From figure 9, it is evident that one battery of six howitzers can easily fire the mission if no shift of fires is re-

quired. Since the target is twice as large as the dispersion pattern of a 105-mm battery (par. 31c(3)(c) and 41d), a shift of fires should be made. Figure 9 gives a time of 30 seconds for shifting of fires. On this basis the battery could fire twenty-four rounds on half the target in a little less than 30 seconds, take 30 seconds to shift fires, and have ample time to deliver the remaining twenty-four rounds on the other half of the target. The firing should be completed in less than 2 minutes.

Munition	Munition expressed in terms of 155-mm chemical equivalents		
	GB	VX	HD
155-mm Shell.....	1	1	1
105-mm Shell.....	0. 25		0. 28
8-inch Shell.....	2. 40	2. 17	
4.2-inch Mortar Shell.....			. 62
175-mm Shell.....	2. 1	2. 1	
M55 Rocket.....	1. 6	1. 6	
M79 Warhead—HONEST JOHN.....	60		
E19R2 Warhead—HONEST JOHN.....	71	71	
LITTLE JOHN.....	10	10	
SERGEANT.....	65	65	
M34A1 1000-lb Cluster.....	30		
MC1 750-lb Bomb.....	35		
5''/38 Gas Projectile (Navy).....	. 50		
5''/54 Gas Projectile (Navy).....	. 68		
5'' Gas Rocket (Navy).....	. 74		
500-lb Gas Bomb.....	17		
115-lb Gas Bomb (Navy).....			6. 2

Figure 7. Munitions expressed in terms of 155-mm chemical equivalents. (The figures given are an estimate of the number of 155-mm howitzer rounds required to give the same effect as one round of the specified munition. Dissemination efficiency has not been considered.)

Munition	Conversion factor		
	GB	VX	HD
155-mm Shell.....	1	1	1
105-mm Shell.....	4		3. 6
8-inch Shell.....	0. 41	0. 45	
4.2-inch Mortar Shell.....			1. 61
175-mm Shell.....	. 48	. 48	
M55 Rocket.....	. 61	. 61	
M79 Warhead—HONEST JOHN.....	. 017		
E19R2 Warhead—HONEST JOHN.....	. 014	. 014	
LITTLE JOHN.....	. 098	. 098	
SERGEANT.....	. 016	. 016	
M34A1 1000-lb Cluster.....	. 033		
MC1 750-lb Bomb.....	. 029		
5''/38 Gas Projectile (Navy).....	2. 00		
5''/54 Gas Projectile (Navy).....	1. 46		
5'' Gas Rocket (Navy).....	1. 35		
500-lb Gas Bomb.....	. 059		
115-lb Gas Bomb (Navy).....			. 164

Figure 8. Conversion factors for converting 155-mm munitions to other munitions.

Weapon	Maximum rate (rounds)	Rates of fire for chemical fire missions without shifting or relaying of the piece (rounds)					Estimated time to shift fires
	30 sec	1 min	2 min	4 min	10 min	15 min	
105-mm Howitzer.....	6	10	14	18	40	60	30 sec
155-mm Howitzer.....	3	5	7	12	30	40	30 sec
155-mm Gun.....	2	4	6	8	12	18	60 sec
8-inch Howitzer.....	1	2	3	6	10	15	60 sec
4.2-inch Mortar.....	10	16	30 (max)	50	80	105	30 sec
M91 Launcher (M55 Rocket).....	45 (15 sec)	Launcher must relocate after firing each ripple.					

Figure 9. Approximate rates of fire for division cannon artillery, mortars, and multiple rockets firing chemical rounds. (Rates of fire for other weapons are given in figure 5.)




Figure 11. Nomogram for conversion of percent GB casualties for protection of personnel in the target area.

Meteorological and terrain conditions	Effects components			
	GB ² (surprise attack)	GB (over 30-sec attack)	VX	HD
1. <i>Temperature Gradient</i>				
Inversion.....	0. 67	1. 09	1. 89	0. 69
Neutral.....	. 57	. 69	1. 89	. 54
Lapse.....	. 30	. 09	1. 89	. 32
2. <i>Wind Speed (km/hr)</i>				
0 to 5.....	. 20	1. 30	0	. 87
6 to 10.....	. 50	1. 00	0	. 70
11 to 16.....	. 70	. 70	0	. 60
17 to 26.....	. 55	. 30	0	. 48
27 to 52.....	. 30	0	0	0
3. <i>Temperature (° F.)</i>				
a. 0 to 39 (—18° to 4° C.).....	0	0	0	-----
40 to 79 (5° to 26° C.).....	. 12	. 12	0	-----
80 and up (27° C. and up).....	. 23	. 23	0	-----
b. 30 to 49 (—1° to 9° C.).....			0	0
50 to 69 (10° to 21° C.).....			0	. 70
70 and up (22° C. and up).....			0	1. 00
4. <i>Terrain</i>				
Open, level, scattered vegetation.....	. 30	. 30	0	. 30
Rugged, mountainous.....	0	¹ 0	¹ 0	¹ 0
5. <i>Precipitation</i>				
None.....	. 70	. 70	. 70	0
Moderate rain.....	0	¹ 0	¹ 0	¹ 0

¹ Estimated.

² Tentative figures not yet verified.

Figure 12. Effects components.

Note: paragraph 105 on page 82 states that the "safe entry times" after bio attacks are:

NU (Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus),
AB (bovine brucellosis), and
UL (tularemia): 2 hrs sun or 8 hrs cloudy
OU (Q fever): 2 hrs sun or 18 hrs cloudy
Cloudy conditions also apply to nighttime





Figure 13. Target area, casualty level, munitions requirement nomogram.



NOTE:
A to B → C
C to D → E
E to F → G
G to I → Reference Number
Then go to Nomogram II.

Figure 14. Downwind distance nomogram I.




Figure 15. Downwind distance nomogram II.

REFERENCE BOOK

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPON EMPLOYMENT



U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1 May 1968

This reference book supersedes RB 3-1, 1 May 1967

CHAPTER 2

TOXIC CHEMICAL AGENTS

1. Characteristics and Effects

a. General. The following antipersonnel chemical agents are used for College instruction in chemical weapon employment: nerve agents GB and VX; blister agent HD (mustard); and incapacitating agent BZ. Actual or assumed characteristics of these agents are described in the following paragraphs for instructional purposes only and are summarized in figure 1.

b. Nerve Agent GB. GB is a quick acting, nonpersistent lethal agent that produces casualties primarily by inhalation.

(1) Inhalation effects. Inhaled GB vapor can produce casualties within minutes. As an example, 50 percent of a group of unprotected troops engaged in mild activity, breathing at the rate of about 15 liters per minute, and exposed to 70 milligrams of GB per cubic meter of air for 1 minute will probably die if they do not receive medical treatment in time. This is the median lethal dosage (50) and is expressed as 70 mg-min/m³. For troops engaged in activities that increase their breathing rate, the median lethal dosage can be as low as 20 mg-min/m³. The median incapacitating dosage of GB vapor by inhalation is about 35 mg-min/m³ for troops engaged in mild activity. Incapacitating effects consist of nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and difficulty with vision, followed by muscular twitching, convulsions, and partial paralysis. Dosages of GB less than the median incapacitating dosage cause general lowering of efficiency, slower reactions, mental confusion, irritability, severe headache, lack of coordination, and dimness of vision due to pinpointing of the eye pupils.

(2) Percutaneous effects. Percutaneous effects refer to those effects produced by the absorption of the agent through the skin. GB vapor absorbed through the skin can produce incapacitating effects. Sufficient GB liquid ab-

sorbed through the skin can produce incapacitation or death. The effectiveness of the liquid or vapor depends on the amount absorbed by the body. Absorption varies with the original amount of agent contamination, the skin area exposed and the exposure time, the amount and kind of clothing worn, and the rapidity in removing the contamination and/or contaminated clothing and in decontaminating affected areas of the skin.

(3) Major considerations in the employment of nerve agent GB. The employment of GB is based primarily on achieving casualties by inhalation of the nonpersistent vapor (or aerosol) of the agent. Major considerations in the employment of this agent are:

(a) Time to incapacitate. The onset of incapacitation resulting from inhalation of casualty-producing doses is rapid, the average time being approximately 3 minutes. To allow for the time required for the agent cloud to reach the individual, 10 minutes is used as the mean time to achieve incapacitation. Nonlethal casualties from GB will be incapacitated for 1 to 5 days.

(b) Persistency. Persistency is defined as the length of time an agent remains effective in the target area after dissemination. Nerve agent GB is considered nonpersistent. GB clouds capable of producing significant casualties will dissipate within minutes after dissemination. Some liquid GB will remain in chemical shell or bomb craters for periods of time varying from hours to days, depending on the weather conditions and type of munition. Because of this continuing but not readily discernible threat, GB can also be highly effective in harassing roles by causing exposure to low concentrations of the vapor. Rounds fired sporadically may compel the enemy to wear protective masks and clothing for prolonged periods, thereby impairing his effectiveness as a result of fatigue, heat stress, discomfort, and decrease in perception.

(c) Level of protection. The weapon system requirements for positive neutralization of masked personnel by GB are too great to be supported except for important point or small area targets. A major factor affecting casualties resulting from GB attacks of personnel equipped with masks but unmasked at the time of attack is the time required for enemy troops to mask after first detecting a chemical attack. Therefore, surprise dosage attack is used to establish a dosage sufficient to produce the desired casualties before troops can mask. Casualty levels for surprise dosage attack that are tabulated in the weapon system effects tables (app A) are based on an assumed enemy masking time of 30 seconds. (Refer to FM 3-10 series manuals for operational data for masking times less than 30 seconds.) A total dosage attack is used to build up the dosage over an extended period of time and is normally employed against troops who have no protective masks available. Dosages built up before troops can mask inside foxholes, bunkers, tanks, buildings, and similar structures will generally be less than dosages attained during the same period of time in the open, thereby reducing the effects on occupants from surprise dosage attacks. Total dosage effects are essentially the same inside or outside.

c. Nerve Agent VX. VX is a slow-acting, lethal, persistent agent that produces casualties primarily by absorption of droplets through the skin.

(1) Effects. VX acts on the nerve systems of man; interferes with breathing; and causes convulsions, paralysis, and death.

(2) Major considerations in the employment of nerve agent VX.

(a) General. Agent VX disseminated in droplet (liquid) form provides maximum duration of effectiveness as a lethal casualty threat. VX will remain effective in the target area for several days to a week depending on weather conditions. Because of its low volatility,

there is no significant vapor hazard downwind of a contaminated area. Except when disseminated by aircraft spray tanks, meteorological conditions have little effect on the employment of VX, although strong winds may influence the distribution of the agent and heavy rainfall may wash it away or dissipate it.

(b) Employment to cause casualties. Agent VX is appropriate for direct attack of area targets containing masked personnel in the open or in foxholes without overhead protection, for causing severe harassment by the continuing casualty threat of agent droplets on the ground or on equipment, and for creating obstacles to traversing or occupying areas. Casualties produced by agent VX are delayed, occurring at times greater than 1 hour after exposure. Although this agent can be used relatively close to friendly forces, it should not be used on positions that are likely to be occupied by friendly forces within a few days. Because of this continuing hazard, areas in which agent VX has been used should be recorded in a manner similar to minefields or fallout areas so that necessary precautions can be taken.

d. Blister Agent HD. HD, sometimes referred to as mustard, is a persistent slow-acting agent that produces casualties through both its vapor and liquid effects.

(1) Vapor effects.

(a) The initial disabling effect of HD vapor on unmasked troops will be injuries to the eyes. Temporary blindness can be caused by vapor dosages that are insufficient to produce respiratory damage or skin burns. However, skin burns account for most injuries to masked troops. The vapor dosages and the time required to produce casualties (4 to 24 hours) vary with the atmospheric conditions of temperature and humidity and with the amount of moisture on the skin. Depending on their severity, skin burns can limit or entirely prevent movement of the limbs or of the entire body.




Figure 2. Temperature gradients.

Surprise dosage GB attacks are influenced only slightly by the temperature gradient except when made with the spray tank. Downwind vapor hazards to both enemy and friendly forces will be most significant during inversion and neutral conditions. Employment of VX is not affected by the temperature gradient.

temperature, 9 kmph is used as wind-speed, and the temperature gradient is approximated from figure 3.

d. Windspeed and Direction.

(1) Air moving over the earth's surface sets up eddies, or mechanical turbulences, that act to dissipate a chemical cloud. A condition of calm will limit the merging of the individual gas clouds. Both of these conditions may reduce the effectiveness of a chemical agent attack. High winds increase the rate of evaporation of HD and dissipate chemical clouds more rapidly than low winds. Moderate winds are desirable for chemical employment. Large-area non-persistent chemical attacks are most effective in winds not exceeding 28 kmph. Small-area nonpersistent chemical attacks with rockets or shell are most effective in winds not exceeding 9 kmph. However, if the concentration of chemical agent can be established quickly, the effects of high windspeed can be partially offset.

Temperature gradients	Time
1. Inversion	From sunset to sunrise.
2. Neutral	2 hours before sunset to sunset, sunrise to 2 hours after sunrise, or any time windspeed is 15 kmph or greater.
3. Lapse	2 hours after sunrise to 2 hours before sunset.

Figure 3. Estimated times that temperature gradients will prevail. (Use when meteorological data are not available.)

(3) When actual or predicted meteorological conditions are not available for a target analysis, 70° F is used for

CHAPTER 4

EMPLOYMENT OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

1. General

a. Antipersonnel biological agents are micro-organisms that produce disease in man. These agents can be used to incapacitate or kill enemy troops through disease. They may cause large numbers of casualties over vast areas and could require the enemy to use many personnel and great quantities of supplies and equipment to treat and handle the casualties. Many square kilometers can be effectively covered from a single aircraft or missile. The search capability of biological agent clouds and the relatively small dose required to cause infection among troops give biological munitions the capability of covering large areas where targets are not precisely located.

b. A biological attack can occur without warning since biological agents can be disseminated by relatively unobtrusive weapon systems functioning at a considerable distance from the target area and relying upon air movement to carry the agent to the target.

c. Biological agents do not produce effects immediately. An incubation period is required from the time the agent enters the body until it produces disease. Some agents produce the desired casualty levels within a few days, whereas others may require more time to produce useful casualty levels. A variety of effects may be produced, varying from incapacitation with few deaths to a high percentage of deaths, depending on the type of agent.

2. Methods of Dissemination

a. The basic method of disseminating antipersonnel biological agents is the generation of aerosols by explosive bomblets and spray devices. Because exposure to sunlight increases the rate at which most biological agent aerosols die and thereby reduces their area coverage, night is the preferable time for most biological attacks. However, if troop safety is a problem, an attack may be made near sunrise to reduce the

distance downwind that a hazard to friendly forces will extend. Conversely, to extend the downwind cloud travel and the area coverage from spray attack, a biological agent may be employed soon after sundown.

b. Missile-delivered Biological Munitions. Missile-delivered biological munitions are used for attack of large-area targets. A typical biological missile system consists of the following components:

(1) A missile vehicle and its launching equipment.

(2) A warhead that can be opened at a predetermined height to release biological bomblets over the target area. The warhead is shipped separately for assembly to a missile at the launching site.

(3) A warhead shipping container equipped with a heating-cooling element and a temperature control unit.

(4) Biological bomblets consisting of an agent container and a central burster that functions on impact. The bomblets have vanes that cause them to rotate in flight, thereby achieving lateral dispersion during their free fall and resulting in random distribution as a circular pattern.

c. Aircraft Spray Tank. Biological agents released from an aircraft spray tank cover a large area downwind of the line of release. A typical spray tank consists of the following components:

(1) An agent reservoir section that is shipped separately in an insulated shipping and storage container equipped with a heating-cooling element and a temperature control unit.

(2) A discharge nozzle assembly that can be mechanically adjusted to vary the agent flow rate.

Table 1. Chemical Weapons Data

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13			
Delivery system	Range (meters)		Agent	Munition	No of weapons per delivery unit	Weapon rate of fire	RT max (meters) ^{1 2}					Reference (table)			
							Fire unit	Total dosage		Surprise dosage					
	Casualty threat	Casualty threat						Casualty threat	Casualty threat						
Min	Max	10%	30%	10%	30%										
4.2-in mortar	180	4,500	HD	Cartridge, M2A1	4/Plat	50 rd/3 min 105 rd/15 min						18 19			
105-mm howitzer		11,100	GB	Cartridge, M360	6/btry	5 rd/30 sec 30 rd/3 min 66 rd/15 min	1 btry ³	200	100	100	50	2			
				1 bn ³			300	300	200	100	3				
			HD	Cartridge, M60							18 19				
155-mm howitzer		14,600	GB	Projectile, M121	6/btry	2 rd/30 sec 12 rd/3 min 24 rd/15 min	1 btry ³	300	200	100	0	4			
				1 bn ³			500	400	300	100	5				
			HD	Projectile, M110							18 19				
			VX ⁴	Projectile, M121			1 btry ³	400	200	NA	NA	13			
				1 bn ³			500	400							
8-in howitzer		16,800	GB	Projectile, M426	4/btry	1 rd/30 sec 4 rd/3 min 10 rd/15 min	1 btry ³	300	200	200	0	6			
							1 bn ³	500	400	300	100	7			
			VX ⁴				1 btry ³	400	200	NA	NA	14			
							1 bn ³	500	400						
115-mm multiple rocket launcher, M91	2,740	10,600	GB ⁴	Rocket, M55 (THE BOLT)		45 rkt/lchr/15 sec	1 lchr	1,000	750	500	200	8			
							3 lchr	1,000	1,000	750	400				
							6 lchr	1,000	1,000	1,000	750				
							9 lchr	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000				
			VX ⁴				1 lchr	300	0	NA	NA	15			
							3 lchr	750	300						
							6 lchr	1,000	400						
							9 lchr	1,000	750						
762-mm rocket, Honest John	8,500	38,000	GB ⁴	Warhead, M190 (M139 bomblets)	2/btry	2 rkt/lchr/hr	1 lchr	600	600	600	400	9			
							2 lchr	600	600	600	400				
Sergeant missile	46,000	139,000	GB ⁴	Warhead, M212 (M139 bomblets)	2/bn	2 msl/lchr/hr	1 msl	600	400	600	200	10			
							2 msl	600	600	600	400				
Aircraft	Dependent on type aircraft		GB ⁴	Bomb, MC-1, 750-lb	Dependent on type aircraft		1 bomb	50				11			
							6 bombs	300	200	300	50				
							12 bombs	500	300	400	200				
							24 bombs	500	300	500	300				
			1 spray tank 2 spray tanks				RT max = 750 meters (one-half effective spray release line length)				12				
			1 spray tank				RT max = 500 meters (one-half effective spray release line length)				16				
BZ ⁴	Bomb, 150-lb					17									
	Bomb, 700-lb														

¹RT max is largest target radius for which indicated casualty threat is tabulated for appropriate fire unit. Division of target into subtargets NOT considered.

²All windspeeds, temperature gradients, and protection categories considered.

³RT max computed for maximum number of volleys for which data are tabulated.

⁴Weapon system capabilities derived from tables composed of hypothetical data for INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. For actual data, refer to FM 3-10.

105-MM HOW/GB BTRY FIRE

Table 2. Estimated Fractional Casualty Threat From 105-mm Howitzer,
GB Projectile, Battery Fire^{1 2}

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Target radius— radius of effect (meters)	Range to target (km)	No of volleys	Windspeed ³											
			4 kmph				9 kmph				28 kmph			
			Surprise ⁴	Total dose ⁵			Surprise ⁴	Total dose ⁵			Surprise ⁴	Total dose ⁵		
				I	N	L		I	N	L		I	N	L
50	<7.5	1	.10	.25	.20	.15	.10	.15	.10	.10				
		2	.20	.45	.40	.30	.15	.30	.25	.20		.10	.05	.05
		3	.30	.60	.60	.35	.30	.50	.45	.30	.10	.20	.15	.10
		4	.30	.75	.70	.45	.30	.55	.45	.35	.10	.25	.20	.10
		5	.35	.90	.85	.55	.35	.60	.50	.40	.15	.30	.25	.15
	>7.5	1	.05	.15	.15	.10	.05	.10	.05	.05				
		2	.15	.30	.25	.15	.10	.20	.15	.10		.05	.05	
		3	.15	.30	.30	.25	.10	.20	.20	.15		.10	.05	.05
		4	.20	.40	.35	.25	.15	.30	.30	.15	.05	.15	.15	.05
		5	.25	.45	.45	.30	.25	.40	.35	.25	.10	.20	.20	.10
100	<7.5	1	.05	.15	.15	.10	.05	.10	.05	.05				
		2	.10	.30	.30	.15	.10	.20	.15	.10				
		3	.15	.40	.35	.20	.15	.25	.25	.15	.05	.10	.05	
		4	.15	.40	.35	.30	.15	.30	.30	.15	.05	.10	.10	.05
		5	.20	.45	.40	.35	.20	.35	.35	.20	.10	.15	.15	.10
	≥7.5	1	.05	.10	.10	.05		.05	.05					
		2	.10	.20	.20	.10	.05	.15	.10	.05				
		3	.10	.25	.25	.15	.10	.15	.15	.10		.05	.05	
		4	.10	.30	.25	.20	.10	.25	.20	.15		.10	.05	
		5	.15	.35	.30	.25	.15	.30	.25	.15	.05	.15	.10	.05
200	Any	1		.05	.05									
		2		.10	.10	.05		.05	.05					
		3	.05	.15	.15	.05		.10	.05					
		4	.05	.15	.15	.10		.10	.10					
		5	.05	.20	.20	.10	.05	.15	.10	.05				

¹ Blank spaces indicate fractional casualties are below 0.05.

² If the target is predominately wooded, use a windspeed of 4 kmph and neutral temperature gradient for total dose attack; use a windspeed of 4 kmph for surprise attack.

³ For windspeeds other than those shown, use data given for the nearest windspeed.

⁴ Multiply the figures given in the table by the appropriate factor to obtain the fractional casualties from surprise dose attack:

Troops in open foxholes:	0.7
Troops in covered foxholes or bunkers:	0.6

⁵ I=inversion, N=neutral, L=lapse.

Table 17. BZ Munitions Requirements

1	2	3	4	5	6
Munition	Casualty level ²	Area coverage ¹ (square kilometers)			
		Windspeed ³			
		8 kmph		16 kmph	
		Temperature gradient		Temperature gradient	
		Inversion	Neutral	Inversion	Neutral
150-lb bomb	.40	.05	.02	.03	.01
	.75	.03	.01	.02	.009
700-lb bomb	.40	.20	.07	.09	.04
	.75	.10	.04	.05	.03

¹Area coverages are for one bomb.

²Casualty levels are for personnel without masks available. For personnel with masks available, multiply casualty levels by 0.7.

³For windspeeds other than those shown, use data given for the nearest windspeed.

NOTE: The above table is composed of hypothetical munitions and data for INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES ONLY at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. For actual data, refer to FM 3-10.

**4.2-IN MORT/HD
105-MM HOW/HD
155-MM HOW/HD
VAPOR EFFECT**

Table 18. HD Ammunition Expenditure for Vapor Effect (50 Percent Coverage of Target Area)^{1 2}

Desired effect ³	Rounds required per hectare																								
	Exposure time (hours)	4.2-inch mortar (cartridge M2A1)								105-mm howitzer (cartridge M60)								155-mm howitzer and gun (projectiles M110 and M104)							
		Windspeed (kmph)								Windspeed (kmph)								Windspeed (kmph)							
		Temperature gradient ⁴								Temperature gradient ⁴								Temperature gradient ⁴							
		I	N	L	I	N	L	I	N	L	I	N	L	I	N	L	I	N	L	I	N	L	I	N	L
Cause eye irritation to troops without masks.	Temperature (°F)	6	9	15	26	6	9	15	26	6	9	15	26	6	9	15	26	6	9	15	26	6	9	15	26
	55° 70° 85° 100°	I	N	L	I	N	L	I	N	L	I	N	L	I	N	L	I	N	L	I	N	L	I	N	L
	1 ½ ¼ ⅙	10	14	16	11	21	22	15	22	26	20	24	29	22	24	27	24	34	39	39	44	46	32	53	65
	2 1 ½ ¼	6	8	9	8	12	14	12	13	16	17	21	24	18	22	23	20	22	27	29	32	34	26	39	51
	4 2 1 ½	6	6	8	8	9	10	9	10	13	13	16	20	16	17	20	17	18	20	20	22	24	22	29	39
Disable masked troops (sweating in humid weather).	8 4 2 1	4	6	6	6	8	9	8	9	11	12	13	15	12	15	17	13	12	17	15	20	22	18	27	36
	16 8 4 2	4	5	5	5	8	9	8	8	10	10	11	13	10	12	13	10	11	15	12	17	20	15	24	34
	1 ½ ¼ ⅙	35	46	52	39	53	63	46	63	80	59	77	108	70	83	108	77	95	121	95	123	166	108	157	243
	2 1 ½ ¼	20	29	33	24	35	40	30	45	56	41	59	69	42	54	63	47	63	84	66	89	102	82	108	192
	4 2 1 ½	15	21	24	17	27	33	24	35	42	30	47	65	27	36	45	32	47	62	48	64	84	64	88	162
Disable masked troops (dry weather).	8 4 2 1	11	17	18	13	21	26	17	28	38	27	45	63	18	29	34	24	38	47	33	53	76	54	83	138
	16 8 4 2	9	14	16	11	18	22	16	24	33	24	42	58	15	23	27	18	32	42	30	51	66	48	72	120
	1 ½ ¼ ⅙	64	83	95	72	95	114	86	113	144	108	144	198	128	154	174	144	174	212	189	202
	2 1 ½ ¼	36	52	58	44	62	72	57	81	101	71	120	125	75	98	128	89	113	147	111	156	180	148	198	288
	4 2 1 ½	26	35	41	30	46	56	45	62	76	57	86	119	50	64	81	59	86	111	88	118	153	117	165	256
	8 4 2 1	18	27	30	23	35	44	32	50	68	50	81	114	33	50	58	45	65	84	62	95	138	101	154	240
	16 8 4 2	13	21	26	18	30	40	29	46	60	42	72	108	26	39	45	34	56	72	54	84	120	84	132	193
	1 ½ ¼ ⅙	36	48	53	41	56	63	46	66	78	36	48	53	41	56	63	46	66	78	59	83	105	36	48	53
	2 1 ½ ¼	26	36	41	26	36	41	38	54	63	21	28	33	26	36	41	38	54	63	26	36	41	38	54	63
	4 2 1 ½	26	36	45	26	36	45	26	36	45	15	21	26	18	28	33	26	36	45	18	28	33	26	36	45
	8 4 2 1	22	33	40	22	33	40	22	33	40	11	16	18	13	21	26	22	33	40	13	21	26	22	33	40
	16 8 4 2	9	12	15	11	18	21	15	22	29	9	12	15	11	18	21	18	21	29	11	18	21	18	21	29
	1 ½ ¼ ⅙	59	77	95	41	59	69	42	54	63	20	28	30	23	32	36	26	39	44	20	28	30	23	32	36
	2 1 ½ ¼	20	29	33	24	35	40	30	45	56	12	17	20	15	22	24	18	27	34	18	27	34	18	27	34
	4 2 1 ½	15	21	24	17	27	33	24	35	42	30	47	65	27	36	45	32	47	62	48	64	84	64	88	162
	8 4 2 1	11	17	18	13	21	26	17	28	38	27	45	63	18	29	34	24	38	47	33	53	76	54	83	138
	16 8 4 2	9	14	16	11	18	22	16	24	33	24	42	58	15	23	27	18	32	42	30	51	66	48	72	120
	1 ½ ¼ ⅙	64	83	95	72	95	114	86	113	144	108	144	198	128	154	174	144	174	212	189	202
	2 1 ½ ¼	36	52	58	44	62	72	57	81	101	71	120	125	75	98	128	89	113	147	111	156	180	148	198	288
	4 2 1 ½	26	35	41	30	46	56	45	62	76	57	86	119	50	64	81	59	86	111	88	118	153	117	165	256
	8 4 2 1	18	27	30	23	35	44	32	50	68	50	81	114	33	50	58	45	65	84	62	95	138	101	154	240
	16 8 4 2	13	21	26	18	30	40	29	46	60	42	72	108	26	39	45	34	56	72	54	84	120	84	132	193
	1 ½ ¼ ⅙	36	48	53	41	56	63	46	66	78	36	48	53	41	56	63	46	66	78	59	83	105	36	48	53
	2 1 ½ ¼	26	36	41	26	36	41	38	54	63	21	28	33	26	36	41	38	54	63	26	36	41	38	54	63
	4 2 1 ½	26	36	45	26	36	45	26	36	45	15	21	26	18	28	33	26	36	45	18	28	33	26	36	45
	8 4 2 1	22	33	40	22	33	40	22	33	40	11	16	18	13	21	26	22	33	40	13	21	26	22	33	40
	16 8 4 2	9	12	15	11	18	21	15	22	29	9	12	15	11	18	21	18	21	29	11	18	21	18	21	29
	1 ½ ¼ ⅙	59	77	95	41	59	69	42	54	63	20	28	30	23	32	36	26	39	44	20	28	30	23	32	36
	2 1 ½ ¼	20	29	33	24	35	40	30	45	56	12	17	20	15	22	24	18	27	34	18	27	34	18	27	34
	4 2 1 ½	15	21	24	17	27	33	24	35	42	30	47	65	27	36	45	32	47	62	48	64	84	64	88	162
	8 4 2 1	11	17	18	13	21	26	17	28	38	27	45	63	18	29	34	24	38	47	33	53	76	54	83	138
	16 8 4 2	9	14	16	11	18	22	16	24	33	24	42	58	15	23	27	18	32	42	30	51	66	48	72	120
	1 ½ ¼ ⅙	64	83	95	72	95	114	86	113	144	108	144	198	128	154	174	144	174	212	189	202
	2 1 ½ ¼	36	52	58	44	62	72	57	81	101	71	120	125	75	98	128	89	113	147	111	156	180	148	198	288
	4 2 1 ½	26	35	41	30	46	56	45	62	76	57	86	119	50	64	81	59	86	111	88	118	153	117	165	256
	8 4 2 1	18	27	30	23	35	44	32	50	68	50	81	114	33	50	58	45	65	84	62	95	138	101	154	240
	16 8 4 2	13	21	26	18	30	40	29	46	60	42	72	108	26	39	45	34	56	72	54	84	120	84	132	193
	1 ½ ¼ ⅙	36	48	53	41	56	63	46	66	78	36	48	53	41	56	63	46	66	78	59	83	105	36	48	53
	2 1 ½ ¼	26	36	41	26	36	41	38	54	63	21	28	33	26	36	41	38	54	63	26	36	41	38	54	63
	4 2 1 ½	26	36	45	26	36	45	26	36	45	15	21	26	18	28	33	26	36	45	18	28	33	26	36	45
	8 4 2 1	22	33	40	22	33	40	22	33	40	11	16	18	13	21	26	22	33	40	13	21	26	22	33	40
	16 8 4 2	9	12	15	11	18	21	15	22	29	9	12	15	11	18	21	18	21	29	11	18	21	18	21	29
	1 ½ ¼ ⅙	59	77	95	41	59	69	42	54	63	20	28	30	23	32	36	26	39	44	20	28	30	23	32	36
	2 1 ½ ¼	20	29	33	24	35	40	30	45	56	12	17	20	15	22	24	18	27	34	18	27	34	18	27	34
	4 2 1 ½	15	21	24	17	27	33	24	35	42	30	47	65	27	36	45	32	47	62	48	64	84	64	88	162
	8 4 2 1	11	17	18	13	21	26	17	28	38	27	45	63	18	29	34	24	38	47	33	53	76	54	83	138
	16 8 4 2	9	14	16	11	18	22	16	24	33	24	42	58	15	23	27	18	32	42	30	51	66	48	72	120
	1 ½ ¼ ⅙	64	83	95	72	95	114	86	113	144	108	144	198	128	154	174	144	174	212	189	202
	2 1 ½ ¼	36	52	58	44	62	72	57	81	101	71	120	125	75	98	128	89	113	147	111	156	180	148	198	288
	4 2 1 ½	26	35	41	30	46	56	45	62	76	57	86	119	50	64	81	59	86	111	88	118	153	117	165	256
	8 4 2 1	18	27	30	23	35	44	32	50	68	50	81	114	33	50	58	45	65	84	62	95	138	101	154	240
	16 8 4 2	13	21	26	18	30	40	29	46	60	42	72	108	26	39	45	34	56	72	54	84	120	84	132	193
	1 ½ ¼ ⅙	36	48	53	4																				

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SK

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL
NAVAL WARFARE INFORMATION PUBLICATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE MANUAL
MARINE CORPS MANUAL

FM 3-10B
NWIP 36-4
AFM 355-9
FMFM 11-3B

**EMPLOYMENT
OF
CHEMICAL AGENTS (U)**

This copy is a reprint which includes current pages from Changes 1.

01 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

*DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY, THE NAVY
AND THE AIR FORCE
NOVEMBER 1966*

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[REDACTED]

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Section I. GENERAL

1. (U) Purpose

This manual provides classified data on chemical agents and on the capabilities and effects of chemical munitions. When used in conjunction with its unclassified counterpart, FM 3-10/NWIP 36-2/AFM 355-4/FMFM 11-3, Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents, it provides guidance in planning the employment of chemical munitions.

2. (U) Scope

This manual contains classified data on lethal agents VX and GB and incapacitating agent BZ; munitions effects tables; and predicted effects of ground-fired and air-released munitions utilized to disseminate these agents. As a joint publication, it discusses all appropriate chemical munitions of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Unclassified HD chemical munitions expenditure tables and guidance in chemical target analysis and casualty estimation are given in FM 3-10/NWIP 36-2/AFM 355-4/FMFM 11-3.

3. (U) Reliability

Data contained in this manual are based on proving ground tests and field tests, analytical studies of such data, and predictions extrapolated from mathematical models.

4. (U) Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps User Comments

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons for each comment should be provided to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command CBR Agency, Fort McClellan, Ala. 36205, with an information copy to the cognizant service doctrinal development agency.

Section II. ANTIPERSONNEL CHEMICAL AGENTS

or mask discipline is poor, such as in counter-insurgency operations.

b. Limitations. BZ has the following limitations:

- (1) The white agent cloud produced by pyrotechnic mixtures acts as a visible alarm.
- (2) BZ may be defeated by improvised respiratory protection such as a folded cloth over mouth and nose.
- (3) The effects are not immediate but require an average onset time of about 3 to 6 hours.
- (4) There is no known antidote to treat affected friendly personnel.

c. Median Incapacitating Dosage (IC₅₀). This is about 110 mg-min/m³ for man engaged in mild activity (breathing rate of 15 liters/min).

d. Physiological and Psychological Symptoms. The symptoms listed below will become more intense as the dosage received increases. They also vary according to the inherent characteristics of each individual exposed to the agent. Because of the many variables involved, estimation of the percentage and type of casualties produced from a BZ attack is difficult. Approximations for the occurrence of ultimate casualties among unmasked personnel are 5 percent in 2 hours, 50 percent in 4½ hours, and 95 percent in 9½ hours.

- (1) Symptoms likely to appear in 30 minutes to 3 hours: dizziness, extreme drowsiness, dryness of the mouth, and increased heartbeat.
- (2) Symptoms likely to appear in 3 to 5 hours: restlessness, involuntary muscular movement, near vision impairment, and physical incapacitation.
- (3) Symptoms likely to appear in 6 to 10 hours: hallucinations, lack of muscular coordination, disorientation, and difficulty in memory recall.

e. Duration of Incapacitation. The duration of incapacitation varies with the dosage received—from 24 hours to 5 days.

f. Duration of Effectiveness. Under average meteorological conditions in the open, the aerosol is normally effective for only a few minutes after dissemination, since the fine BZ particles travel

6. (U) Incapacitating Agent BZ

This agent is disseminated as an aerosol to produce physical and mental effects when inhaled. The effects are temporary, and recovery is normally complete. There may be permanent ill effects in a few instances among the very young, the aged, and the infirm, or when massive dosages are received.

a. Tactical Employment. BZ is employed against carefully selected targets to incapacitate enemy troops when the use of lethal or destructive munitions is undesirable. This agent may be particularly useful in situations where adequate protective equipment is normally not available to enemy troops or where the status of training

27. ~~(S)~~ (U) CBU-5B/M43 750-Pound BZ Cluster Bomb

Both the U.S. Air Force CBU-5B and the U.S. Army M43 750-pound cluster bombs contain 57 M138 BZ-filled bomblets. The U.S. Army M43 cluster is designed for delivery by aircraft at low speeds. When modified and equipped with a suitable fairing for streamlining purposes, an internal arming wire system, and a strengthened tail fin, it is then designated the CBU-5B and can be delivered by high-performance aircraft.

a. *Operational Concepts.* The BZ cluster bomb is used on carefully selected targets against enemy personnel when the use of lethal chemical or destructive weapon systems is militarily or politically undesirable. See paragraph 6 for additional data.

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b. *Characteristics.* The cluster contains about 85 pounds of agent BZ and employs two tail mechanical time fuzes. To function properly, the cluster must be released above 6,200 feet so as to allow the cluster to open at approximately 4,500 feet. The M138 bomblet contains four canisters, each with three-fourth pound of agent-pyrotechnic mixture (50/50 ratio), and an "all-ways" impact fuze. The bomblet is *not* self-dispersing.

c. *Capabilities.* The cluster delivers M138 bomblets over an elliptical impact area having a cross section of approximately 100 by 200 meters when released at heights above 6,200 feet. One cluster can cover about 12,000 square meters

(1.2 hectares) with an incapacitating total dosage of BZ (110 mg-min/m³) under neutral temperature gradient and in a wind speed between 2 and 10 knots; under lapse temperature gradient conditions, the area coverage will be smaller. Under optimum delivery conditions, the area coverage for one cluster is expected to range from 15,000 to 20,000 square meters. Field tests indicate that wind speed has only minor effects upon area coverage.

d. *Operational Considerations.* Refer to the appropriate technical order/flight manual to determine aircraft loads (see para 16d).

Field Manual
No 3-6

Air Force Manual
No 105-7

Fleet Marine Force Manual
No. 7-11-H

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Washington, DC, 3 November 1986

**FIELD BEHAVIOR OF NBC AGENTS
(INCLUDING SMOKE AND INCENDIARIES)**

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DISPERSION CATEGORY	ATMOSPHERIC DESCRIPTION	TRADITIONAL ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS
1	Very Unstable	Lapse
2	Unstable	Lapse
3	Slightly Unstable	Neutral
4	Neutral	Neutral
5	Slightly Stable	Neutral
6	Stable	Inversion
7	Extremely Stable	Inversion

Figure 1-1. Atmospheric stability categories and conditions.




Figure 1-2. Stability decision tree.

Table 1-3. Center line dosages at different distances downwind for different dispersion categories and wind speeds for a unit source. 100 kilograms of GB

Table 1-3. Center line dosages at different distances downwind for different dispersion categories and wind speeds for a unit source. 100 kilograms of GB

HIGHER DOSAGES THAN ABOVE

Table 1-4. Summary of favorable and unfavorable weather and terrain conditions for tactical employment of chemical agent vapor or aerosol. (The stability condition listed for the south slope is for the northern hemisphere; due to solar loading on the slope, the situation would be reversed for the southern hemisphere.)

FACTOR	UNFAVORABLE	MODERATELY FAVORABLE	FAVORABLE
Wind	Artillery employment if speed is more than 7 knots. Aerial bombs if speed is more than 10 knots.	Steady, 5 to 7 knots, or land breeze.	Steady, less than 5 knots, or sea breeze.
Dispersion Category	Unstable (lapse).	Neutral.	(Stable) inversion.
Temperature	Less than 4.4°C.	4.4° to 21.1°C.	More than 21.1°C.
Precipitation	Any.	Transitional.	None.
Cloud Cover	Broken, low clouds during daytime. Broken, middle clouds during daytime. Overcast or broken, high clouds during daytime. Scattered clouds of all types during daytime. Clouds of vertical development.	Thick, low overcast. Thick, middle overcast.	Broken, low clouds at night. Broken, middle clouds at night. Overcast or broken, high clouds at night. Scattered clouds of all types at night. Clear sky at night.
Terrain	Hilltops, mountain crests. South slopes* during daytime.	Gently rolling terrain. North slopes at night.	Even terrain or open water.
Vegetation*	Heavily wooded or jungle.	Medium dense.	Sparse or none.
*Cloud dissemination occurs above the canopy.			

Chemical and biological contamination avoidance, FM 3-3 (1992)

10 grams/square meter

*TABLE 1-2. Chemical Agent Persistency in Hours on
CARC Painted Surfaces.*

Temperature		GA/ GF ¹	GB ^{2,3}	GD ^{2,3}	HD ¹	VX ^{2,3}
C°	F°					
-30	-22	*	110.34	436.69	**	***
-20	-4	*	45.26	145.63	**	***
-10	14	*	20.09	54.11	**	***
0	32	*	9.44	22.07	**	***
10	50	1.42	4.70	9.78	12	1776
20	68	0.71	2.45	4.64	6.33	634
30	86	0.33	1.35	2.36	2.8	241
40	104	0.25	0.76	1.25	2	102
50	122	0.25	0.44	0.70	1	44
55	131	0.25	0.34	0.51	1	25

NOTE

- 1 For grassy terrain multiply the number in the chart by 0.4.
- 2 For grassy terrain multiply the number in the chart by 1.75.
- 3 For sandy terrain multiply the number in the chart by 4.5.
- * Agent persistency time is less than 1 hour.
- ** Agent is in a frozen state and will not evaporate or decay.
- *** Agent persistency time exceeds 2,000 hours.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT DATA

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*This reference book replaces RB 3-2, 8 July 1981, for all resident and nonresident programs.

Section X Spray Tank/VX


AIM POINT & FLIGHT PATH ADJUSTMENTS VARIABLE DELIVERY TECHNIQUES

DELIVERY SYSTEM
Refer to Air Force &
Navy Publications


TANKS/AIRCRAFT
Minimum 1
Maximum 2

AIRCRAFT SPEED*
450 Knots
Centered Delivery

$$\text{Altitude of Spray Release Line} = \frac{\text{Windspeed} - \text{Height Product (VWH)}}{\text{Windspeed in Knots}}$$



FLIGHT PATH IN RELATION TO WIND DIRECTION



500-M TARGET RADIUS

1,000-M TARGET RADIUS

1,500-M TARGET RADIUS

Flight path Initiation point is leading edge of target Target center

*Used on all tables in this section.

Table I-79. Spray Tank/VX Aim Point & Flight Path Adjustments

Spray Tank/VX

Expected Fraction of Casualties

PROTECTION CATEGORY:
CASUALTIES WITHIN:

A (NO MASK OR PROTECTIVE CLOTHING)
1/2 HOUR

FLOW RATE	WIND ANGLE	TARGET RADIUS (Meters)	WINDSPEED-HEIGHT PRODUCT (VWH)														
			500			750			1000			2000			3000		
			NO. AIRCRAFT			NO. AIRCRAFT			NO. AIRCRAFT			NO. AIRCRAFT			NO. AIRCRAFT		
			1	2	4	1	2	4	1	2	4	1	2	4	1	2	4
ONE TANK AT HALF FLOW	90°	500	.08	.15	.20	.17	.37	.60	.25	.46	.68	.25	.43	.60	.19	.35	.50
		1000	.01	.04	.10	.06	.15	.31	.09	.19	.45	.09	.20	.45	.09	.20	.45
		1500	—	.02	.07	—	.06	.14	—	.06	.19	—	.06	.22	—	.08	.23
	45°	500	.04	.11	.23	.13	.29	.61	.20	.41	.69	.22	.41	.64	.21	.37	.57
		1000	.01	.04	.11	.04	.10	.23	.07	.16	.36	.08	.19	.42	.08	.19	.42
		1500	—	—	.07	—	.06	.12	—	.08	.18	—	.08	.20	—	.08	.22
	30°	500	.02	.07	.16	.10	.23	.48	.15	.32	.64	.17	.36	.62	.18	.35	.57
		1000	—	.03	.08	.03	.09	.20	.06	.13	.29	.07	.15	.34	.07	.16	.36
		1500	—	—	.04	—	.04	.09	—	.06	.14	—	.06	.18	—	.08	.20
TWO TANKS AT HALF FLOW	90°	500	.08	.17	.30	.22	.46	.69	.34	.55	.69	.31	.50	.65	.25	.43	.60
		1000	.01	.05	.11	.10	.19	.41	.13	.29	.61	.15	.33	.53	.18	.35	.51
		1500	.01	.03	.10	.05	.11	.25	.07	.17	.38	.09	.20	.46	.09	.22	.49
	45°	500	.06	.13	.28	.18	.37	.71	.27	.50	.71	.30	.50	.67	.29	.47	.62
		1000	.02	.06	.13	.06	.14	.31	.11	.24	.51	.13	.29	.60	.15	.32	.63
		1500	—	.02	.08	.03	.09	.20	.06	.14	.31	.07	.17	.38	.08	.19	.42
	30°	500	.04	.09	.39	.13	.29	.73	.20	.41	.69	.23	.44	.63	.24	.43	.57
		1000	.01	.04	.10	.05	.11	.26	.09	.19	.41	.10	.23	.51	.12	.26	.56
		1500	—	.01	.06	.02	.07	.14	.04	.11	.24	.06	.13	.29	.07	.15	.34

PROTECTION CATEGORY:
CASUALTIES WITHIN:

A (NO MASK OR PROTECTIVE CLOTHING)
1 HOUR

FLOW RATE	WIND ANGLE	TARGET RADIUS (Meters)	WINDSPEED-HEIGHT PRODUCT (VWH)														
			500			750			1000			2000			3000		
			NO. AIRCRAFT			NO. AIRCRAFT			NO. AIRCRAFT			NO. AIRCRAFT			NO. AIRCRAFT		
			1	2	4	1	2	4	1	2	4	1	2	4	1	2	4
ONE TANK AT HALF FLOW	90°	500	.08	.20	.27	.25	.50	.70	.36	.57	.69	.33	.53	.64	.28	.48	.58
		1000	.02	.06	.15	.10	.22	.47	.16	.34	.65	.19	.39	.65	.22	.40	.63
		1500	—	.04	.09	—	.10	.23	—	.12	.34	—	.15	.41	—	.21	.42
	45°	500	.06	.14	.30	.19	.40	.71	.28	.52	.72	.31	.52	.68	.30	.49	.64
		1000	.02	.06	.14	.07	.15	.33	.11	.25	.52	.14	.29	.55	.16	.32	.54
		1500	—	.02	.07	—	.08	.19	—	.13	.34	—	.16	.38	—	.19	.43
	30°	500	.04	.10	.22	.14	.30	.63	.21	.43	.69	.24	.45	.65	.25	.45	.59
		1000	.01	.04	.10	.05	.12	.27	.09	.19	.41	.10	.23	.48	.12	.25	.49
		1500	—	.01	.05	—	.06	.14	—	.11	.24	—	.14	.31	—	.16	.37
TWO TANKS AT HALF FLOW	90°	500	.11	.24	.41	.32	.57	.74	.39	.59	.72	.35	.55	.69	.29	.47	.66
		1000	.03	.08	.19	.13	.28	.58	.21	.43	.72	.27	.49	.71	.31	.51	.68
		1500	.01	.05	.14	.07	.16	.37	.12	.26	.56	.16	.34	.66	.19	.39	.67
	45°	500	.08	.17	.37	.23	.48	.75	.35	.57	.72	.35	.55	.68	.32	.51	.65
		1000	.03	.08	.17	.09	.20	.42	.16	.34	.67	.20	.42	.71	.24	.47	.71
		1500	.01	.03	.10	.05	.13	.28	.09	.20	.44	.12	.26	.55	.14	.30	.60
	30°	500	.05	.13	.51	.17	.37	.74	.26	.50	.71	.28	.49	.65	.28	.48	.64
		1000	.02	.05	.13	.07	.16	.34	.12	.26	.55	.16	.33	.67	.18	.38	.69
		1500	—	.02	.07	.03	.10	.20	.07	.15	.35	.10	.19	.43	.10	.23	.48

Table I-80. Spray Tank/VX Expected Fraction of Casualties

Expected Fraction of Casualties

Spray Tank/VX

PROTECTION CATEGORY:
CASUALTIES WITHIN:

A (NO MASK OR PROTECTIVE CLOTHING)
ULTIMATE

			WINDSPEED-HEIGHT PRODUCT (VWH)														
FLOW RATE	WIND ANGLE	TARGET RADIUS (Meters)	500			750			1000			2000			3000		
			NO. AIRCRAFT			NO. AIRCRAFT			NO. AIRCRAFT			NO. AIRCRAFT			NO. AIRCRAFT		
			1	2	4	1	2	4	1	2	4	1	2	4	1	2	4
ONE TANK AT HALF FLOW	90°	500	.14	.31	.43	.39	.62	.74	.39	.59	.69	.35	.55	.65	.30	.50	.60
		1000	.05	.12	.26	.18	.38	.69	.30	.54	.73	.35	.56	.70	.36	.56	.68
		1500	—	.06	.15	—	.21	.42	—	.31	.56	—	.34	.59	—	.41	.59
	45°	500	.10	.23	.49	.30	.56	.75	.39	.60	.72	.36	.56	.68	.33	.53	.65
		1000	.04	.10	.22	.12	.26	.53	.19	.39	.63	.23	.43	.61	.26	.44	.59
		1500	—	.06	.12	—	.16	.33	—	.27	.54	—	.35	.62	—	.41	.65
	30°	500	.07	.16	.36	.22	.45	.74	.30	.54	.69	.31	.52	.65	.30	.50	.60
		1000	.03	.07	.16	.09	.20	.42	.14	.29	.55	.16	.34	.56	.18	.35	.55
		1500	—	.04	.09	—	.12	.25	—	.20	.45	—	.27	.55	—	.33	.59
TWO TANKS AT HALF FLOW	90°	500	.18	.38	.64	.43	.64	.75	.39	.59	.73	.35	.55	.70	.30	.50	.67
		1000	.06	.15	.30	.21	.45	.74	.35	.59	.73	.39	.60	.71	.39	.59	.69
		1500	.04	.09	.22	.13	.28	.60	.22	.46	.72	.30	.54	.74	.34	.56	.72
	45°	500	.13	.28	.58	.35	.60	.75	.40	.61	.72	.36	.56	.68	.34	.53	.65
		1000	.05	.11	.27	.16	.33	.66	.27	.52	.75	.33	.57	.73	.37	.59	.72
		1500	.03	.06	.16	.10	.21	.44	.16	.34	.65	.21	.42	.69	.24	.46	.68
	30°	500	.09	.20	.72	.26	.51	.74	.33	.56	.74	.32	.53	.70	.31	.50	.67
		1000	.04	.09	.20	.12	.26	.54	.20	.41	.73	.25	.49	.74	.29	.53	.73
		1500	.02	.04	.12	.07	.16	.32	.12	.25	.52	.15	.30	.60	.17	.34	.61

Table I-81. Spray Tank/VX Expected Fraction of Casualties

Section XI

HD Munitions

HD DOSAGE REQUIREMENTS

HD DOSAGES mg/minute/cubic meter			PERSONNEL PROTECTION CATEGORY	CASUALTY EFFECTS	DEGREE OF DISABILITY	ONSET TIME	DURATION
HOT ¹	WARM ²	COOL ³					
50	50	50	"A" no mask or protective clothing	No significant injury; maximum safe dosage	--	--	--
100	100	100		Eye damage of threshold military significance	PARTIAL	6-24 HR	1-3 DAYS
200	200	200		Temporary blindness	TOTAL	3-12 HR	2-7 DAYS
100	150	400	"B" or "C" with no protective clothing	No significant injury; maximum safe dosage	--	--	--
200	300	1,000		Skin burns of threshold military significance	PARTIAL	2-12 DAYS	1-2 WEEKS
500	1,000	2,000 to 4,000		Severe genital burns	PARTIAL TO TOTAL	2-7 DAYS	1-4 WEEKS
750	2,000 to 4,000	4,000 to 10,000		Severe generalized burns	PARTIAL TO TOTAL	4-12 HRS About 24 HRS	3-4 WEEKS 1-2 WEEKS
			"D" mask with protective clothing	HD IS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR USE IN THIS PROTECTION CATEGORY.			

¹Hot, humid; above 80°F; sweating skin

²Warm; 60°-80°F; skin not wet with sweat

³Cool; 40°-60°F; cool, dry skin

Table I-85. HD Munitions

HD Contamination Replenishment Time (Rate Factors)

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} \text{TERRAIN} & & & & & & \\ \text{FACTOR} & \times & \text{WINDSPEED} & \times & \text{GROUND} & \times & \text{TEMPERATURE} \\ & & \text{FACTOR} & & \text{SURFACE} & & \text{GRADIENT} \\ & & & & \text{TEMPERATURE} & & \text{FACTOR}^2 \\ & & & & \text{FACTOR} & & \text{(STABILITY)} \\ & & & & & = & \text{TIME (HOURS)} \\ & & & & & & \text{FOR 50\%} \\ & & & & & & \text{EVAPORATION} \\ & & & & & & \text{OF HD} \end{array}$$

FACTORS

TERRAIN	WINDSPEED ¹ (knots)	GROUND SURFACE TEMPERATURE (°F)	TEMPERATURE GRADIENT ²
OPEN GRASSLAND = 1	1 = 3.1 2 = 1.8 3 = 1.3 4 = 1.0	50° = 4.0 60° = 2.5 70° = 1.6 80° = 1.0 90° = 0.6 100° = 0.4 110° = 0.3 120° = 0.2	INVERSION = 1.2 NEUTRAL = 1.0 LAPSE = 0.7
FOREST OR JUNGLE = 1	5 = 0.8 6 = 0.7 7 = 0.6 9 = 0.5 11 = 0.4		
BARREN SOIL OR SAND = 2	14 = 0.3 18 = 0.3		

¹at 2 meters high in the open
²in the open

Table I-96. HD Contamination Replenishment Time (Rate Factors)

Approximate Duration of Hazard in Contaminated Terrain

TASK	TERRAIN	APPROXIMATE TIME AFTER CONTAMINATION THAT PRESCRIBED TASKS MAY BE PERFORMED WITH NEGLIGIBLE RISK ¹ (Not wearing protective clothing) ²			
		BLISTER AGENT (HD)		NERVE AGENT (VX-GB)	
		TEMPERATURE ³		UNIFORM ⁴	
		WARM (70°-85°F)	HOT (80°-100°F)	SUMMER	WINTER
TRAVERSAL⁵ (Walking across area 2 hours or less)	Bare soil or low vegetation ⁶ (except sand)	WEARING MASKS			
	High vegetation, including jungle and heavy woods	36 HOURS	36 HOURS	5 HOURS	2 HOURS
OCCUPATION (Without hitting ground 24 hours)	Bare soil or low vegetation ⁶ (except sand)	NOT WEARING MASKS⁷			
	High vegetation, including jungle and heavy woods	4 DAYS	3 DAYS	32 DAYS	13 DAYS
OCCUPATION (Involving advance under fire 24 hours)	Bare soil or low vegetation ⁶ (except sand)	4 DAYS	3 DAYS	32 DAYS	13 DAYS
	High vegetation including jungle and heavy woods	6 DAYS	4 DAYS	50 DAYS	18 DAYS

¹These times are safe-sided for troop safety.

²Leather combat boots treated with protective dubbing or rubber combat boots are worn.

³Effects of blister agent vary significantly with temperature. Mustard freezes in temperatures below 60°F and can present a hazard when the temperature rises.

⁴Protection from V-agent and thickened G-agent varies significantly with layers of clothing worn.

⁵For personnel walking for 2 hours in an area contaminated by blister agents, the limiting factor is the vapor hazard. If only a few minutes are required for traversal of the area, the task can be initiated at earlier times than those given.

⁶Times shown are not applicable to sand, which will hold chemical agents for longer periods of time than those given.

⁷The data refer to approximate times at which personnel could occupy contaminated areas without having to wear protective masks for protection against vapor hazard.

Table I-97. Approximate Duration of Hazard in Contaminated Terrain

WARNING

This table is intended as a guide only.
Chemical agent detectors must be used to determine the extent
of actual contamination and vapor hazards.

Table 5-2. Potential Biological Warfare Agents.

Microorganism	Mode of Transmission	Incubation Period (Days) ²	Mortality Rate (Percent) ²	Vaccine (³)	Treatment (⁴)
Bacteria					
Bacillus Anthracis (Anthrax)	A, D ⁹ , I	1-7	5-1005	+	E ⁶
Francisella Tularensis (Tularemia)	A, D ⁹ , I, V	1-10	<30	++	E
Yersinia Pestis (Plague)	A, V	2-6	25-1007	++	E ⁶
Vibrio Cholerae (Cholera)	I	1-5	15-90	++	E
Corynebacterium Diptheriae (Diptheria)	A, D ⁹	2-5	5-12	++	E
Salmonella Typhi (Typhoid Fever)	I	6-21	7-14	++	E
Rickettsiae					
Rickettsia SPP (Spotted fevers group)	V	6-15	10-40	++	E
Rickettsiae (Endemic or flea-borne typhus)	V	6-14	2-5	N	E
Rickettsia (Rocky Mountain spotted fever)	V	3-10	30 (approx)	N	E
Coxiella Burnetii (Q fever)	A, I	14-21	<1	++	E

¹Transmission can be by aerosol-A, direct contact-D, ingestion-I, and/or vector-V.

²Incubation periods and mortality rates vary according to a number of factors (such as ability of the host to resist infection, infective dose, portal of entry, and virulence of the microorganism).

³ + indicates vaccine available but of questionable value; ++ indicates vaccine available, but mainly used in high risk individuals; +++ indicates vaccine used extensively; N indicates no vaccine available.

⁴ E indicates effective treatment available; N indicates no specific treatment.

⁵ The mortality rate is lower when the agent enters through the skin; higher when it enters through the respiratory tract.

⁶ Treatment must be initiated in the earliest stage of the pulmonary form to be effective.

⁷ The 25 percent represents mortality due to bubonic form; 100 percent represents mortality due to pneumonic form.

⁸ Mosquitoes are thought to be the primary vectors, but this has not been proven.

⁹ Direct contact refers to being bitten by a rabid animal, which is the usual means of transmission, or coming into contact with a rabid animal.

Table 5-2. Potential Biological Warfare Agents (continued).

Microorganism	Mode of Transmission	Incubation Period (Days) ²	Mortality Rate (Percent) ²	Vaccine (³)	Treatment (⁴)
Viruses					
Eastern Equine Encephalitis (EEE)	V ⁸	4-24	60 (Approx)	N	N
Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE)	V ⁸	4-24	<1	+	N
Japanese B Encephalitis	V (Mosquito)	5-15	10-80	+	N
Russian Spring Summer Encephalitis (RSSE)	V (Tick)	7-14	3-40	+	N
Yellow Fever	V (Mosquito)	3-6	5-40	+	N
Dengue Fever	V (Mosquito)	4-10	<1	+	N
Pox Virus					
Varicella Virus (Smallpox)	A, D ⁹	7-16	10-25	+	N
Hantaan Virus (Hemorrhagic Fever with Renal Syndrome)	A, V			+	
Phlebovirus (Rift Valley Fever)	V (Mosquito)	4-6	<1	N	N
Nairovirus (Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever)	V (Tick)	3-7			
Bunyavirus (LA Crosse)	V (Mosquito)				
Phlebovirus (Sandfly)	V (Sand fly)	3-6			

¹ Transmission can be by aerosol-A, direct contact-D, ingestion-I, and/or vector-V.

² Incubation periods and mortality rates vary according to a number of factors (such as ability of the host to resist infection, infective dose, portal of entry, and virulence of the microorganism).

³ + indicates vaccine available but of questionable value; + + indicates vaccine available, but mainly used in high risk individuals; + + + indicates vaccine used extensively; N indicates no vaccine available.

⁴ E indicates effective treatment available; N indicates no specific treatment.

⁵ The mortality rate is lower when the agent enters through the skin; higher when it enters through the respiratory tract.

⁶ Treatment must be initiated in the earliest stage of the pulmonary form to be effective.

⁷ The 25 percent represents mortality due to bubonic form; 100 percent represents mortality due to pneumonic form.

⁸ Mosquitoes are thought to be the primary vectors, but this has not been proven.

⁹ Direct contact refers to being bitten by a rabid animal, which is the usual means of transmission, or coming into contact with a rabid animal.

Table 5-3. Threat Toxins.

Type of Toxin	Means of ID	Symptoms in Man	Effects on Man	Rate of Action	How Normally Disseminated	Protection Required	Decontamination
Mycotoxins	None	Vomiting, eye and skin irritation, dizziness, bloody diarrhea, and blisters.	Can incapacitate or kill, depending on concentration.	Rapid	Dusts, droplets, aerosols, or smokes, or covert means	Protective mask and protective clothing	Soap and water, bleach, M258-series kit, STB and DS2
Enterotoxins	None	Severe vomiting and diarrhea, painful cramps, and weakness	Primarily incapacitates, assuming proper first aid is conducted	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above
Botulinum Toxin	None	Double vision, weakness, difficulty in speech and swallowing, and respiratory paralysis	Kills	Delayed	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above

POTENTIAL MILITARY CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND COMPOUNDS, US Army FM 3-11.9, 2005

Table G-4. Toxicity Estimates for CW Agents

ROE	Liquid (mg/70 kg man)		Inhalation/Ocular (mg-min/m³)			Inhalation (mg/m³) Odor Detection (EC ₅₀)	Ocular (mg-min/m³)		Percutaneous Vapor (mg-min/m³)				
	Lethal (LD ₅₀)	Severe (ED ₅₀)	Lethal (LC ₅₀)	Severe (EC ₅₀)	Mild (EC ₅₀)		Severe (EC ₅₀)	Mild (EC ₅₀)	Leithal (LC ₅₀)		Severe (EC ₅₀)		
									Moderate	Hot	Moderate	Hot	
Choking Agents	Endpoints												
	CG	-	-	1,500 (2-60)	-	-	6 S	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nerve Agents	DP	-	-	1,500P (10-60)	-	-	4 S	-	-	-	-	-	-
	GA	1,500	900	70 (2)	50 (2)	0.4 (2)	-	-	15,000 (30-360)	7,500P (30-360)	12,000 (30-360)	6,000P (30-360)	
	GB	1,700	1,000	35 (2)	25 (2)	0.4 (2)	-	-	12,000 (30-360)	6,000P (30-360)	8,000 (30-360)	4,000P (30-360)	
	GD	350	200	35 (2)	25 (2)	0.2 (2)	-	-	3,000 (30-360)	1,500P (30-360)	2,000 (30-360)	1,000P (30-360)	
	GF	350	200	35 (2)	25 (2)	0.2 (2)	-	-	3,000 (30-360)	1,500P (30-360)	2,000 (30-360)	1,000P (30-360)	
	VX	5	2	15 (2-360)	10 (2-360)	0.1 (2-360)	-	-	150 (30-360)	75P (30-360)	25 (30-360)	12P (30-360)	
	Vx	NR											
Blood Agent	AC	-	-	2860P (2)	NR		34 S	-	-	-	-	-	-
	CK	-	-	NR	NR		12 S	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SA	-	-	7,500P (2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Blister Agents	HD	1400	600	1,000 (2)	-	-	0.6 – 1 S	75 (2-360)	25 (2-360)	10,000 (30-360)	5,000P (30-360)	500 (30-360)	200 (30-360)
	HN-1	1400P	600P	1,000P (2)	-	-	-	75P (2)	25P (2)	10,000P (30)	5,000P (30)	500P (30)	200P (30)
	HN-2	1400P	600P	1,000P (2)	-	-	-	75P (2)	25P (2)	10,000P (30)	5,000P (30)	500P (30-360)	200P (30-360)
	HN-3	1400P	600P	1,000P (2-360)	-	-	-	75P (2-360)	25P (2-360)	10,000P (30-360)	5,000P (30-360)	500P (30-360)	200P (30-360)
	HT	1400P	600P	1,000P (2-360)	-	-	-	75P (2-360)	25P (2-360)	10,000P (30-360)	5,000P (30-360)	500P (30-360)	200P (30-360)
	L	1400P	600P	1,000P (2-360)	-	-	8 S	75P (2-360)	25P (2-360)	5,000 - 10,000P (30-360)	2,500 - 5,000P (30-360)	500P (30-360)	200P (30-360)
	HL	1400P	600P	1,000P (2-360)	-	-	2 S	75P (2-360)	25P (2-360)	10,000P (30-360)	5,000P (30-360)	500P (30-360)	200P (30-360)

COMPARATIVE VOLATILITY OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS

Agent	Volatility (mg/m ³) at 25°C
Hydrogen cyanide (HCN)	1,000,000
Sarin (GB)	22,000
Soman (GD)	3,900
Sulfur mustard	900
Tabun (GA)	610
Cyclosarin (GF)	580
VX	10
VR ("Russian VX")	9

Data source: US Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. *Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, DA, DN, DAF; December 12, 1990. Field Manual 3-9. Naval Facility Command P-467. Air Force Regulation 355-7.

SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS REPORTED BY TOKYO HOSPITAL WORKERS TREATING VICTIMS OF SARIN SUBWAY ATTACKS*

Symptom	Number/percentage of the 15 physicians who treated patients at UH	Number/percentage of 472 care providers reporting symptoms at SLI
Dim vision	11 73%	66 14%
Rhinorrhea	8 53%	No information
Dyspnea (chest tightness)	4 27%	25 5.3%
Cough	2 13%	No information
Headache	No information	52 11%
Throat pain	No information	39 8.3%
Nausea	No information	14 3.0%
Dizziness	No information	12 2.5%
Nose pain	No information	6 1.9%

*Data reflect reported survey of self-reported symptomatology of physicians at the University Hospital of Metropolitan Japan emergency department and all hospital workers at Saint Luke’s International Hospital exposed to sarin vapors from victims of the Tokyo subway attack.
SLI: Saint Luke’s International Hospital
UH: University Hospital
Data sources: (1) Nozaki H, Hori S, Shinozawa Y, et al. Secondary exposure of medical staff to sarin vapor in the emergency room. *Intensive Care Med.* 1995;21:1032-1035. (2) Okumura T, Suzuki K, Fukuda A, et al. The Tokyo subway sarin attack: disaster management, Part 1: community emergency response. *Acad Emerg Med.* 1998;5:613-617. (3) Okumura T, Suzuki K, Fukuda A, et al. The Tokyo subway sarin attack: disaster management, Part 2: Hospital response. *Acad Emerg Med.* 1998;5:618-624.

TABLE 21-3
MANAGEMENT OF MILD TO MODERATE NERVE AGENT EXPOSURES

Nerve Agents	Symptoms	Management			
		Antidotes*		Benzodiazepines (if neurological signs)	
		Age	Dose	Age	Dose
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tabun• Sarin• Cyclosarin• Soman• VX	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Localized sweating• Muscle fasciculations• Nausea• Vomiting• Weakness/floppiness• Dyspnea• Constricted pupils and blurred vision• Rhinorrhea• Excessive tears• Excessive salivation• Chest tightness• Stomach cramps• Tachycardia or bradycardia	Neonates and infants up to 6 months old	Atropine 0.05 mg/kg IM/IV/IO to max 4 mg or 0.25 mg AtroPen† and 2-PAM 15 mg/kg IM or IV slowly to max 2 g/hr	Neonates	Diazepam 0.1–0.3 mg/kg/dose IV to a max dose of 2 mg, or Lorazepam 0.05 mg/kg slow IV
		Young children (6 months old–4 yrs old)	Atropine 0.05 mg/kg IM/IV/IO to max 4 mg or 0.5 mg AtroPen and 2-PAM 25 mg/kg IM or IV slowly to max 2 g/hr	Young children (30 days old–5 yrs old)	Diazepam 0.05–0.3 mg/kg IV to a max of 5 mg/dose or Lorazepam 0.1 mg/kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg
		Older children (4–10 yrs old)	Atropine 0.05 mg/kg IV/IM/IO to max 4 mg or 1 mg AtroPen and 2-PAM 25–50 mg/kg IM or IV slowly to max 2 g/hr	Children (≥ 5 yrs old)	Diazepam 0.05–0.3 mg/kg IV to a max of 10 mg/dose or Lorazepam 0.1 mg/kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg
		Adolescents (≥ 10 yrs old) and adults	Atropine 0.05 mg/kg IV/IM/IO to max 4 mg or 2 mg AtroPen and 2-PAM 25–50 mg/kg IM or IV slowly to max 2 g/hr	Adolescents and adults	Diazepam 5–10 mg up to 30 mg in 8 hr period or Lorazepam 0.07 mg/kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg

2-PAM: 2-pralidoxime
IM: intramuscular
IO: intraosseous
IV: intravenous
PDH: Pediatrics Dosage Handbook

*In general, pralidoxime should be administered as soon as possible, no longer than 36 hours after the termination of exposure. Pralidoxime can be diluted to 300 mg/mL for ease of intramuscular administration. Maintenance infusion of 2-PAM at 10–20 mg/kg/hr (max 2 g/hr) has been described. Repeat atropine as needed every 5–10 minutes until pulmonary resistance improves, secretions resolve, or dyspnea decreases in a conscious patient. Hypoxia must be corrected as soon as possible.

†Meridian Medical Technologies Inc, Bristol, Tenn.

Data sources: (1) Rotenberg JS, Newmark J. Nerve agent attacks on children: diagnosis and management. *Pediatrics*. 2003;112:648–658. (2) Pralidoxime [package insert]. Bristol, Tenn: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2002. (3) AtroPen (atropine autoinjector) [package insert]. Bristol, Tenn: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2004. (4) Henretig FM, Cieslak TJ, Eitzen Jr EM. Medical progress: biological and chemical terrorism. *J Pediatr*. 2002;141(3):311–326. (5) Taketomo CK, Hodding JH, Kraus DM. *American Pharmacists Association: Pediatric Dosage Handbook*. 13th ed. Hudson, Ohio; Lexi-Comp Inc: 2006.

TABLE 21-4
MANAGEMENT OF SEVERE NERVE AGENT EXPOSURE


		Management			
Nerve Agents	Severe Symptoms	Antidotes*		Benzodiazepines (if neurological signs)	
		Age	Dose	Age	Dose
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tabun• Sarin• Cyclosarin• Soman• VX	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Convulsions• Loss of consciousness• Apnea• Flaccid paralysis• Cardio-pulmonary arrest• Strange and confused behavior• Severe difficulty breathing• Involuntary urination and defecation	Neonates and infants up to 6 months old	Atropine 0.1 mg/kg IM/IV/IO or 3 doses of 0.25mg AtroPen [†] (administer in rapid succession) and 2-PAM 25 mg/kg IM or IV slowly, or 1 Mark I [†] kit (atropine and 2-PAM) if no other options exist	Neonates	Diazepam 0.1–0.3 mg/kg/dose IV to a max dose of 2 mg, or Lorazepam 0.05 mg/kg slow IV
		Young children (6 months old–4 yrs old)	Atropine 0.1 mg/kg IV/IM/IO or 3 doses of 0.5mg AtroPen (administer in rapid succession) and 2-PAM 25–50 mg/kg IM or IV slowly, or 1 Mark I kit (atropine and 2-PAM) if no other options exist	Young children (30 days old–5 yrs and adults)	Diazepam 0.05–0.3 mg/kg IV to a max of 5 mg/dose, or Lorazepam 0.1 mg/kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg
		Older children (4–10 yrs old)	Atropine 0.1 mg/kg IV/IM/IO or 3 doses of 1mg AtroPen (administer in rapid succession) and 2-PAM 25–50 mg/kg IM or IV slowly, 1 Mark I kit (atropine and 2-PAM) up to age 7, 2 Mark I kits for ages > 7–10 yrs	Children (≥ 5 yrs old)	Diazepam 0.05–0.3 mg/kg IV to a max of 10 mg/dose, or Lorazepam 0.1 mg/kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg
		Adolescents (≥ 10 yrs old) and adults	Atropine 6 mg IM or 3 doses of 2 mg AtroPen (administer in rapid succession) and 2-PAM 1800 mg IV/IM/IO, or 2 Mark I kits (atropine and 2-PAM) up to age 14, 3 Mark I kits for ages ≥ 14 yrs	Adolescents and adults	Diazepam 5–10 mg up to 30 mg in 8-hr period, or Lorazepam 0.07 mg/kg slow IV not to exceed 4 mg

IM: intramuscular
IO: intraosseous
IV: intravenous


*In general, pralidoxime should be administered as soon as possible, no longer than 36 hours after the termination of exposure. Pralidoxime can be diluted to 300 mg/mL for ease of intramuscular administration. Maintenance infusion of 2-PAM at 10–20 mg/kg/hr (max 2 g/hr) has been described. Repeat atropine as needed every 5–10 min until pulmonary resistance improves, secretions resolve, or dyspnea decreases in a conscious patient. Hypoxia must be corrected as soon as possible. [†]Meridian Medical Technologies Inc, Bristol, Tenn.

Data sources: (1) Rotenberg JS, Newmark J. Nerve agent attacks on children: diagnosis and management. *Pediatrics*. 2003;112:648–658. (2) Pralidoxime [package insert]. Bristol, Tenn: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2002. (3) AtroPen (atropine autoinjector) [package insert]. Bristol, Tenn: Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc; 2004. (4) Henretig FM, Cieslak TJ, Eitzen Jr EM. Medical progress: biological and chemical terrorism. *J Pediatr*. 2002;141(3):311–326. (5) Taketomo CK, Hodding JH, Kraus DM. *American Pharmacists Association: Pediatric Dosage Handbook*. 13th ed. Hudson, Ohio: Lexi-Comp Inc; 2006.


Sarin (GB)




Soman (GD)




Cyclosarin (GF)




Tabun (GA)



VX



Russian VX






Fig. 22-2. Hydrolysis pathway of sarin (GB), soman (GD), and cyclosarin (GF). Hydrolysis pathway of nerve agents proceeds through the alkyl methylphosphonic acids IMPA, PMPA, and CMPA to MPA. Analysis of the alkyl methylphosphonic acids allows identification of the parent agent, while assay of MPA is nonspecific.

CMPPA: cyclohexyl methylphosphonic acid

IMPA: isopropyl methylphosphonic acid

MPA: methylphosphonic acid

PMPPA: pinacolyl methylphosphonic acid